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THREE ESSAYS ON THE RELATIVE OUTCOMES OF 
MINORITY GROUPS IN THE SPANISH LABOUR MARKET 
Introducción 
Esta tesis se compone de tres capítulos  donde se analiza el comportamiento 
de tres grupos de trabajadores, generalmente calificados como grupos minoritarios, 
pertenecientes al mercado laboral en España. Se trata de los inmigrantes, las 
mujeres y los trabajadores con edades próximas a la jubilación.  Nos centramos en 
analizar temas  relacionados con el flujo de rentas que reciben dichos  trabajadores 
así como en sus trayectorias laborales. Para ello, se utilizan diferentes enfoques 
empíricos aplicados a datos procedentes de las únicas fuentes de datos en España 
que proporcionan información concerniente a los ingresos  de los trabajadores: 
Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), en el primer y tercer capítulo, y la 
Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (EES) en el segundo capítulo. 
Los dos primeros capítulos se centran en el análisis de las diferencias 
salariales de dos grupos de trabajadores respecto a los que existe una amplia 
literatura económica: los inmigrantes (frente a los nativos) y las mujeres (frente 
a los hombres). Sin embargo, en ellos se adopta una perspectiva novedosa, 
analizándose elementos hasta ahora inexplorados, al menos, en la literatura 
dedicada a estos temas en el contexto de la economía española. 
En concreto, en el Capítulo 1, titulado "Asimilación salarial de los 
inmigrantes en España, un análisis longitudinal" (conjunto con Mario Izquierdo y 
Aitor Lacuesta, y publicado en Labour Economics, vol 16, 2009) se analiza, el 
proceso de asimilación salarial de los inmigrantes que han llegado a nuestro 
país en los últimos 25 años, utilizando para ello datos de carácter longitudinal 
recientemente disponibles. Estos datos, permiten seguir a los inmigrantes que 
permanecen en España durante un determinado periodo de tiempo desde el 
inicio de su carrera laboral en nuestro país, lo que hace posible comparar sus 
patrones de evolución salarial con los de trabajadores españoles homólogos en 
cuanto a características socio-económicas observables.  
En dicho capítulo, además de realizar la primera cuantificación existente 
en España del ritmo de asimilación salarial de los inmigrantes que han llegado a 
nuestro país durante la última década, se exploran algunos factores explicativos 
de dicho proceso de  asimilación. En concreto, se cuantifica la importancia que 
tiene la movilidad laboral (espacial, sectorial y de empresas) de los inmigrantes 
en sus patrones de evolución salarial, mostrando sus efectos diferenciales por 
nacionalidades.  
En el Capítulo 2, titulado "Remuneración variable  por rendimiento y 
Diferencial Salarial de Género en España"(conjunto con Sara de la Rica y Juan J. 
Dolado), se usa la información detallada referida a los diferentes componentes 
que conforman el salario total de los individuos proporcionados por la Encuesta 
de Estructura Salarial en su ola de 2006. El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar 
qué papel juegan los pagos o remuneraciones variables en función del 
rendimiento del trabajador a la hora de explicar el diferencial salarial de género. 
6 
 
Este componente variable no anticipado es ofertado por cerca del 27% de las 
empresas consideradas en la Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 2006, afectando a 
un  23% de los trabajadores encuestados en dicha fuente de datos salariales. En 
concreto, se cuantifica la posible existencia de diferencias por género en el 
componente de remuneración por rendimiento (RR) y en qué medida estas 
diferencias contribuyen al diferencial total de género existente. Dado que la 
proporción que representa la remuneración por rendimiento sobre el salario 
total es pequeña y el porcentaje de personas que lo reciben también lo es, las 
diferencias en el componente del salario asociado al rendimiento tan sólo 
explican un 7% (en media) del diferencial salarial total para el conjunto de 
trabajadores de la muestra y en torno a un 18% (en media) para el conjunto de 
trabajadores que reciben remuneración por rendimiento.  
En la segunda parte del capítulo se identifican algunas hipótesis útiles 
para explicar la existencia de diferencias de género en este componente del 
salario que, en teoría, debería determinarse de manera más competitiva que 
otros componentes fijados en convenios colectivos (salario base, remuneración 
de horas extraordinarias, etc.).  A la vez, se intenta identificar cuál es, a la vista 
de los datos, la teoría más plausible para explicar diferenciales de género en este 
tipo de retribución salarial :(i) auto-segregación de las mujeres en empleos de 
en los que no se remunera por rendimiento, (ii) menor esfuerzo de las mujeres 
en el trabajo como consecuencia de su mayor implicación en las tareas del 
hogar, lo que se refleja en menor RR para las mujeres, (iii) aspectos de carácter 
monopsonístico que llevan a las empresas que remuneran por rendimiento a 
pagar menor RR a las mujeres que a los hombres de iguales características, 
basándose en la creencia de que las  mujeres tienen una menor movilidad. La 
evidencia ofrecida por la información de la EES 2006 respalda la tercera 
hipótesis. 
En el tercer capítulo, titulado "Evaluando los incentivos para la jubilación 
anticipada en España" (sin coautores), se analiza el impacto de las reglas 
establecidas por la Seguridad Social en materia de pensiones  sobre las 
decisiones de los individuos en las edades próximas a su jubilación. Siguiendo 
la metodología de modelos de duración propuesta por Grubber y Wise (2004), 
se analiza la decisión de jubilación como una decisión dinámica discreta. Para 
ello,  en base a la información contenida en la MCVL, se construyen  las 
variables tradicionales de incentivos utilizadas en la literatura al respecto: 
riqueza de la seguridad social, o flujo descontado de rentas que se recibirán en 
forma de pensión de jubilación desde el momento de retiro hasta el final de la 
vida del individuo (Social Security Wealth, SSW), valor máximo de ese flujo de 
rentas en función del momento de jubilación elegido (Peak Value, PV) y tasa de 
acumulación (Accrual Rate; AR), que mide el incremento en valor descontado 
del flujo de rentas que  recibirá el trabajador por retrasar un año la edad de 
jubilación. En la primera parte del capítulo, se estima un modelo de duración 
con el fin de determinar si bien las características personales, o bien los 
incentivos generados por el sistema de Seguridad Social,  son los elementos que 
guían las decisiones de los individuos en lo referente a su jubilación.  
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En la segunda parte, teniendo en cuenta el resultado de que los 
incentivos generados por el sistema de Seguridad Social juegan un papel 
relevante en las decisiones de los individuos en las edades próximas a su 
jubilación, se plantean diferentes simulaciones relativas a los efectos sobre la 
edad de jubilación de  tres cambios regulatorios alternativos en la legislación en 
materia de pensiones. En concreto, se analizan:  
(i) Una reducción en la cuantía de las pensiones percibidas por los 
individuos a todas las edades, de forma que como máximo se reciba un 96% de 
la base reguladora, implicando  una reducción en la carga financiera de la 
Seguridad Social,  
(ii) Un incremento en el número de años de cotización exigidos para 
tener acceso a la pensión de jubilación contributiva, de 15 a 18 años, así como 
incremento de las bonificaciones si se alcanzan más de 35 años cotizados en el 
momento de la jubilación,  
(iii) Un aumento en las bonificaciones de cada año adicional que el 
individuo permanezca trabajando una vez cumplidos los 65 años de edad. 
 Los tres cambios propuestos dan como resultado un leve incremento en 
la edad de jubilación y, consecuentemente, una reducción en la probabilidad de 
jubilación en cada una de las edades consideradas. 
8 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation consists of three chapters which examine relevant issues 
related to the outcomes of three minority groups (immigrants, women and 
elderly workers) in the Spanish labor market. Throughout the dissertation, 
several features related to wage profiles and individuals' labor careers are 
analyzed from different economic perspectives. To do so, I use the only 
available sources in Spain of wage micro data, namely, the Continuous Sample 
of Working Histories (MCVL), in the first and third chapter, and the Earnings 
Structure Survey (EES) in the second chapter. 
In the first two chapters, I analyze issues related to wage-gaps 
concerning immigrants (relative to natives) and women (relative to men. Both 
issues have been widely addressed in the labor economics literature. However, 
a novel perspective is adopted here to analyze some specific facts that had been 
unexplored to date, at least in the literature devoted to these issues in Spain. 
In particular, in Chapter 1, entitled "Wage Assimilation of immigrants in 
Spain, a longitudinal analysis" (coauthored with Mario Izquierdo and Aitor 
Lacuesta, already published in Labour Economics, vol. 16, 2009) the wage 
assimilation process of immigrants that arrived to Spain  over the past decades 
is analyzed, using  a longitudinal data source recently available, MCVL. These 
data allow us to track those immigrants that have remained for a sufficiently 
long period of time in this country of destination. In this way, the assimilation 
wage patterns of immigrants are compared with those of natives  
Moreover, I explore some potentially relevant factors that underlie the 
assimilation process. Specifically, I focus on the role of immigrants' labor 
mobility (across regions, sector and firms) as well as on their wage evolution, 
showing differential effects by nationality. 
In Chapter 2, entitled "Pay for Performance and Gender Wage Differential in 
Spain" (coauthored with Sara de la Rica and Juan J. Dolado), I make use of 
detailed information about the individual wage components that make up total 
wages, available from the EES 2006. The goal of this chapter is to analyze the 
role played by the pay performance (PP) component of wages on the total 
gender wage gap observed in Spain.  PP is a variable component of the total 
wage, determined by workers´ performance, which is offered by about 27% of 
companies considered in the EES 2006, applying to 23% of workers in that 
survey. Our focus lies on measuring whether there are gender pay differences 
in this variable wage component and to what extent these differences contribute 
to the overall gender gap in Spain. Since the share of PP over total wage and the 
proportion of workers receiving PP are small,  gender differences in this wage 
component only explain  7% (on average) of the overall gender wage gap in the 
sample and around 18% (on average) of the gender wage gap of those workers 
who receive PP. 
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In the second part of the chapter, I test several hypotheses which could 
account for gender differences in PP, considering that, at least  in theory, PP is 
bound to be determined in a more competitive fashion that other non-variable 
pay components (base wage, compensation for overtime work, etc.) : (i) self-
segregation of women into jobs which do not  entail  PP  schemes, (ii) women´ s 
lower effort at marketplace due to greater involvement than men in housework 
and other household responsibilities, and (iii) monopsonistic features that lead 
firms to  pay  women less than  men with the same observable characteristics, 
based on firms ´ beliefs about  women´s lower job mobility. Evidence provides 
higher support to hypothesis (iii) than to (i) and (ii). 
In the third chapter, entitled "Evaluating the incentives to early retirement in 
Spain" (single authored) , I examine the effect of Social Security rules on the 
retirement decisions of individuals whose age is close to legal retirement age. I 
followed the hazard model methodology proposed by Gruber and Wise (2004), 
where the retirement decisions are modeled as a dynamic discrete option, 
building on the information contained in the MCVL. 
  
 Incentive variables that are traditionally used in the literature -such as 
Social Security wealth, (discounted flow of revenues to be received in the form 
of pension from retirement, SSW), Peak Value (that compares this year’s social 
security wealth to the maximum social security wealth that could be attained in 
the future; PV) and Accrual rate (the discounted increase in SSW from 
postponing retirement one year, AR)- are computed to estimate a duration 
model with the aim of determining whether individual characteristics or 
incentives generated by Social Security  retirement rules are the key factors  
guiding retirement decisions in Spain. 
In the second part of the chapter, given that incentives generated by the 
Social Security rules play an important role in explaining individual's 
retirement decisions, I simulate the effects of three alternative policy proposals: 
 
(I)  An overall reduction in the amount of the pension received at all ages that 
caps the pension to 96% of the regulatory base, therefore preventing individuals 
from receiving a pension equivalent to 100% of the regulatory base at any 
retirement age. 
  
(II) An increase in the length of the contributions period required to claim a 
pension (18 instead of 15 years) and an additional increase in the pension 
received at the age of 66, if the worker has accumulated  more than 35 
contributory years over her/his professional career.  
 
(III) Higher retirement benefits for each additional year beyond 65 that an 
individual remains working. 
 
 Under these three alternative scenarios, our basic finding is that there is a slight 
increase in the retirement age and, as a result, a reduction in the probability of 
retirement at each of the considered ages. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we use a panel to analyze the earnings assimilation of 
migrants in Spain. We show that immigrants reduce the wage gap 
relative to natives by 15pp during the first 5-6 years after arrival, but the 
earnings differential does not disappear completely. Earnings 
assimilation is not homogeneous across different nationalities, being 
faster for South-American and European (new accession countries to EU) 
immigrants compared to Africans. Finally, we show that human capital 
gains within the firm as opposed to higher mobility contribute the most 
to their assimilation process. 
JEL codes: J31, J61 
Keywords: Immigration, Assimilation, Longitudinal data, Selection, Human Capital. 
_____________________________ 
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ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN SPAIN: 
A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS * 
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1. Introduction 
Assimilation of immigrants in the host country is a broad concept. Some people 
emphasise the way immigrants adopt particular values and traditions of the 
host country with the underlying idea of keeping a cohesive society. Others are 
interested in how immigrants change their behaviour in terms of fertility or 
consumption as they spend more time abroad. A common feature of all these 
different ideas of behavioural adaptation is the difficulty of obtaining measures 
to analyse in quantitative terms the assimilation pattern of migrants. However, 
a much easier concept to evaluate is earnings differentials over time. It is a fact 
that the majority of immigrants face a wage gap differential relative to 
observationally equivalent natives upon arrival; however, this wage gap is seen 
to decrease over the years following migrants’ arrival. 
The literature on assimilation of wage earnings starts with Chiswick (1978), 
who found an assimilation rate of around 2% per year in the United States. This 
means that an initial wage gap of 30% completely disappears after 15 years’ 
residence. Despite differences in quantitative terms, some degree of earnings 
assimilation has been also observed for many other countries.1 However, the 
robustness of the previous empirical result was criticised because of the use of a 
single cross-section. In a single cross-section, migrants with different labour 
market experiences in the country of destination belonged to different entry 
cohorts. If there were a decrease in the quality of migrants that entered the 
country over time, as occurred in the United States (Borjas, 1999), the wage 
growth estimated would be an upward biased measure of the actual growth. 
This problem was traditionally solved by using repeated cross-sections and 
following the experiences of different individuals belonging to the same entry 
cohort (LaLonde and Topel, 1992). Despite solving the previous shortcoming, 
the use of synthetic cohorts was not free of problems if there was selective 
emigration. That is the reason why nowadays most of the studies on 
assimilation are using longitudinal data (Hu, 2000; Lubotsky, 2007; Constant 
and Massey (2002); or Edin et al., 2000). Longitudinal data track the wage 
growth of individuals who belonged to a particular entry cohort and stayed for 
a certain number of years in the country. In a sense, with longitudinal data one 
empirically estimates the assimilation profile of foreigners who stayed in the 
country for a certain period of time.2 Once this type of information was 
considered, the assimilation rate slightly decreased in the United States 
(Lubotsky, 2007) and Sweden (Edin et al., 2000) to 1.5pp per year. Indeed, in 
Sweden there is no perfect convergence between migrants and natives. On the 
other hand, Constant and Massey (2002) did not find any change in their 
conclusions regarding what they found using a single cross-section for the case 
of “guest workers” in Germany. 
                                                                                 
1 Adsera and Chiswick (2007) present evidence for most European countries. Evidence from Canada and 
Australia is found in Antecol et al. (2006), from Norway in Longva and Raaum (2001), from the 
Netherlands in Hartog and Winkelmann (2003), from Sweden in Bevelander and Nielsen (2000), and from 
the UK in Wheatly Price (1999). 
 
2 Notice that this is not an estimation of the assimilation profile of all foreigners who entered in a 
particular year. 
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We contribute to this literature by analysing the case of immigrant’s 
assimilation in Spain. Notice that immigration in Spain has become a matter of 
huge relevance in recent years. The robust annual inflow of immigrants, on 
average more than 500,000 since 2000, pushed up the percentage of immigrants 
in the Spanish population from 2% in 2000 to 11% 6 years later. Moreover, 
Spain's case is interesting because it has particularly rigid labour market 
institutions compared to the US, Sweden or Germany. 3 
Analysis of the assimilation process of immigrants in Spain has been limited 
due to the lack of appropriate data for earnings. Most of the research was 
devoted to employment rates and the characteristics of the job held by migrants 
since their arrival. In particular, Amuedo Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) used 
the labour force survey to find that immigrants were increasing their 
employability very rapidly. If upon arrival they had a very high unemployment 
rate relative to natives, after 5 years this difference had practically disappeared. 
They also observe differences in the assimilation pattern by nationality. Indeed, 
South-Americans and immigrants from the EU Enlargement perform much 
better in terms of assimilation. Fernández and Ortega (2008) confirmed the 
results found in the foregoing paper using repeated cross-sections from the 
Labour Force Survey. However, they also found that immigrants did not 
improve their situation in terms of labour conditions (incidence of fixed-term 
contracts or over-education) relative to natives. 
The recent availability of databases with information on immigrant’s wages in 
Spain has enabled estimates of the wage differential between immigrants and 
natives to be made. Using the SES-2002, Simón et al. (2008) showed that the 
wage differential is about 30%. Using the NIS, Sanromá et al. (2008) analysed 
the difference in returns to human capital acquired abroad and in Spain. Their 
results tend to find that returns to human capital from abroad are very low. 
Indeed, this result is capital in the literature of assimilation. The fact that the 
portability of skills is low across countries explains why immigrants on arrival 
face an artificial depreciation of their human capital stock. In that case, a typical 
human capital model (Ben Porath, 1967) would predict a large incentive to 
invest in human capital upon arrival, which will consequently generate a 
steeper wage earnings profile over the migrants’ life cycle compared with 
otherwise identical native workers. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is 
the first to conduct an analysis of the assimilation process of immigrants in 
Spain using a longitudinal dataset. As in other studies, we will distinguish 
between migrants of different nationalities.  
On top of reporting some findings for the assimilation pattern of Spanish 
immigrants, the richness of the data will help us to explore whether the higher 
wage growth of immigrants occurs within the initial firm or whether it is due to 
changes of firm and province. Immigrants are usually found in more 
prosperous cities and growing sectors (Amuedo Dorantes and de la Rica, 2005; 
Banco de España, 2007) give some evidence in this regard for Spain. This is 
                                                                                 
3 According to Antecol et al. (2006), a labour market with high EPL and with institutions that encourage 
real wage rigidities might produce a more rapid assimilation pattern for migrants in terms of 
unemployment than in terms of wages.  
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usually attributed to the fact that they are more mobile than natives, which 
enables them to take all possible opportunities in terms of earnings across firms 
and regions. Indeed, in a regulated labour market such as Spain’s, there are 
many institutions that can contribute to non-market clearing wage differentials 
across regions or sectors (Izquierdo and Lacuesta, 2005). Therefore, the initial 
wage gap between migrants and non-migrants might disappear insofar as 
migrants reallocate themselves into jobs that offer better economic 
opportunities. If this were the case, assimilation would be explained outside a 
human capital framework, providing a completely different set of policy 
implications.  
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2 Data 
Since 2004 a new source of information about the Spanish labour market is 
available for researchers: Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH 
“Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”, in Spanish4). This database provides a 
unique dataset with very rich information about labour market histories coming 
from Social Security Administrative records. It contains a representative sample 
of those individuals who have had an affiliation in the Social Security during 
the reference year. In this paper we use the information from the sample 2005B 
which contains information about 1.142.118 individuals (92% of those are 
natives), what amounts a 4% of the total population who had an affiliation in 
the Social Security during 2005. 
The information contained in the CSWH allows to make a complete 
characterization of each individual in the sample, since it reports personal 
characteristics -such as nationality, date and country of birth (province if 
Spanish), gender, place of residence at the first time the individual entered into 
the social security system - some additional information about the composition 
of her household and, finally, labour market variables. Moreover, and this is the 
main distinctive feature of the CSWH, this information about the labour market 
career is available for the whole labour market career of the worker since her 
first entry in the Social Security records, including unemployment episodes. 
Concerning employment periods, it gives information related to the type of 
contract, seniority in the firm, sector of activity, type of working day -part time 
vs. full time-, and wages (although monthly capped). Concerning 
unemployment, it gives information about the amount of benefits received, the 
length of the unemployment period receiving and not receiving benefits, and 
the type of unemployment benefits received. CSWH also contain relevant 
information about sick leaves and other contributed benefits received by 
individuals (retirement, disability, widows and orphans benefits). 
When using the longitudinal aspect of the dataset, it is certainly important to 
note that the CSWH has been designed to be representative of the labour 
market in the current year. That is, the sample of workers in 2005 is a random 
sample of workers affiliated to the Social Security in 2005. However, for 
previous years if the exit of the labour market is not random, the sample loses 
representativeness, as we only have information of workers staying in the 
labour market in 2005. This is, of course, more relevant as we move far enough 
to the past and, for instance, for women entering and exiting from the labour 
market.  
                                                                                 
4 Social Security Records is complemented with information from fiscal registers and the Municipal 
register of Inhabitants. A more detailed description about CSWH could be found in Durán (2007). In a 
recent article, García Perez (2007), the pros and cons of this dataset are described, particularly emphasizing 
its comparative advantages for analysing job mobility. 
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Ramos Muñoz (2007) showed that the CSWH is a good representation of the 
Spanish labour market. He compared aggregate results from this database with 
those coming from Labour Force Survey (LFS) and found very similar labour 
market composition across different variables in the current year. Main 
differences, although quite small, were found for youth, females and foreigners 
which can be related to employment relationships in the informal sector not 
registered in the Social Security records. That is the reason why our results only 
apply to the assimilation of legal immigrants into the Spanish labour market. 
With respect to the sample selection we perform for our analysis, we restrict the 
original sample to males between 25 and 54 years old in order to avoid, as 
previously mentioned, the sample selection bias that is present in CSWH for 
collectives with lower participation rates. Since there is no earnings information 
before 1979 we keep individuals who start their labour career after that date. 
Moreover, we keep track of earnings only in the case of being employed in the 
Social Security General Scheme. That is, we cannot take into account earnings 
obtained as self-employed since in this case, the information available about 
contributions bases may not be closely associated to wages. We also drop 
unemployment insurance earnings because we want to be as close to the actual 
productivity of the worker.  
In order to compute the days worked during a month or a year we consider all 
contracts in a particular month/year for each individual. Only full-time jobs are 
considered since information on part-time jobs does no allow computing hours 
worked.5 A migrant is a person who has no Spanish nationality and we restrict 
the sample of migrants to be not members of the EU-15 since immigration from 
those countries has been traditionally very different to the immigration coming 
from the rest of the world (with a high share of retirees). Ideally we would have 
liked to do the project with the place of birth as a better approximation to the 
origin of migrants. The reason is that nationalization processes do not affect the 
country of birth. However, information about the place of birth is of poor 
quality, in terms of a high percentage of missing values6 and the impact of 
nationalization processes in our results should be very small7. 
As for the definition of the main variables, we perform the analysis using two 
different measures of daily wages. Firstly, daily wages are computed as the 
                                                                                 
5 In that sense, assimilation of earnings might come from working more hours instead of earning more per 
hour. There is some evidence that temporary migrants earn less per unit of time but working more hours 
(Dustmann and Schmidt, 2001). This could be a problem with the interpretation of cross section or 
synthetic cohort analysis but it is a less important problem for longitudinal data because we are only 
considering stayers. Nevertheless, it could be a problem if some stayers did plan to do a temporary 
migration at arrival. 
 
6 In particular, country of birth is missing for 36% of foreign born individuals. As we will document later, 
using this limited information instead of citizenship do not affect the aggregate results. 
 
7 These processes take, usually, a long period of time due to a quite complicated procedure. In principle 
someone needs 10 years of residence to apply for Spanish citizenship. In the case of South-Americans one 
could apply pretty rapidly, usually 2 years, but process of naturalization takes many more years. Thus, our 
results could only be affected by nationalizations in case of old entry cohorts in Spain and, as we will 
document later, assimilation process is estimated to be quite similar across different entry cohorts. 
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ratio between monthly earnings and the days worked in a particular month. 
However, since migrants are expected to rotate between employment and 
unemployment much more than natives, we might be capturing a self selected 
sample of immigrants (only those who are employed in a particular month). In 
order to solve this problem we check the robustness of the findings to a 
different computation of daily earnings: the ratio between the sum of the 
current year earnings and the days worked during the year. Both measures will 
lead to very similar results.  
Experience in the Spanish labour market is computed sequentially from the 
moment the worker enters the sample regardless whether he worked in all 
years. Therefore, experience should be considered as years after the first entry 
in the labour market8. Many migrants entered Spain with some experience from 
abroad. However, we do not have information on that issue. In order to have 
information on experience abroad we estimate potential experience abroad by 
removing from the age of entry in Spain, the potential age of entry in the labour 
market in the origin country. Potential age of entry in the labour market in the 
origin country is 16 if the person has lower education than a university degree 
and 22 if the person received a university degree. On the other hand, the age of 
entry in Spain is the age of the person at the moment of the first contribution in 
the social security. 
One evident problem with this estimation of potential experience is that our 
measure of education comes from Administrative registers in municipalities 
(“Padrón” in Spanish) and as it was commented above it does not appropriately 
depict actual education, and is not available for every one9. Many people 
present a lower education in the Padrón compared to their real level. This is the 
case because the administrative data is not updated unless someone changes 
residence into a different municipality. This problem should be smaller for 
immigrants since most of them arrive in Spain to work.10  
An additional problem is that the age of entry into Spain does not necessarily 
depict the real age of entry, since many migrants, as it will be shown later, enter 
illegally into the country or work in the informal sector even being legal. 
Lubotsky (2007), who have alternative measures for the age of entry, showed 
that different measures affect slightly the quantitative results without affecting 
them qualitatively. Since we do not have alternative measures we need to stick 
to the abovementioned concept of year of entry. On this regard, the existence of 
several regularization processes in Spain is problematic. For an illegal migrant 
that is legalized, years since migration is an upward biased measure of the real 
years spent in Spain and the number of years abroad is a downward measure of 
the experience in the home country. OECD (2007) described all the processes of 
                                                                                 
8 Since the study is restricted to males between 25 and 54 years old we do not think that exit and re-entry 
or long unemployment is an important issue. 
 
9 We consider as low educated those who do not report education. 
 
10 Even in that case, people might decide not to update the information, since could be inconvenient. For 
instance, being elected as a member of a public jury or of a polling station depends on the educational 
attainment. 
 
17 
 
regularization in the recent past11. In order to analyze whether our results are 
affected by those regularizations, we repeat all the analysis dropping from our 
sample all individuals who report to have had their first labour experience in 
those particular years. 
                                                                                 
11 In 1985-86 there were 38181 legalized, in 1991 (110100), in 1996 (21300), in 2000 (163900), in 2001 (216400) 
and in 2005 (548700). The appendix provides some additional information regarding these processes. 
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3 Empirical strategy 
Spaniards enter into the labour force with some specific skills, depending on 
their gender, education and birth cohort.12 From that moment on, the wage is 
increased year by year by a function k
nδ   due to a process of on the job learning. 
The individual wage is finally determined by a macroeconomic shock tµ  and an 
idiosyncratic shock itε : 
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On the other hand, immigrants arrive to Spain with certain labour market 
experience in addition to their initial particular skills. The experience acquired 
abroad has certain value in the Spanish labour market say
k
Iλ . Following 
Sanromá et al. (2008), we would expect some depreciation of the skills that 
migrants bring to the host country therefore we would expect n
kk
I < δλ . And once 
in the country, immigrants start to increase their human capital at a rate  k
Iδ  
depending on their investment in human capital. Given that the individual 
enters at the age of ta, the wage is given by: 
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Let’s define an indicator of migrant status I. Pooling (1) and (2) we have a 
model of earnings for the pool of workers in this economy: 
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Earnings assimilation is the process by which an immigrant with the same 
labour market experience than a native has a higher wage growth. Therefore: 
0>− sNsI δδ  
19 
 
Eventually, this higher growth wage could lead to an equal wage level for 
migrants and natives. The assimilation pattern of the previous equation could 
be estimated once we define a set of variables for experience in the host labour 
market, years since migration and years abroad. 
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 The literature posed some problems associated to the estimation of Eq. (4) 
using a single cross-section. In a cross-section, migrants with different years of 
labour market experience have entered Spain at different points in time. 
Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the wage growth associated with 
labour market experience from changes in the entry cohort quality (changes in 
lnWN0). Provided that there was a decrease in the quality of migrants that enter 
the country over time, as it happened in the United States (Borjas, 1999), the 
wage growth over the life cycle in the cross section is an upward biased 
measure of the actual average wage growth. This problem has been 
traditionally solved by using several cross-sections allowing us to follow the 
history of different individuals belonging to the same entry cohort. 
Even in the case that the quality of migrants was the same over year of entry, 
we might face an additional estimation problem derived from selective 
emigration. Let’s assume that migrants who decide to go back home after a 
while are those who perform the worse. In that case the actual wage growth 
would also be over-estimated in the cross section because those who present 
higher levels of experience are the best migrants of their cohort of entry. This 
shortcoming cannot be solved by using repeated cross sections. However, using 
longitudinal data, we observe information on wages in a retrospective way for 
every individual who enter in a particular year and have stayed in the country 
until 2005. This fact allows overcoming both problems. Notice that longitudinal 
data only identifies the assimilation profile of stayers. Finally, in order to 
incorporate time effects we include the NAIRU (HP filter on the original 
unemployment).13   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
12 Including birth cohort is important given the notable measurement error in the variable educational 
attainment. 
13 Notice that we could not include experience, birth cohort and time effects at the same time. In that case 
we restrict macro shocks to be identical to the NAIRU. We chose the NAIRU since it is a sensible variable 
that might affect the power of unions in a bargaining setting and in principle, since we are talking about 
legal migrants, unions should affect the same way to natives and immigrants. Restricting time effects to 
certain macroeconomic variables has been widely used in the literature; see Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) 
for an example. 
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4 Empirical results for assimilation 
Let’s start by analysing the assimilation of all migrants coming from non-EU-15 
countries. In order to have a visual description of the assimilation process in 
Spain, Table 1 shows raw wage differentials between migrants coming from 
non-EU15 countries and Spaniards as a function of the time spent in Spain by 
migrants. As a control group we choose a generation of Spaniards with a 
relatively long labour market career and a comparable number of years of 
potential experience.14 The wages shown in the table are median wages. The 
first three columns show that initially immigrants face a wage penalty of 45%. 
However, over time this penalty decreases to around 20%.  
Table 1: Wage differentials of immigrants by years since migration 
 
 Spaniards Non EU-15 
  1979-1982 1979-1982 1991-1995 2001-2005 
  Euros/day Euros/day Differential Differential Differential 
t=0 42.07 23.26 -44.69% -30.06% -20.53% 
t=1 43.60 26.12 -40.09% -28.87% -19.93% 
t=2 44.51 28.14 -36.78% -30.23% -18.48% 
t=3 44.97 27.52 -38.79% -29.78% -17.84% 
t=4 45.06 27.89 -38.10% -28.33% -15.81% 
t=5 45.86 32.51 -29.11% -26.90%  
t=6 46.61 33.74 -27.60%   
t=7 47.50 33.64 -29.18%   
t=8 48.51 38.22 -21.21%   
t=9 49.41 39.46 -20.13%   
t=10 49.94 40.94 -18.02%     
Source: CSWH 2005. 
Note: Spaniards are constrained to the generation that entered the Social Security in 
1979-1982 and t=0 corresponds to the wage after 12 years of labour market experience (27 
years of age potentially). Each column of immigrants corresponds to a different year of 
entry in the social security and t=0 corresponds to the wage the first year in Spain. 
 
This reduction of the wage differentials is also observed for other more recent 
entry cohorts of migrants. Notice that over time, the initial wage differential has 
decreased. This means that immigrants have experienced a quality upgrading 
over time.15 As a consequence, the assimilation profile in the single cross section 
should be downward biased because of the increase in quality by migrant 
                                                                                 
14 Since migrants entered in Spain between the age of 25 and 30, we estimate that they enter with a 
potential experience around 12 years, Therefore a comparable t=0 for a Spanish worker is an individual 
with 12 years of experience. In order to have long enough labour careers for Spaniards with 12 years of 
experience in table 1, the control group was chosen to have entered the Social Security between 1979 and 
1982.  
 
15 The quality upgrading of more recent cohorts of Spaniards has not been as important as the immigrant 
upgrading. This is clear when plotting the life cycle profile of different cohorts of entry into the Social 
Security for Spaniards. Ideally we would have liked to use that information in constructing table 1 but we 
do not have long enough careers of Spaniards who entered in the 90’s onwards.  
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cohort. Below, we will relate this increase in quality with the composition of the 
immigration cohorts and we will analyse how immigrants with different 
countries of origin follow different assimilation patterns. 
In order to properly check whether there is assimilation on earnings we need to 
carefully estimate Eq. (4). Since the observed value of earnings is top-coded and 
the censored part is around 20% in the whole sampling period we will use 
median regressions for the dependent variable, being    
itWln     the salary cap: 
( )ititit WWW ln,lnminln * =  
As in Lubotsky (2007) we use Powell (1984) semi-parametric censored least 
absolute deviation. We compute the standard deviation with a sandwich 
estimator (Koenker and Basset, 1978). In Table 2 we show the results for the 
regression pooling natives and immigrants coming from countries outside the 
EU-15. In the first three columns of that table the analysis is done with daily 
wages measured as the ratio between monthly earnings and the days worked in 
a particular month. The following three columns show the same results using 
annual wages and the days worked in a particular year. The first column of 
each block shows the wage model estimated using only the information in 2005, 
as it would be in a cross section. The coefficients in front of the dummies “years 
since migration” express the way the wage gap decreases over time in Spain. The 
results do show some assimilation over the time of residence (the first 8 years of 
experience in Spain reduced the wage differential by 17%). On the contrary, 
after that date, assimilation decreases notably. 
The second column of each block shows the results using the panel and adding 
the cohort of entry for migrants. Indeed, the importance of introducing this 
variable is clear since in both cases there has been an upgrading of quality from 
1996 onwards. Once we control for this fact, the results regarding assimilation 
change notably respect to what was observed in the cross section especially for 
very long spells. The coefficient in front of the dummy regarding the first 2 
years of experience in Spain indicates that the initial wage gap decreases 8 pp 
after the first 2 years. The following 2 years the wage gap decreases 4 pp 
additionally (reducing the wage gap in 12pp). Finally, those who have stayed in 
Spain for longer than 8 years present a reduction in the initial wage gap of 20 
pp. From that moment on, it does not appear to be further reductions, as can be 
seen in Fig. 1 where we show the evolution of wage differential for recent 
migrants with respect to a typical native. We have carried-out the same type of 
estimation for different cohorts of entry in order to test whether the assimilation 
process has varied over time. However, we find a qualitatively similar 
assimilation pattern across entry cohorts. These results increase our confidence 
in our choice of nationality to define a migrant since, if any, the impact of 
nationalizations should arise in older cohorts.16 
                                                                                 
16 In addition, we have checked the robustness of our results to the definition of a migrant by country of 
birth instead of nationality. Despite the number of observations is lower in this case, main results reported 
in Table 2 remain. In particular, using the same specification as in column 2 of Table 2, assimilation profile 
is estimated to reduce wage gap between immigrants and natives by 9.4 pp in the first 2 years in the 
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Fig 1. Wage differential between migrants (exp abroad<5 and arrival 1996-2000) 
and natives (born 1964-1975). 
 
 
The third column of each block presents the same type of regression excluding 
those years when regularization processes have taken place since we know that 
for those years experience in Spain is not well captured by the labour 
experience by the moment of first register in the Social Security. For other 
periods both concepts should be closely associated. Results in terms of 
assimilation are similar to those in column 2 and 4. Notice however, that 
experience abroad, as expected, is less valued in Spain than in the previous 
estimations. This is evidence in favour of the notable measurement error of the 
variable experience abroad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Spanish labor market (8.6 pp in Table 2) or 14.3 pp after 4 years in Spain (12.7 pp in Table 2). Only for long 
working careers in Spain, the use of country of origin introduces a relevant change in our results 
estimating a higher assimilation profile, for instance, wage gap reduces by 26.5 pp after 12 years while it is 
estimated at 19.3 pp in Table 2. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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Table 2. Wage equation estimations at percentile 50.  
 
 
Monthly contribution over total days 
worked in a given month   
Annual contribution over total days 
worked in a given year 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables  Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients   Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
  Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err   Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err 
                
Total experience 0.107 0.100 0.101   0.084 0.102 0.103 
  0.003 0.001 0.000   0.004 0.001 0.001 
Total experience2 (/10) -0.106 -0.095 -0.096   -0.074 -0.091 -0.092 
  0.005 0.002 0.000   0.005 0.002 0.002 
Total experience3 (/100) 0.047 0.046 0.047   0.030 0.043 0.043 
  0.003 0.001 0.000   0.003 0.001 0.001 
Total experience4 (/1000) -0.007 -0.008 -0.008   -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 
  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.001 0.000 0.000 
Illiterate -0.711 -0.764 -0.767   -0.716 -0.752 -0.757 
  0.003 0.001 0.000   0.003 0.001 0.001 
Primary education -0.645 -0.689 -0.690   -0.650 -0.678 -0.681 
  0.003 0.001 0.000   0.003 0.001 0.001 
Secondary education -0.331 -0.338 -0.336   -0.355 -0.353 -0.352 
  0.003 0.001 0.000   0.003 0.001 0.001 
Birth Cohort <=1934   -0.014 -0.014     -0.081 -0.079 
    0.013 0.000     0.012 0.011 
Birth Cohort 1935-1944   0.032 0.032     -0.042 -0.041 
    0.004 0.000     0.004 0.003 
Birth Cohort 1945-1954 0.120 0.084 0.083   0.108 0.023 0.022 
  0.008 0.002 0.000   0.009 0.002 0.002 
Birth Cohort 1955-1964 0.123 0.041 0.040   0.113 -0.004 -0.006 
  0.003 0.001 0.000   0.003 0.001 0.001 
Birth Cohort 1965-1974 0.052 -0.006 -0.007   0.042 -0.024 -0.024 
  0.002 0.001 0.000   0.002 0.001 0.001 
NAIRU   -0.021 -0.021     -0.025 -0.025 
    0.000 0.000     0.000 0.000 
Non EU-15 -0.305 -0.395 -0.349   -0.282 -0.406 -0.529 
  0.022 0.019 0.000   0.023 0.018 0.039 
Years since migration, 1-2 0.047 0.086 0.103   0.020 0.058 0.073 
  0.010 0.005 0.000   0.011 0.005 0.008 
Years since migration, 3-4 0.121 0.127 0.142   0.109 0.104 0.123 
  0.008 0.006 0.000   0.009 0.006 0.009 
Years since migration, 5-6 0.167 0.143 0.161   0.141 0.115 0.143 
  0.011 0.009 0.000   0.012 0.009 0.012 
Years since migration, 7-8 0.179 0.169 0.178   0.146 0.154 0.164 
  0.021 0.012 0.000   0.021 0.012 0.014 
Years since migration, 9-10 0.145 0.192 0.206   0.122 0.197 0.216 
  0.027 0.015 0.000   0.028 0.015 0.018 
Years since migration, 10-12 0.091 0.193 0.207   0.058 0.182 0.194 
  0.051 0.018 0.000   0.052 0.017 0.020 
More than 13 years since 
migration  0.148 0.201 0.204   0.112 0.183 0.212 
  0.024 0.022 0.000   0.024 0.021 0.025 
Experience abroad, from 5 to 9 
years 0.077 0.093 0.057   0.078 0.093 0.067 
  0.022 0.013 0.000   0.023 0.013 0.016 
Experience abroad, from 10 to 14 
years 0.075 0.063 0.025   0.072 0.055 0.025 
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  0.022 0.013 0.000   0.022 0.013 0.016 
Experience abroad, from 15 to 19 
years 0.048 0.009 -0.020   0.041 -0.008 -0.021 
  0.022 0.014 0.000   0.023 0.013 0.016 
More than 25 years of 
Experience abroad 0.040 0.004 -0.023   0.036 -0.041 -0.055 
  0.024 0.015 0.000   0.025 0.014 0.018 
Arrival 1983-1985   -0.100 -0.139     -0.220 -0.085 
    0.040 0.000     0.038 0.053 
Arrival 1986-1990   -0.012 -0.041     -0.045 0.095 
    0.022 0.000     0.020 0.039 
Arrival 1991-1995   -0.002 -0.048     -0.025 0.087 
    0.013 0.000     0.013 0.035 
Arrival 1996-2000   0.080 0.046     0.106 0.227 
    0.013 0.000     0.012 0.036 
Arrival 2001-2005   0.058 0.019     0.090 0.208 
    0.013 0.000     0.012 0.036 
Constant 8.526 8.763 8.760   8.569 8.758 8.755 
  0.009 0.004 0.000   0.010 0.004 0.004 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14   0.126 0.122 0.123 
Dependent variable: logarithm of daily wages 
(1) and (4). CSWH- 2005: Cross- Section 2005 
(2) and (5). CSWH- 2005: Longitudinal 1980-2005 
(3) and (6).  CSWH- 2005: Longitudinal 1980-2005 without including those migrants whose arrival was during a 
period of Special Immigrant Legalization 
 
.  
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5 The importance of the country of origin  
Underlying the increase in the relative initial wage of recent immigrants there is 
a change in the immigrants’ country of origin. This change could be attributed 
to a different composition in both entries and exits of immigrants over time. In 
our dataset we only observe the nationality of the stock of stayers (see Table 3). 
In the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s, the weight of immigrants coming from 
Africa attained a percentage around 50%. However, over time, the weight of 
migrants coming from South-America and from countries of the latter 
European Enlargement has increased notably17. Notice that, both South-
Americans and immigrants coming from the European Enlargement have some 
characteristics that make them more likely to have productivity above the 
average of immigrants from outside the EU-15, say the same language and a 
higher level of education respectively. As a consequence, they present a lower 
initial wage differential. This would lead to the observed result of quality 
upgrading over time.  
Table 3: Stock of foreign workers in 2005 by year of entry in the Social Security 
and nationality 
 
 Africa Enlargement 
South 
America 
Other 
1983-1985 40.51% - 15.68% 43.81% 
1986-1990 48.81% 3.79% 13.97% 33.43% 
1991-1995 71.50% 5.85% 7.98% 14.67% 
1996-2000 59.70% 9.41% 18.45% 12.44% 
2001-2005 31.98% 20.48% 39.27% 8.27% 
Source: CSWH 2005     
 
Using alternative datasets we could confirm that both entries and exits 
contribute to the variation of the stock of stayers over time. The Survey on 
Residential Variation is a dataset that incorporates all entries in Spain18. The 
official numbers of entries from the rest of the world are broken by nationality 
in Table 4.  
It is evident that, in the beginning of the 90’s the percentage of immigrants 
coming from African countries increased, while South-Americans decreased. In 
the second half of the 90’s, South-Americans and foreigners coming from 
countries of the European Enlargement started increasing its importance. From 
the 2000 onwards the latter group took over. This image on the evolution of 
entries resembles the variations on the stock that were observed in Table 3.  
                                                                                 
17 The 2005 figure is biased due to the regularization process that legalized 600.000 individuals (mostly 
Ecuadorians and Romanians). 
 
18 We do not have microdata from years previous to 1988. 
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Table 4: Inflows of foreigners by year of registration (padrón) and nationality 
 
  
Africa Enlargement 
South 
America 
Other 
     
1986-1990 23.69% 6.67% 55.77% 13.87% 
1991-1995 38.89% 5.51% 43.48% 12.12% 
1996-2000 33.76% 9.51% 49.21% 7.52% 
2001-2005 19.00% 24.68% 51.57% 4.75% 
Source: Residential Variation Survey   
Average of yearly percentages over the period  
 
How selective emigration affect the initial wage differential is a more difficult 
issue to analyse since there are not credible registers of exits in Spain. However, 
we could rely on different studies that positively relate exits from Spain to the 
GDP per capita of the country of origin. Lacuesta and Puente (2009) used data 
on a renewal process of the municipal registers in 2005 to determine that 
immigrants were more likely to come back to countries with higher GDP per 
capita regardless the cyclical situation in the host country and at home. This 
result is also confirmed by other international studies.19 In that sense, they show 
that immigrants coming from the enlargement and other richer countries 
presented a higher emigration rate than Africans and South Americans. This 
positive selective emigration in terms of country of origin could also contribute 
to the quality upgrading observed in the data.  
Once we have seen the importance of the composition of immigrants by 
nationality, we might wonder whether assimilation is different depending on 
the country of origin. Assimilation profile could, in principle, be quite different 
across migrants with different characteristics. Thus, in Table 5, we show 
regression results similar to those in Table 2 but allowing for a different 
coefficient in the assimilation dummies for different nationality groups. We will 
specifically focus on Africans, Europeans from the new accession countries to 
the EU and South-Americans.  
These results show a quite similar assimilation pattern in the initial years in 
Spain, that is, wage differential reduces by around 5 pp. in the first 2 years and 
around 10 pp. in the first 6 years. European and South-American migrants 
appear to perform relatively better than Africans, although differences are not 
high. For long periods in Spain, however, results tend to show more differences 
across nationalities with a lower assimilation profile for Africans migrants. 
These results could be indicating the impact of some characteristics as the 
common languages for South-Americans and the higher educational attainment 
for Europeans in the assimilation process. This result is not surprising given 
that a lower assimilation profile in unemployment rates for immigrants coming 
from African countries was also found by Amuedo Dorantes and de la Rica 
(2007). 
                                                                                 
19 Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) in US, Dustman (2007) in UK, Bratsberg et al. in Norway (2007) and Edin 
(2000) for Sweden. 
27 
 
Table 5: Assimilation profile by nationality and years since migration 
 
  Africa Enlargement  South America Others 
 Independent variables Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
 Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err 
          
Years since migration, 1-2 0.047 0.049 0.056 0.090 
  0.010 0.047 0.008 0.017 
Years since migration, 3-4 0.074 0.034 0.119 0.172 
  0.011 0.049 0.009 0.018 
Years since migration, 5-6 0.081 0.088 0.100 0.227 
  0.013 0.060 0.017 0.024 
Years since migration, 7-8 0.094 0.187 0.095 0.282 
  0.015 0.070 0.030 0.029 
Years since migration, 9-10 0.133 0.206 0.167 0.312 
  0.018 0.077 0.040 0.035 
Years since migration, 11-12 0.125 0.171 0.248 0.411 
  0.021 0.084 0.051 0.041 
More than 13 years since 
migration 0.113 0.147 0.334 0.417 
  0.025 0.105 0.054 0.044 
 
Source: CSWH- 2005: Longitudinal 1980-2005 
The regression is the same as in Table 2 with interactions of the immigration variables by 
nationality 
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6 Mechanisms underlying assimilation 
In the previous sections we have shown that the wage gap between immigrants 
and natives reduces with the time spent in Spain at a relatively faster pace 
while this pattern appears to be somewhat different depending on the 
immigrant’s nationality. Most of the literature related to assimilation of 
earnings has assumed that behind the reduction of wage differentials there is a 
conventional human capital accumulation story. As time goes on, immigrants 
adapt their knowledge and qualifications to the host country and acquire new 
skills and abilities that make them more prone to benefit from their previous 
skills. However, additional mechanisms could also play a relevant role in the 
assimilation process. For instance, labour mobility in most Mediterranean 
countries is quite reduced given that natives are reluctant to move across 
regions despite the big existing disparities of earnings.20 Of course immigrants, 
who have a lower social attachment to particular regions, are much more prone 
to benefit from those differences (Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2005; Banco 
de España, 2007). Moreover, the lower mobility of natives is not limited to 
regional movements but it is also evident in changes of firms. A higher 
incidence of permanent contracts with high dismissal costs across the native 
population makes them less likely to be willing to change a particular job and 
benefit from potential better productivity matches. Therefore differences in the 
degree of mobility would lead to a closing earnings gap between immigrants 
and natives regardless the human capital accumulation story.  
In table 6 we observe how Spaniards and immigrants move across regions over 
time. For each nationality the first column describes the distribution of the 
population across Spanish regions in the data. The second column describes the 
distribution after five years of work.21 The table shows that the distribution of 
Spaniards is fairly constant over time. On the other hand, there are more 
notable differences across immigrants. Those differences are higher if we 
restrict the population to particular cohorts of entry22.  
Even more striking are the changes in the distribution of the immigrant 
population by sectors over time.23 Table 7 shows a clear tendency between 
immigrants to move from low earnings sectors (construction and 
accommodation) to better paid service sectors.   
                                                                                 
20 Bentolila (1997) argued that mobility decreases with high unemployment levels. Moreover, Antolín and 
Bover (1997) have seen housing market prices to be a deterrent of mobility. 
 
21 In this raw data we are not following a particular immigrant cohort of entry; therefore changes in the 
entry pattern could affect the table. However, we have done the analysis by particular generations of entry 
and the results were similar although the regional and by sector distributions of migrants were much more 
spiky. We decided to present the aggregate ones to increase the clarity of the argument.  
 
22 Notice that in the table we cannot distinguish changes in the entry pattern or real changes of residents.  
In particular, there are very few Europeans from the accession countries that entered before the year 2000 
and stayed more than 5 years.  
 
23 Remember that the sectors belong to the general regime; therefore people working in agriculture, 
household activities and public administration are not completely captured. 
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Table 6:  Regional distribution of workers by nationality 
  Spain   Africa   Enlargement   South America 
  
1st 
year 
5 years 
later 
  
1st 
year 
5 years 
later 
  
1st 
year 
5 years 
later 
  
1st 
year 
5 years 
later 
  
                        
Andalucía 17.48 14   7.93 5.16 9.28 0   6.77 4.98   
Cataluña 16.31 18.78   37.7 34.7 23.71 12.07   19.07 19.78   
Madrid 21.51 22.95   15 16.72 34.02 46.55   29.94 41.9   
Valencia 9.91 9.91   7.44 10.44 13.4 12.07   9.97 5.76   
Galicia 5.14 4.71   0.81 0.33 1.03 0   1.69 1.87   
Castilla y León 3.91 3.56   2.02 1.59 4.12 6.9   2.95 1.4   
País Vasco 4.74 5.24   2.51 2.45 1.03 3.45   2.34 1.56   
Canarias 4.37 4.45   5.02 5.82 0 0   6.15 6.07   
Castilla-La Mancha 3.4 3.04   3.96 3.11 0 8.62   4.1 3.74   
Murcia 2.98 2.63   3.24 4.49 1.03 1.72   3.96 5.61   
Aragón 1.88 2.31   4.05 3.44 3.09 1.72   2.37 1.56   
Extremadura 1.46 1.4   0.32 0.26 0 0   0.54 0.62   
Asturias 1.8 1.81   0.32 0.26 5.15 3.45   0.47 0.62   
Baleares 2.5 2.31   5.34 7.2 4.12 3.45   5.15 2.18   
Navarra 1.12 1.28   1.21 1.39 0 0   2.77 1.25   
Cantabria 0.87 1   0.16 0.07 0 0   1.04 0.78   
La Rioja 0.4 0.49   0.81 1.06 0 0   0.68 0.31   
Ceuta 0.15 0.07   1.13 0.33 0 0   0.04 0   
Melilla 0.08 0.07   0.89 1.19 0 0   0 0   
 
Source: CSWH 2005 
 
  
In order to assess whether the catching up to the native born earnings levels 
could be explained as a result of the higher degree of migrants’ mobility we are 
going to enlarge the earnings model in section 3 controlling by job to job 
changes in province and firm. With this distinction, we are trying to show how 
much of the change in the earnings differential is due to a higher labour 
mobility of immigrants. Of course, human capital gains could be underlying a 
particular change of firm or province. However, differential wage growth that 
occurs within the same firm cannot be related to mobility and should be more 
related to human capital gains.24 
 
  
                                                                                 
24 An alternative interpretation of wage changes within the initial firm is a higher degree of discrimination 
by the employer. At the beginning, the employer used vague information to pay the employee because of 
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Table 7: Distribution of workers by sector and nationality 
  
Spain 
 
Africa 
 
Enlargement 
 
South 
America   
  
1st  
year 
5 
years 
later 
 
1st  
year 
5 
years 
later 
 
1st  
year 
5 
years 
later 
 
1st  
year 
5 
years 
later 
  
                      
Agriculture                                                                                                                  3.33 1.62   3.71 1.6 3.55 1.01 1.6 1.1 
Extractive industries                                                                                                        0.27 0.36   0.16 0.19   0 0 0.19 0.33 
Manufacturing industry                            22.79 23.73   16.09 11.06   9.22 15.15 11.06 11.91 
Supply of electrical energy, gas 0.31 0.57   0 0.08   0.71 0 0.08 0 
Construction 16.33 17.22   41.88 37.61   49.65 42.42 37.61 32.97 
Wholesale and retail trade 20.01 19.39   11.4 14.05   9.22 13.13 14.05 12.35 
Accommodation 9.56 5.93   9.76 13.45   7.09 4.04 13.45 14.33 
Transport 3.23 5.04   1.91 4.61   5.67 8.08 4.61 5.51 
Financial and insurance 1.57 2.48   0.05 0.19   0.71 0 0.19 0.55 
Real estate 10.29 10.36   8.18 11.77   8.51 9.09 11.77 12.68 
Public Administration 5.04 5.31   2.62 0.62   0 0 0.62 0.55 
Education 2.13 1.97   0.71 0.46   2.13 0 0.46 1.21 
Health 1.47 2.38   0.44 0.89   0 0 0.89 1.21 
Arts, recreation 3.57 3.54   2.84 3.31   3.55 6.06 3.31 5.07 
Household activities 0.09 0.11   0.27 0.08   0 1.01 0.08 0.22 
Extraterritorial 0 0.01   0 0.03   0 0 0.03 0 
Source: CSWH 2005                   
 
Let’s take equation (3) and define changes in log wages: 
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By applying first differences in the data, all fixed effects vanish and the wage 
growth differential between natives and immigrants ( )11 ++ − tNtI δδ  will be 
explained by different propensity to regional mobility 1λ , changes of firm 2λ  
and human capital accumulation that yields a payoff within the initial firm 0λ .    
Doing this analysis requires defining a main occupation for each worker in at 
least two different points in time. The data set provides information about all 
the legal labour relations that the workers have every day. However, the 
potential multiplicity of contracts in a certain moment of time generates an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
the uncertainty on his productivity. Over time, the employer might learn rapidly on the real productivity 
of the employee and decide a higher salary. We are not going to be able to distinguish between the two 
hypotheses. 
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added difficulty. For a particular moment, if the individual has more than one 
job, we choose among all of them by preferring by this order the permanent 
one, the longer and the one that begins earlier. We repeat the process for the 
following years. By doing this, we get a sequence of movements of province 
and firms for each individual in the sample and, it is possible to compute the 
probability of changes from one year to other for each specific dimension 
considered.  
Table 8 provides the probit coefficients for the regression of changes in labour 
status from one year to another. The table shows that non UE-15 workers in 
Spain are more occupationally mobile than natives regardless the nationality.  
Table 8: Yearly change of status 
  Dependent variable 
  Province change   Firm change 
  (1)   (2) 
Independent  Coefficients   Coefficients 
variables Std. Err   Std. Err 
        
Africa  0.0136   0.0143 
  (0.0006)   (0.0014) 
Enlargement 0.0144   0.0196 
  (0.0029)   (0.0064) 
South America  0.0170   0.0210 
  (0.0006)   (0.0014) 
Others 0.0147   0.0003 
  (0.0011)   (0.0025) 
Age 0.0003   -0.0005 
  (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
Illiterate 0.0025   -0.0028 
  (0.0003)   (0.0007) 
Primary 0.0027   0.0005 
  (0.0003)   (0.0006) 
Secondary 0.0016   -0.0031 
  (0.0003)   (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0010   0.0734 
  (0.0004)   (0.0008) 
        
Source: CSWH 2005       
 
To inspect the influence of labour choices - changes in province and firm - on 
wage growth, we estimate (5) on non top coded observations (table 9). The first 
column identifies that immigrants from outside the EU-15 experienced a wage 
growth that is 3 pp higher than comparable natives. The coefficient in front of 
the variable years since migration identifies the fact that this higher wage 
growth for immigrants vanishes over time and eventually disappears in 9 years. 
This result is consistent with what was obtained in section 4. Column 2 controls 
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for inter-provincial movements and column 3 controls for firm movements. As 
can be seen, both types of labour mobility are positively associated with wage 
growth, especially the second one although we should admit that an 
endogeneity problem arise since job movements are, likely, caused by wage 
changes. In any case, we want to emphasize that even after controlling for job 
mobility, the assimilation process mostly explains the decrease in wage gap. 
That is, as can be seen in our results in Table 9, controlling for job mobility only 
explains 1pp of the differential wage growth25. We can interpret this result, see 
table 10, as labour mobility only accounts for 32% of the higher wage growth of 
immigrants. In other words, around two thirds of the assimilation profile 
estimated in the Spanish economy can be related to the acquisition of country-
specific human capital. 
Table 9: Determinants of the increase in wages 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Independent  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Variables Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err 
  
Non EU-15 0.031 0.029 0.021 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 
Years since 
migration -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Africa  0.023 0.020 0.012 
  0.005 0.005 0.005 
Enlargement 0.033 0.031 0.025 
  0.013 0.013 0.013 
South America  0.038 0.036 0.028 
  0.005 0.005 0.005 
Others 0.026 0.024 0.018 
  0.007 0.007 0.007 
Province change 0.037 0.011 0.037 0.011 
  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Firm change 0.033 0.033 
  0.001 0.001 
Total Experience -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total experience2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.055 0.055 0.050 0.055 0.055 0.051 
  0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  
N 1,289,468 1,289,468 1,289,468 1,289,468 1,289,468 1,289,468 
R2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 
Source: CSWH 2005                       
 
                                                                                 
25 The coefficient in front of the immigrant dummy decreases from 3.1 to 2.1 
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In the following columns the same exercise is performed by country of origin in 
order to check whether significant differences exist. It is clear that South-
Americans and immigrants from the EU-Enlargement have a relatively higher 
wage growth respect to Africans, again consistent with the evidence shown in 
table 5. Regardless the country of origin, the contribution of mobility to this 
differential wage growth does not achieve 50%. The contribution is highest for 
African immigrants suggesting that the lower assimilation profile of 
immigrants from Africa is not driven by a different willingness to move. 
Instead, difficulties in the adaptability of skills or the acquisition of new ones 
could be the ultimate cause. 
 
Table 10: Contribution of mobility in the differential wage growth 
 
Movements across 
provinces 
Movements across provinces 
and firms 
   
Non-EU-15 7.1% 32.3% 
Africa 10.5% 46.1% 
Enlargement 6.1% 23.0% 
South America 5.5% 26.6% 
Others 9.5% 32.2% 
 
Source: CSWH 2005 with results in table 9 
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper we analysed earnings assimilation of immigrants in Spain using 
longitudinal data. Immigration in Spain has become an important matter in the 
recent years since the percentage of immigrants in the Spanish population 
increased from 2% in 2000 to 11% six years later. We used a dataset of working 
histories to analyse how earnings evolve over time. We show that the initial 
wage differential with respect to natives of the same characteristics (around 
30% for recent arrival cohorts) decreases with time spent in Spain. According to 
our results, however, assimilation of legal immigrants is pretty rapid, with a 
reduction of 15pp in the wage gap during the first 5-6 years, but the differential 
never vanishes completely. This result is very similar to the one obtained by 
Lubotsky (2007) in the US and Edin et al. (2000) in Sweden despite presenting 
less rigid wage bargaining systems. 
The use of longitudinal data to analyse the Spanish case is an improvement 
respect to using single or repeated cross sections because it takes into account 
the fact that Spain has experienced important changes in the composition 
quality of immigrants over time. In this respect, estimations based on a single 
cross section would underestimate earnings assimilation for long spells. This is 
the case because in recent years, the weight of South-Americans and 
immigrants from the European Enlargement had grown notably respect to 
Africans and the former nationalities present higher initial wages than the 
latter.  
Our estimates show a relatively different assimilation pattern across nationality 
groups with South-Americans and EU-Enlargement immigrants showing a 
faster assimilation process. This is also consistent with evidence by Amuedo-
Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) in terms of unemployment rates. 
There are two hypotheses behind the positive wage growth differential between 
migrants and natives. On the one hand, the initial low level of human capital 
(useful in the destination country) compared to the level faced by comparable 
natives, justifies a high incentive to invest in human capital upon arrival. On the 
other, in a regulated labour market such as the Spanish, there are many 
institutions that exacerbate economic differences across regions or 
municipalities. Migrants are more prone to benefit from those differences since 
they have lower social attachments than natives and lower severance payments 
rights. In order to separate out those two mechanisms we have analyses how 
wage growth differential between migrants and Spaniards evolve, first 
unconditionally, and second controlling for labour market mobility. According 
to our results, most of the assimilation pattern happens within the initial firm. 
Following this evidence, we conclude that human capital gains are important. 
However, notice that there is an alternative explanation based on the possibility 
of a change in the behaviour of the entrepreneur. At the beginning of the labour 
relationship the entrepreneur might be more reluctant to pay the uncertain 
productivity of an unknown input. However, over time the employer could be 
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discovering the real quality of that input and pay it accordingly. Further 
research should be devoted to the distinction of the two hypotheses. In any 
case, mobility seems to play a limited role. This result is observed regardless the 
nationality of origin. The highest contribution of mobility appears in the African 
group. This could be interpreted as a higher difficulty of this group in adapting 
or acquiring new human capital.  
To conclude, our results could be indicating a positive contribution of 
immigration to the evolution of productivity in the Spanish economy over the 
coming years. Large immigration flows received in the recent past has, at least 
partly (Banco de España, 2006; Lacuesta et al., 2009), contributed to poor 
productivity performance. Our paper has shown that the initial wage, or 
productivity, gap between natives and immigrants rapidly decreases as 
immigrants acquire country-specific human capital. Hence, in the near future, 
while lower immigrant flows are expected, the assimilation profile of those 
migrants already in the Spanish labour market will tend to positively contribute 
to productivity growth. In any case, we should also recognize that much 
uncertainty remains about the behaviour of immigrants in the Spanish labour 
market since the immigration phenomena has taken place in a especially 
positive economic environment. 
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Appendix. Some additional information on regularization processes in the 
Spanish economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Number 
regularized 
Primary policy 
target 
Benefit granted Conditions 
1985-1986 38.181 All foreigners Residence and 
work permit 
Applied to unauthorized 
workers and residents 
1991 110100 Workers Residence and 
work permit 
Illegal aliens working in Spain 
since May 15, 1991, rejected 
asylum seekers or those with 
asylum request pending 
1996 21.300 All foreigners 
(13800 work 
permits and 
7500 residence) 
One year 
residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those residing in 
Spain since January 1, 1996 
2000 163.900 All foreigners One year 
residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those who had 
previously held or applied for 
either work of residence permits 
in the three years prior to 2000, 
or had filed an asylum 
application before 2000 
2001 216.400 Workers One year 
residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those who could 
prove employment as well as 
social ties in Spain 
2005 548.700 All foreigners Six months 
residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those who have an 
employment offer lasting for 6 
months. 
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ABSTRACT  
 This chapter uses detailed information from a large wage survey in 2006 to analyze 
the gender wage gap in the performance–pay (PP) component of total hourly wages 
and how it contributes to the overall gender gap in Spain. Under the assumption that 
PP compensation is determined in a more competitive fashion than the other 
components of the wage, one would expect, in principle, to find a low gender gap in 
the first component. However, this is not what we find. After controlling for 
observable differences in individual and job characteristics as well as for non random 
selection, the estimated adjusted gender gap in performance pay is around 26 log 
points in favour of males. Further, there seems to be evidence of a “glass ceiling” 
pattern throughout the PP distribution. After examining alternative theories that 
could rationalize these findings, we  conclude that monopsonistic features, possibly 
related to women´s lower mobility due to housework duties, may be more consistent 
with our results than other theories related to occupational segregation. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the cornerstones of the standard competitive model of the labour 
market is the well-known equilibrium condition stating that wage equals 
labour's marginal revenue product (MRP henceforth). Accordingly, the final 
wage distribution represents the equilibrium outcome of demand and supply 
forces. This straightforward implication of the competitive model has proven 
instrumental in the empirical analysis of how relevant phenomena, such as 
changes in the relative demand and supply of skills, have affected within and 
between-group wage inequality over the last few decades in economies with 
flexible labour markets, like e.g., UK and US (see, eg., Katz and Murphy, 1992). 
Yet, it is also well established that the competitive model can provide a rather 
misleading interpretation of how wages are actually determined in real-life 
labour markets when information is asymmetric or search frictions are present 
in the allocation of workers to jobs. In addition, a common feature of many 
existing labour market institutions (like unions and minimum wages) is that 
they tend to compress the wage distribution and thus reduce pay differences 
between more productive and less productive workers.1 
While it is reasonable to acknowledge that the competitive paradigm 
often lacks realism in describing how wages are set, there are some specific 
forms of wage compensation that could be considered good proxies for the 
“wage equals MRP” condition. In particular, if compensation is paid at least 
partially as a function of performance pay – such as bonuses, comission or piece 
rates- it seems plausible to assume that this wage component becomes closer to 
worker´s productivity than the remaining components (e.g.,the base wage) that 
do not depend so closely on individual performance. Following this intuitive 
reasoning, Lemieux et al. (2009) have analyzed the impact of performance pay 
(PP hereafter) on wage inequality in the US . Their basic hypothesis is that, 
through a widespread reduction in the cost of gathering and processing 
information, PP growing incidence may have contributed to the increase in 
inequality, mainly at the top of the wage distribution. Indeed, their finding is 
that PP accounts for 25% of male wage inequality between the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s, what provides favourable support for this hypothesis. 2 
In this paper, we contribute to this line of research by making use of a 
recently available dataset on the detailed breakdown of total wage 
compensation for Spanish workers into its different components. We re-
examine Lemieux et al. ´s (2009) hypothesis, but from a different angle which, 
as will me discussed below, is somewhat novel in this literature3.  That is, unlike 
                                                                                 
1 Empirical evidence, such as Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Card (1996), DiNardo et al. (1996), Farber and 
Gibbons (1996), and Lemieux (1998) provide ample evidence about the different channels through which 
wages are not equalized to their MRPs.  
2 The existing literature has mainly focused on analyses of the incentive effects on productivity of PP 
arrangements; see, inter alia, Booth (1999), Ewing (1996), Dohmen and Falk (2009) and Lazear (2000), 
among others.  
3 There is  however a growing literature on gender differences in compensation for CEOs and top 
executives which shares element in common with performance pay (see, e.g., Bertrand and Hallock, 2001, 
and Bertrand et al., 2009) 
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these authors, we focus on the impact of performance pay gap on the overall 
observed gender wage gap. Since our data provide information about the 
precise amount of money that workers receive as payment to reward 
performance -Lemieux et al (2009) only know whether workers are under PP 
schemes or under alternative payment schemes, but they lack information 
about the amount of PP workers receive- we make a detailed analysis about the 
how gender wage gap in the PP component of wages evolves along the total 
wage distribution. Specifically,  we analyze whether PP compensation differs 
by gender and the extent to which this component contributes to explaining the 
overall wage gender gap (gender gap hereafter) in Spain.  
To our knowledge, the only paper available in the gender literature 
which deals with a similar issue to ours is Chauvin & Ash (1994). Specifically, 
these authors use wage micro data from a survey of business school graduates 
to examine how the gender gap structure changes across different pay 
components. Based on standard Oaxaca decompositions, their main finding is 
that there is a very significant reduction in the adjusted-by-characteristics 
gender wage gap once PP differences related to job performance are accounted 
for.  In comparison to their work,  our approach makes three contributions to 
this strand of the  literature: i) first, whereas their database only provides 
information about a very small segment of the population, we use here 
information from a much larger sample of workers, as provided by the 
Earnings Structure Survey, (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (EES) in Spanish) 
covering a representative sample of the Spanish employees in the construction 
and services sectors in 2006 (about  82.6% of the overall Spanish salaried 
employment that year); ii) secondly, whereas their focus lies exclusively on the 
mean gender gap, we analyze how this gap evolves throughout the entire wage 
distribution; and iii) finally, whereas they cannot identify firm fixed effects in 
their data, we have information not only at the individual level but also at the  
firm-job level. This last feature allows us to test among alternative explanations 
of the gender differences in PP within the same firms.  
One could think of two alternative hypotheses regarding gender 
differences in PP. On the one hand, under the presumption that this component 
is determined in a more competitive fashion than the remaining components of 
the wage, the gender gap in PP between equally skilled men and women could 
be smaller than in the non PP components. In other words, since  theoretically 
PP responds mostly to meritocracy, equally performing workers should receive 
the same PP irrespectively of their gender. Moreover, if women perceive some 
forms of (taste and/or statistical) discrimination in non-PP jobs relative to men, 
then they will seek intensively for PP jobs in order to ameliorate these 
disadvantages. However, against this hypothesis, one could claim that, to the 
extent that effort at the marketplace may be negatively affected by housework, 
PP could also provide a clear channel through which women´ s greater 
involvement in household tasks hinders their returns in the labour market and, 
therefore, it lowers their PP relative to men ´s4. For example, Amuedo-Dorantes 
and de la Rica (2006) find that variable wage complements in Spain, which can 
easily make up to 40 percent of men's wages, account for up to 80 percent of the 
                                                                                 
4 See Becker (1985) and an stylized model with this flavour in Appendix 2. 
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aggregate gender gap due partially to women ´s lower availability to undertake 
long working hours.  
On the other hand, even abstracting from the role of distorting labour 
market institutions, the assumptions of free access to PP jobs and/or the 
absence of search frictions in a competitive setup may not be suitable for female 
workers. First, as it has been stressed in the occupational segregation literature, 
women may select themselves into non-PP jobs (e.g. public sector jobs) because 
they anticipate that these positions are more compatible with their larger 
household responsibilities. Hence, in line with the so-called mommy track 
hypothesis (see Mincer and Polacheck, 1977), they may willingly opt for jobs 
entailing steadier and, possibly, lower pay in exchange for less penalties in case 
of career interruptions. Secondly, employers may be more reluctant to place 
women in fast-track jobs involving PP if they expect lower female work 
attachment even though they have the same ability distribution as their male 
colleagues (see Lazear and Rosen, 1990). Thirdly, statistical discrimination in 
the allocation of PP jobs may still prevail if employers invest on workers´ 
specific training and therefore try to minimize quits. Moreover, if women are 
aware of the existence of statistical discrimination in advance, this may 
discourage them from applying to these jobs leading to self-fulfilling equilibria 
(see Coate and Loury, 1993, and de la Rica et al., 2009). Lastly, the presence of 
some monopsonistic features in PP jobs, due to women´ s lower mobility or lack 
of alternative job offers, should not be discarded even if, contrary to the 
standard human capital explanation, this does not lead to lower productivity 
(see Booth et al., 2003, and Manning, 2003).    
In view of the previous considerations, our goal in this paper is to dig 
deeper into the specific role played by PP as a determinant of the overall gender 
gap in Spain. Our data comes from the recently released 2006 wave of the 
Spanish Earnings Structure Survey which contains detailed micro-data 
information on the various components of the wage, such as the base wage, 
overtime pay and other wage complements. When compared to the 
longitudinal dataset used by Lemieux et al. (2009) - i.e., the interview years 
1976-1999 of the PSID- our data suffers from a clear drawback since its cross-
section nature prevents us from controlling for workers´ fixed effects. In 
exchange, however, it has the advantage of providing information about the 
precise amount of PP received by workers, in contrast to PSID which only 
reports qualitative information on whether employees receive a variable pay 
component as part of their total compensation at least once during their 
employment relationships (but not its amount). This implies that our data are 
less noisy than theirs and that we can focus specifically on the PP component 
rather than on jobs that pay PP, as Lemieux et al. (2009) do. 
In the first half of the paper, we address the impact of PP on the observed 
gender gap in total pay both at the mean and throughout the wage distribution, 
since PP is bound to have substantially different effects at different percentiles. 
In effect, if PP is more concentrated at the higher quantiles, where bonuses and 
commissions are believed to represent a more important fraction of 
compensation, they may have a larger impact on the gender gap and therefore 
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help explain at least partly the so-called “glass ceiling” effect at the top of the 
wage distribution. The second part focuses exclusively on the PP wage 
component and explores whether there are potential selection issues in the 
fraction of employees receiving PP, and to what extent unadjusted gender gaps 
change once observable individual controls and selectivity biases have been 
accounted for. Additionally, we present evidence about adjusted gender PP 
gaps within-firms and within-occupations in order to disentangle the role 
played by different theories explaining the existence of sizeable adjusted gender 
gaps. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
dataset and provides some basic descriptive statistics regarding the whole 
sample, the distribution and extent of PP, the differences between the 
characteristics of workers receiving and not receiving PP and the contribution 
of the gender gap in PP to the overall gender gap in raw terms. In Section 3, we 
test whether the PP wage component is set in a more competitive way than the 
non-PP component. Section 4 deals with adjusted gaps in PP jobs, once 
differences in individual and job characteristics across genders are accounted 
for; after addressing nonrandom selection problems among workers 
participating in PP jobs, we analyze which of the different explanations for 
gender gaps fits better with our evidence. Section 5 allows for different returns 
on observable characteristics by gender in order to identify which specific traits 
are differently rewarded in the market place. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Three 
appendices gather some analytical and further descriptive evidence that help us 
to interpret the results. 
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2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data source is the third wave of the Spanish Earnings Structure 
Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial or ESS 06 in short)5. The ESS is the 
outcome of a European Project aiming at the design of harmonized earnings 
databases for several European countries. The survey is based on two-stage 
random samples of workers from establishments in the manufacturing, 
construction and service industries. First, establishments are randomly selected 
from the Social Security General Register of Payments records, which are 
stratified by region and establishment size.  In a second stage, samples of 
workers from each of the selected establishments are also randomly drawn.  
Overall, sample sizes are much larger than those provided by any other Spanish 
survey (see below for details). Besides wage compensation, EES collects 
individual information on workers’ demographics (such as age and educational 
attainment) and job characteristics (including industry, occupation, contract 
type, type of collective bargaining, establishment’s export activity, 
establishment size, and region).  
The main advantages of EES 06 relative to its earlier waves are that: (i) 
establishments with less than 10 employees are included in this survey whereas 
only employees in larger establishments were previously interviewed; (ii) it 
includes a module where employers provide detailed information on the 
breakdown into fixed and variable components of the total annual wage 
compensation paid to their workers. This module allows us to identify PP, since 
data on annual bonuses and commissions related to productivity are 
specifically reported by each firm for their employee. However, the structure of 
EES does not enable us to construct a matched employer-employee dataset. One 
important shortcoming of the EES is that information is not available on either 
workers´ civil status, spouses´ characteristics or the number and age of children 
in the households. More concretely, besides reporting total monthly gross 
wages and working hours, EES 06 does provide information on both the 
ordinary (base wage and other complements due to shifts, tenure, job risks, etc.) 
and non-ordinary components of annual gross earnings. Regarding the latter 
category, the ESS 06 distinguishes between two different types of payments: 
• Fixed Annual Non-ordinary Payments. This payment “basically 
corresponds to extraordinary compensations at Christmas and summer 
vacations (in Spanish, known as pagas  por navidad y verano) 6, the standard rates 
for overtime work and participation in firms´ normal profits”. It is specifically 
stated that their amount is known in advance by the employee, typically 
established at the collective bargaining level, and that they do not depend on 
either workers´ or firms´ performance.  
                                                                                 
5 The previous waves correspond to 1995 and 2002. 
6 This implies that the fixed part of the total annual gross wage is distributed into 12 ordinary installments 
and 2 extraordinary ones in june and december.  This tradition dates back to the Francoist industrial 
relations during the dictatorship period.  
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• Variable Annual Non-ordinary Payments. In contrast to the first 
category, these are “payments related to workers´ or firms´ performance whose 
amount is not established a priori since it depends on incentives, returns and 
extraordinary profits”. It lumps together bonuses, compensations and piece 
rates. 
Given this breakdown of total wage compensation, the PP component in 
the sequel will correspond to the Variable Annual Non-ordinary Payments 
whereas the non-PP components will be identified as the sum of the ordinary 
wage and the Fixed Annual Non-ordinary Payments.  
 
2.1. Description of the dataset  
Our sample consists of full-time workers aged 18-65 for whom the 
interview month (October) is an ordinary period regarding their labour status. 
Table 1 displays the weighted descriptive statistics for the male and female 
samples. They contain a total of 129,930 males (66.6%) and 65,223 females 
(33.4%) covering almost 18,000 establishments.                                                                         
Inspection of workers´ demographic characteristics reveals the following 
stylized facts: (i) women´ s educational attainment is significantly larger than 
men´ s – e.g., the percentage of female workers with a university degree (32%) 
almost doubles men’s (18%) whereas the fraction of women with at most 
primary education is 10 pp. smaller (18% vs. 28%) than men´s , (ii) women are 
about two years younger than men (from interpolation of the mid-points of the 
different age brackets), (iii) female  job tenure is about 1.5 years shorter than 
males´ tenure, and (iv) the raw gender gap is about 21 log points in favour of 
male workers. As regards firms´ characteristics, on average, women work in 
larger establishments (> 200 employees) than men (a 9 pp. higher share), and 
enjoy a lower coverage by bargaining agreements at the firm level (3 pp. less).  
Regarding total gross hourly wages, the gender gap in favour of men is 
about 21 log points, using differences in mean logged wages, and 23.1%, using 
the ratio of the wage levels.7  Interestingly, the incidence of PP (22.7 %) is 
almost identical across genders which, prima facie, is consistent with our 
previous hypothesis that this kind of jobs are attractive to women because, in 
principle, they should be less subject to discriminatory practices. This 
statement, however, will need to be reconsidered later on, once we report 
further evidence on the distribution of women throughout the PP distribution.  
2.2. Characterization of performance pay 
Table 2a compares the sample characteristics of workers and firms in PP 
and non-PP jobs, distinguishing by gender. The main finding is that workers on 
                                                                                 
7  Denoting the total annual gross wage by GAW, total hourly wages are defined as w= GAW 
/ORH+OVH), where ORH represents annual ordinary working hours set at the collective bargaining 
agreement (jornada anual pactada) and OVH denotes the overtime working hours completed in the month 
of the interview (october). The latter are annualized using the seasonal pattern of aggregate extra hours in 
the Spanish economy as of 2006.  
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PP jobs are more skilled than those in non-PP jobs (40% of women and 27% of 
men in the PP sample have a university degree against 29% and 15% in the non-
PP sample). Likewise, they are older (about a 10 pp. larger share in the 31-50 
age category), have longer tenure (about 2.5 years longer for women and 5 
years for men), enjoy a higher rate of permanent contracts and work in larger 
establishments (typically less subject to centralized bargaining levels).  
Table 2b, in turn, presents the incidence of PP jobs by industry and 
occupation. Regarding industries, Financial Intermediation (60%) and 
Education (9%) are the sectors where PP is most and least prevalent, 
respectively.  As for occupations, the results confirm that PP incidence is much 
higher for the high-wage categories: 50% for managers and 30% for 
Professionals and Technicians.   
Finally, Table 2c reports the share of female workers receiving PP 
throughout the distribution of this component of the wage, which we can 
compare to the average share of women receiving PP in our sample, i.e., about 
23% (=14789/ 44249). The sharp decline in this proportion as we move upward 
in the PP distribution - from 41% at the bottom to 16% at the top- is seemingly 
inconsistent with the above-mentioned hypothesis about more skilled women 
being more likely to seek jobs entailing PP compensation, especially since, as 
reported above, they have higher educational attainments than men. By 
contrast, such evidence would be consistent with the implications of theories 
based on occupational segregation and/or lower mobility which predict a 
“glass “ceiling “pattern whereby well qualified females are less likely to get 
better paid positions than high qualified males.                                  
                                      
2.3. The Contribution of Performance Pay to the Overall Gender Gap 
We next analyze how important is PP, the size of the gender gap in this 
wage component and, finally, its contribution to the overall gender gap. As 
explained in Appendix 1, the computation of the respective contributions of the 
gender gaps in the PP and non-PP components to the overall gender gap is 
greatly facilitated by using a measure of the gap expressed in percent (i.e., the 
ratio between average male and female wage minus unity) rather than in log 
points (differences in average logged wages), as is customary in the literature. 
The first four columns in Table 3a present the total hourly wage compensation 
in PP jobs (expressed in €) across genders and the corresponding shares of total 
wages accounted by the PP component. Further, for comparison, the hourly 
wages in non-PP jobs appear in the last two columns. Table 3b reports similar 
evidence but this time referred to the two components of the wage 
compensation received by PP workers, i.e. its variable and non-variable 
components. Lastly, Figure 1 plots the three gender gaps in percentage terms 
(total hourly wage, w, PP/variable component, v, and other/fixed or 
predetermined components, f) both at the mean and throughout the wage 
distribution for the whole sample of workers in our sample.   
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As can be observed, workers on PP jobs earn more on average than 
workers on non-PP jobs (about 64% and 50% higher wages for men and women, 
respectively) in line with the evidence offered in Table 2a about the higher skills 
and longer job tenure of the former. Using individual information on the PP 
component of the wage, we can compute its unadjusted/raw gender gap. This 
yields a strikingly large gap of 74% (around 46 log points using the 
conventional measure of the gap based on the geometric mean) in favour of 
men. This gap turns out to be much larger than the raw gap in total hourly 
wages found for the whole sample (24% or 20.6 log-points). However, the share 
of the PP component in the total wage is rather low: 7% for women and 9% for 
men on average. Nonetheless, as expected, the PP share increases over the wage 
distribution, reaching 22% (men) and 17% (women) at the 90th percentile 
(P90th). Taken together, the low average PP share and the low incidence of PP 
jobs in our sample (22.7%) imply a rather tiny contribution of the gap in PP to 
the overall gender gap for the whole sample of workers: 1.7 pp. out of 24.0 pp. 
(about 7%), despite a mild increase at the upper part of the wage distribution 
where it reaches 3.8 pp. out of 33 pp. (11.5%) at P90th. 
The next step is to examine whether PP plays a more relevant role when 
we consider the sample of PP jobs exclusively. Using this restricted sample, 
Figure 2 displays the raw gaps, again both at the mean and throughout the 
distribution, in the total hourly wage (w), the non-PP/fixed component (f) 
together with the estimated contribution of the PP component to the overall gap 
as explained in Appendix 18. As expected, the contribution of PP to the 
aggregate hourly wage gap is now higher than in the whole sample reaching , 
on average, 5.7 pp. out of 32 pp. (i.e., about 18%) and 11.7 pp. out of 46.5 pp. 
(25%) at the top of the distribution.   
In sum, two main conclusions stem from this preliminary evidence: (I) 
the gender gap in PP is much larger than in total hourly wage compensation, 
particularly at the top of the wage distribution where it can explain about one-
fourth of the “glass ceiling” pattern observed at the higher percentiles, and (II) 
PP makes a dent at higher wages in line with the previous evidence that 
workers receiving this type of variable compensation have better observable 
characteristics.  
In principle, several theories would be consistent with the above-
mentioned results. First, as regards finding (I), it is likely that wages set in 
collective bargaining at the sectoral (provincial, industry-wide) level and actual 
wages are similar for non-college workers in less-skilled/blue-collar 
occupations, while bargained wages do not bind for college workers in high 
skill/ white collar occupations. There is evidence (see Dolado et al., 1997) 
pointing out that employers in Spain improve high-skill workers´ pay above 
compressed bargained wages through formal and informal agreements which 
are likely to involve variable PP arrangements. Therefore, insofar as unions 
compress the wage distribution and base wages respond more to occupational 
categories and tenure than to individual characteristics, like gender, it is likely 
that the raw non-PP gender gap would be quite smaller than the raw PP gap. 
                                                                                 
8 The gap in the PP component (v)  is the one displayed in Figure 1. 
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This is confirmed by the fact that the standard deviation of the (logged) fixed 
component of total hourly wages (0.61 and 0.60 for men and women, 
respectively) is less than one-half of  the standard deviation of the (logged) PP 
component (1.41 and 1.34, respectively). 
As for finding (II), it could be rationalized by either: (i)  women exerting 
less effort in PP jobs due to disutility of housework, (ii) women self-selecting 
away from PP jobs where variable components represent a relevant share of 
total compensation, maybe due to systematic differences in risk preferences 
between men and women, or (iii) women receiving lower PP than men due to 
monopsonistic features elements in the PP segment of the labour market, 
possibly related to employers´ beliefs that women enjoy lower mobility than 
equally qualified men.  
Appendix 2 offers a simple model of the main gender implications of jobs 
offering PP which illustrates the main implications of the above-mentioned 
theories throghout the sequel. 
Disentangling which of the previous theories is more likely to operate in 
explaining the very large gender gap found for PP requires several steps. First, 
Lemieux et al.´s (2007) hypothesis stating that PP tends to be closer to MRP than 
non-PP compensation needs to be tested. Next, we also need to examine 
whether the pattern of the PP raw gap discussed above remains similar once it 
is adjusted for differences in individual and job characteristics across genders. 
In other words, it is only under the competitive labor market paradigm and 
under similar observable characteristics that the documented PP gap can be 
described as being “strikingly large”. The next two sections are devoted to 
address these issues in detail.  
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3 Is PP determined in a competitive fashion? 
Following the above-mentioned motivation, we devote this section to 
analyze whether PP jobs are “more attached to the worker” whereas non-PP 
jobs are more “attached to the job”. The basic insight once more is that, if PP 
depends essentially on individuals´ endowed and acquired characteristics, MRP 
would be more transferable across firms and occupations, supporting the idea 
that PP is bound to be set in a more competitive fashion than non-PP jobs. If PP 
jobs pay more on the basis of workers´ productivity, then human capital 
variables – basically age, education and, to a lesser extent, tenure 9 -should have 
higher market returns in this kind of jobs than in other jobs not involving PP. 
Conversely, returns to job characteristics- such as firm size, sector, and tenure 
on the firm should receive a higher market reward in non-PP jobs.  
To analyze this issue, Table 4 reports standard mincerian (logged) hourly 
wage regressions estimated by OLS where the returns (estimated coefficients) to 
job and human capital variables are displayed separately in the first two 
columns for PP and non-PP jobs, respectively. The third last column, in turn, 
shows the results from a pooled regression where interactions of human capital 
and job characteristics with an indicator of receiving PP are added to test for 
statistically significant differences between returns in the two samples. Thus, 
denoting the hourly wage of worker i in firm j as ijW , individual and job 
characteristics as iX  and jX , respectively, and an indicator (1/0) for receiving 
PP as iD  , the estimated model  
ijjiiijiiij XDXDXXDW εφφββββ ++++++= 213210ln  
   where we expect 01 >φ and 02 <φ . 
 In line with the results by Lemieux et al. (2009), we find that the returns 
to characteristics attached to the worker are larger in PP than in non-PP jobs. 
For example, the returns to university and secondary education are 41% (0.304 
vs. 0.215) and 60% (0.09 vs. 0.06) larger, respectively, than in non PP jobs. 
Likewise, the returns to age, as a proxy for potential experience, and to a lesser 
extent tenure follow the same pattern. By contrast, the returns to firm size and 
other characteristics of the job are significantly smaller in PP jobs, as is also the 
case for estimated coefficients on industry and occupational dummies, not 
reported in this table for brevity. This evidence suports the view that PP jobs 
pay wages closer to worker ‘s  productivity than the rest.  Yet, the fact that 
estimated returns on firm´s characteristics are, in gereneral,  statistically 
significant points out that workers tend to be categorized by firms into jobs, 
albeit less so in the sample of workers receiving PP. 
                                                                                 
9 The lower (in absolute terms) coefficient on the interaction of tenure and the PP indicator  may reflect 
high union power in collective bargaining determining the non-PP components of the wage, where tenure 
is a key element in wage increases. 
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4 Adjusted gender gaps in the performance pay component 
Once the pattern of the raw gender gap in PP has been described, we 
proceed next to compute their adjusted counterparts accounting for differences 
in observed individual and job characteristics. However, the fact that slightly 
less than one-fourth of workers in the whole sample receive PP and that these 
workers present different personal and job characteristics than non-PP workers, 
make us consider that non random selection of workers into PP jobs may be a 
relevant issue to address. This is particularly important if the selection process 
into PP is not exactly the same for males and females. In such a case, ignoring 
gender differences in selection will lead to biased estimates of the adjusted gap 
for the PP component.  
4.1. Selectivity issues 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating a probit model to explain 
participation in PP jobs (PP=1, non-PP=0). This model will be later used to 
compute the inverse Mills ratio in a conventional two-stage Heckman approach 
to control for selection in the estimation of log hourly wage regressions 
explaining the PP component. Given the lack of information regarding civil 
status or number and age of children in our sample, we use the availability of  
wage bargaining at the firm level (Firm Agreement) as the identifying variable in 
the participation equation. The insight for this choice is that jobs with this type 
of decentralized wage agreement are more likely to involve PP compensation 
than other jobs where wages are set at a more centralized bargaining level 
(sectoral/provincial or nationwide) and unions play a larger role. Further, the 
fact that the estimated coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant 
when included in the PP wage regression make us to trust on the validity of this 
exclusion restriction. 
In the first column of  Table 5, we present the estimates of the coefficients 
in the probit using the standard explanatory variables, where a Female indicator 
(1/0) captures gender differences in the probability of receiving PP 
compensation. As can be observed, women have a lower probability of getting 
PP than equally able men working in the same occupations. The remaining 
estimates are in line with the evidence presented in Table 2a: higher educational 
attainment, longer tenure and being in the 31-50 age intervals also raise this 
probability.  
Thus, in principle, this evidence goes against the earlier hypothesis that, 
under the competitive labour market paradigm, equally productive men and 
women should not exhibit significant differences regarding paticipation in jobs 
offering PP compensation and that, if females anticipate non-competitive 
features in non PP jobs, they should be more prevalent in PP jobs. To examine 
whether these differences in participation can be related to women´s larger 
disutility in market work due to larger involvement in housework, as in 
Becker´s hypothesis, or rather to occupational segregation and/or lower 
mobility, as in the “ mommy track” and  “monopsonistic” hypothesis, the 
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second column in Table 5 reports the estimates obtained in an specification 
where interaction terms between the different age brackets and the Female 
dummy are added to the model. Under the first hypothesis, the main 
differences againt women shoud appear for those age groups more prone to 
bear household responsibilities since it is actual involvement in housework that 
hampers performance in market work. Lacking information on civil status and 
household composition, we choose to identify women aged 31-50 as those more 
prone to be heavily involved in child bearing, looking after elderly relatives, etc. 
Thus, conditioning on the remaining observable controls, one should expect 
lower probability of participation for women in this age group. This would 
correspond to a negative coefficient on the corresponding interaction terms 
between PP and 31-39 and 40-49 brackets indicators. By contrast, under the 
second hypothesis, the effect should be mainly captured by the female intercept 
since all women, irrespectively of their age, antipate career interruptions due to 
the above-mentioned reasons.  
The basic finding is that the coefficients on these interaction terms are 
negative and highly significant, pointing out that, conditioning on all the 
remaining covariates, women in two above-mentioned age brackets have a 
lower probability of receiving PP than younger and older women, respectively. 
For example, the net coefficient of a woman aged 30-39 is -0.134 (=-0.103+0.016-
0.047) whereas, for women below 30 or in the 50-59 interval, the corresponding 
net coefficients would be -0.103 and -0.041 (=-0.103-0.01+0.072), respectively. A 
chi-squared test rejects the null of equal coefficients across the previous age 
brackets with a p-value of 0.023. Further, when not only age dummies, but also 
education categories are interacted with the female dummy variable (third 
column in Table 5), the lower estimated probabilites of receiving PP for women 
in the two above-mentioned age brackets remain basically unaltered. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction between the female and 
university education dummies is negative. One possible interpretation of this 
result could be that women with higher educational attaiment face greater 
restrictions than less skilled women in  adequatelly matching their skills and 
occupational requirements with their family responsibilities, and therefore shy 
away from PP. Overall, the above-mentioned evidence points out the “mommy 
track”/“monopsonistic” hypotheses are likely to play a joint role in explaning 
gender differences in receiving PP 
 
4.2. Disentangling occupational segregation from monopsonistic 
features 
4.2.1 Within- firms and within- occupations regressions  
The next step is to analyze which of the two theories embedded in the 
second joint hypothesis is more likely to explain the PP gender gap:  is it 
“occupational segregation” or “ monopsonistic features”?. To try to 
discriminate between these two somewhat alternative explanations, we carry 
out  the following exercise. Using the specification of a mincerian wage equation 
for the restricted sample of PP workers with a Female intercept and equal 
returns to individual and job characteristics across genders, we compare the 
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estimated coefficient on the Female indicator in a regression (augmented by the 
inverse Mills ratio obtained from the participation equation reported in the 
second column of Table 5 under four different specifications: (i) a pooled 
regression (P), (ii) within- occupations (WO),10 (iii) within-firms (WF), and (iv) 
within-firms & occupations (WFO). 
The insight for such comparison can be briefly described as follows. Let 
us denote the coefficient on the Female dummy in the four specifications above 
as Pβ , WOβ , WFβ  and WFOβ respectively. Then, under the “occupational 
segregation “hypothesis we should expect WOβ  to be significantly smaller than 
pβ  (since we are comparing men and women in the same occupation and firm) 
whereas WFβ  should be similar to Pβ . Conversely, under the “monopsonistic” 
hypothesis, the estimate of WFβ  should be quite smaller than the estimate of pβ  
(since now the comparison is between men and women working in the same 
firm), while WOβ  and  Pβ  would be similar. Finally, if both theories play a role, 
then WFOβ  should be below both WOβ  and WFβ  which, in turn, should be smaller 
than Pβ .  
Table 6 reports the estimates obtained under the alternative specifications 
where the OLS results (without selection correction) are also included in the 
first column for comparison. The following findings stand out. First, the 
adjusted average gender gap in the OLS pooled specification is about 41 log 
points against a raw gap of 46 log points. Second, once we control for selection 
bias in such specification, the gap increases slightly to 45 log points. The fact 
that this gap is larger than the OLS gap is explained by the highly significant 
positive sign on the coefficient of Heckman´s lambda which reflects strongly 
positive selection of workers in PP jobs.  Since women have higher educational 
attainment than men in our sample, despite having lower tenure, this leads to a 
larger gap when selection is taken into account. Third, again controlling for 
selection biases, the estimate of the gap in the within-firm specification (34 log 
points) is quite smaller than the corresponding estimate in the within-
occupation specification (43 log-points) which, in turn, is quite close to the gap 
estimated  in the pooled specification (41 log points). Finally, the gap in the joint 
within-firm and occupation (29 log-points) is slightly lower than the gap in the 
within-firm and within-occupation model. Lastly, in Appendix 3(B) we report 
some evidence in favor of the existence of gender differences in risk attitudes 
whereby women tend to avoid jobs entailing  PP more than men. However, the 
amount of self-segregation due to this feature seems to be too small in light of 
the similarity of the gaps in the pooled and WO specifications. Hence, we 
interpret all this evidence as seemingly yielding higher support to the 
“monopsonistic” hypothesis at the joint occupational-firm level than to the 
conventional “occupational segregation” hypothesis in explaining the large 
documented PP gender gap. 
                                                                                 
10 We use the most disaggregated occupational classification available, i.e., 18 occupational categories. 
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One potentially important caveat about the previous results is that so far 
we have implicitly assumed that workers receiving PP and those entitled to 
receive PP were identical populations. However, that assumption may not hold 
if there is a fraction of workers, among those entitled to receive PP, who did not 
get it because of poor job performance or any other reasons (e.g., due to holding 
a different labor contract). In the absence of further information on PP 
entitlement, it seems natural to define an upper bound on the true size of this 
category of workers, by assuming that of all those individuals in our sample 
who did not receive PP (“PP non-recipients”) but happen to work in the same 
firms and occupations as other co-workers who actually were awarded PP, 
belong to this group. In Appendix 3 (C), Tables A.8 and A.9, we provide a 
detailed discussion on the subsample PP non-recipients and their 
characteristics.  The main conclusion to be drawn is that differences by gender 
among this category of workers are not noticeable across sectors and 
occupations.  Further, to check if our main conclusions from Table 6 are altered 
when considering information about "PP non-recipients", we perform the 
following sensitivity analysis. In Table 7, we re-estimate the regressions 
reported in Table 6 considering now a selectivity correction concerning the 
probability of receiving PP among “PP recipients” and “PP non-recipients”, 
namely the sample of workers which are assumed to be entitled to PP. As can 
be observed, the results in Tables 6 and 7 are rather similar supporting once 
more the “monopsonistic” hypothesis against the occupational segregation” 
hypothesis. 
 
Nonetheless, the previous conclusion could be premature if it were to be 
the case that women exert less effort than men in the same occupation and firm 
because of their larger involvement in housework. In such a case, differences in 
effort could also be behind the gap in PP. Lacking a precise measure of 
productivity, it is difficult to test this hypothesis11. However, despite the absence 
of controls on household composition, the fact that our sample consist of full-
time workers and that we control for age, education and tenure – all related to 
productivity- as well as that the overtime hours are similar for men and women 
receiving PP. (although, as discussed in Appendix 3(A)  the proportion of men 
doing overtime in the overall sample of workers is higher than the corresponding 
proportion of women), make us believe that gender differences in effort do not 
play an important role in explaining the gap in PP. One possible test of 
differences in effort can be implemented by checking whether the proportion 
that PP represents over the total hourly wage is lower for women than for men, 
once we control for differences in characteristics and sample selection. The 
insight is simply that higher effort should give rise to a larger proportion of PP. 
As mentioned above, on average, these proportions are 9% for men and 7.2% for 
women. Though not reported for brevity, we have run a similar mincerian 
regression to the one shown in column (5) of Table 6, where the dependent 
                                                                                 
11 In Appendix 3(A), we provide additional evidence to that reported in the main text about gender 
differences in effort exerted at the firm level not driving the gap in PP. We use information on overtime 
hours as a proxy for effort since the individuals considered in our sample are full-time workers. 
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variable is the logit transformation of the above-mentioned proportion.12 We 
obtain that the Female indicator explains less than one-half (0.85 pp.) of the 1.8 
p.p. gap (=9.0-7.2) gap in the proportions. Therefore, we conclude that such a 
difference is too small to be considered as a very relevant factor in explaining the 
gender gap in PP.  
 
4.2.2 Quantile regressions    
 Further evidence on this issue can be obtained from comparing the 
relative pattern of the gender gap throughout the distribution on the PP 
component. Indeed the available theories on female segregation in slow-track 
jobs (aka non-PP jobs in our setup), like Lazear and Rosen ´s (1993), predict that 
gender gaps arise because women face lower probability of being assigned to 
PP jobs even if they are as skilled as men, not because they are subject to within-
job discrimination. However, given that the ability standard for allocation to PP 
jobs is higher for women, it should be expected that the relatively few women 
who are at the top of the PP distribution should receive higher PP 
compensation than their male counterparts. In other words, conditioning on 
observable characteristics, the gender gap should be negative at the top 
percentiles of the PP distribution. By contrast, theories related to lower female 
mobility, like Booth et al. ´s (2003) “sticky floors” hypothesis, predict that 
women at all  percentiles will be paid less than men since there is a higher rent 
to be earned by firms due to women having lower outside opportunities 
because employers perceive that they are less mobile than men.  
To test which of the two previous implications is supported by the data, 
we use quantile regressions (QR) accounting for selectivity corrections under 
the within-firm & occupation specification. Following Buchinsky´s (1998) 
approach, the selectivity correction for workers receiving PP is based on a two-
stage approach. First,  a two-term series expansion of the inverse of the Mills 
ratio in Table 5 is used to obtain an estimate of a latent index that approximates 
the unknown quantile functions of the truncated bivariate distribution for the 
error terms in the wage and participation equations. The covariance matrix for 
the two-stage QR and the selectivity corrected estimates is obtained by 
bootstrapping the design matrix with 100 replications. 
Table 8 reports the QR estimates of the coefficient on the Female dummy 
for a few relevant percentiles of the PP distribution.  A clear “glass ceiling” 
pattern emerges with the gap evolving from 20 log-points at the bottom deciles 
to 43 log points at the top of the distribution.  In line with our previous 
discussion, we interpret again this evidence as being supportive of the existence 
of monopsonistic features in the determination of PP. 
                                                                                 
12  The logit  transformation, ),,()1/ln( +∞−∞∈− RR  achieves consistency with the support 
of the distribution of the error tem in the regression, where )1,0(∈R is the proportion of  PP 
in the total hourly wage. Denoting by b the estimated coefficient in the regression, then the 
effect of the Female dummy, D , on R becomes ).1(/ RbRDR −=δδ  
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5. Decomposing the Gender Gap in PP  
So far, the estimated models have assumed the same market returns 
(coefficients) to male and female characteristics, except the intercept. Since this 
assumption is rejected by the data (p=value 0.023), we next report results 
allowing for different remuneration to observed characteristics for workers in 
the PP sample.  
  Table 9 summarises the results of the slightly modified version of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder gender gap decomposition proposed by Gardeazabal and 
Ugidos (2004) when, as in our  case, there are indicator variables in the hourly 
wage regressions which can take more than two categories (e.g.., education and 
age). The reported results correspond to the WFO specification. In general, the 
results indicate that the contribution of differences in returns to explain the PP 
gender gap (46 log-points) is much larger (88%) than the contribution of 
differences in characteristics (12%). Among the former, the largest components 
are the differences in constant terms (26 log points) and in the returns to age. 
Though we only report the aggregate contribution for all age categories, it is 
worth noticing that the two specific categories where differences in returns are 
larger are the 30-39 and 40-49 groups which jointly account for 5.67 log-points 
out of the 8.46 log- points contributed by age.  This result somewhat points out 
that typical ages where individuals incur in child bearing or other household 
tasks involves a “marriage premium “ for males and a “child/elderly parent 
penalty” for women,  in line with many studies of the gender gap in Spain (see, 
e.g., de la Rica et al. , 2008).  Interestingly, albeit not large, the differences in 
returns to tenure favour women, in agreement with our previous result that 
firms may find it optimal to offer steeper wage-tenure profiles to women than 
to men in order to retain them. Finally, the fact that the female intercept 
accounts for 26 log points of the overall gender gap when in the pooled WFO 
regression it accounted for 29 log-points may just reflect that the lack of 
variables in our dataset capturing civil status and household composition may 
still biasing upwards the size of this coefficient.  
All in all, the result in this section do not change our previous hypothesis 
that the gender gap in PP and the corresponding “glass ceiling” may be well 
due to monopsonistic features in PP jobs, whereby female lower mobility leads 
to a rate of exploitation by firms even when women acquire higher education 
than men to signal their commitment to job stability.    
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5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have used a large cross-section dataset for Spanish 
workers in 2006 to examine whether the gender performance-pay (PP) gap 
differs from the gender gaps in other components of wage compensation. We 
have found evidence that PP responds more to workers´ performance and that 
women in PP jobs have several observable characteristics which are better than 
men ´s (e.g., educational attainments). Yet, our main result is that the gender 
gap in PP is much higher, both in raw terms and adjusted for observable 
characteristics, than the gap in non-PP compensation, and that there are clear 
signs of a “glass ceiling” effect (higher gaps and lower female participation of 
women in the upper parts of the PP distribution).  
According to our empirical results the most likely explanation for these 
findings is the existence of monopsonistic features in the PP segment of the 
labour market, related to women´s lower mobility due to their attachment to 
household tasks, and to a lesser extent on alternative theories explaining 
women ´s segregation in different occupations than men. Among the latter, we 
have also considered gender differences in attitudes towards risk. We find some 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that women are more risk averse than men, 
which leads  them to prefer industries and occupations with more stable 
payment schemes where, therefore, PP represents a lower proportion of the 
overall pay. Nonetheless, the similarity of the estimated gender gaps in the 
pooled and within-occupations specifications lead us to conclude that this self-
segregation phenomenon is not too relevant and that, as stated before, 
monopsonistic features in the PP segment of the labour market seem to provide 
a more plausible explanation of the documented gender gap in PP. .   
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APPENDIX 1: Contribution of PP gender gap to the total gender gap  
 
The total hourly wage ( w ) is defined as the sum of the non-PP/fixed 
component ( f ) and the PP/variable component ( v ). Since
)ln()ln()ln( vfvf +≠+ , it is difficult to compute the gender gap in log points, as 
is customary in the literature. , by means of the difference between the averages 
of logged wages for males (M) as females (F) i.e., as Mwln - Fwln , and then 
proceed to decompose the overall gap into the respective gaps of the fixed and 
variable components.  
 However, such decomposition is straightforward if we express the gaps 
in percent rather than in logged points. In effect, given that:  
vfw +=  
wage averaging for each gender yields: 
                                            MMM vfw +=                                                  (A.1.1) 
                                            FFF vfw +=                                                    (A.1.2) 
Therefore, the following decomposition of the total gender gap (in 
percent) in terms of the two gender gaps of the components (also in percent) 
holds exactly for the restricted sample of PP workers:  
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 where
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f
=α , while for the whole sample of PP and non-PP workers, 
we have: 
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such that  
ALL
PP
N
N
=ϕ , where PPN  and ALLN  are the respective number of 
observations in the restricted and whole samples. Hence, the second terms in 
the RHS of (A.3) and (A.4) are interpreted as the contributions of the gender 
gap in the PP component to the overall gender gap in the two samples. 
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APPENDIX 2: An illustrative model of the gender implications of PP  
 
(A) Competitive wages 
Let us assume that a PP worker of (exogenous) skill δ receives a wage W
per unit of output produced and that firms incur a fixed C of monitoring the 
worker which in a competitive market is paid by the worker. Denoting effort by 
e , output is assumed to be )( e+δ . Effort produces a disutility cost )(ec which is 
increasing and convex. We assume the functional form )1/()( 1 γγ += +eec with 
0>γ . Given women ´s higher involvement in housework, their disutility of 
effort is higher than for men, namely, )1/(1 γφ γ ++e ,  where φ >1. Therefore, we 
can write down the utility of men (M) and women (F) in PP jobs as follows:  
)1/()( 1 γδ γ +−−+= +eCeWU PPM                                                                  (A.2.1) 
)1/()( 1 γφδ γ +−−+= +eCeWU PPF                                                              (A.2.2) 
Regarding non PP jobs, let us assume that the worker produces a 
minimum level of output, say δ , which can be monitored by the firm at no cost 
and does not involve any effort. After all, it is painful to produce output and, in 
the absence of monitoring, the worker can get away without producing any 
more than δ  . This implies that the utility for both men and women of this type 
of job is simply given by: 
                   δWU NPP =                                                                               (A.2.3)  
The workers´ effort decision in PP jobs is simply obtained by equating the 
marginal revenue from exerting effort to its marginal cost. From (A.2.1) and 
(A.2.2), it yields γMeW = and 
γφ FF eW = , whereby γγγ φ FFM eee >= . Substituting these 
two expression into (A.2.1) and (A.2.2), implies that worker FMi ,(= ) will 
choose PP for ,*iδδ >   where  
    NPPFMFMMMM
PP
M UWCeeeeU ==−++
=+
+
=
++ δϕδ
γ
γφδ
γ
γδ γγγγ *1*1*
11
)(        (A.2.4) 
    NPPFFFF
PP
F UWCeeU ==−++
=
+ δδ
γ
γφδ γγ *1*
1
)(                                          (A.2.5) 
Comparing both expressions, we get that MMF δφδδ >= . Thus, assuming 
that the skills distribution is identical across genders, we should expect fewer 
women in PP jobs and, conditionally on receiving PP, higher ability among 
female workers than among male workers.  
Further, if women are aware of discrimination in non- PP jobs where, say, 
they get paid δαWU NPPF = , with 10 << α  , whereas δWU NPPM = , then obviously 
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they will have higher preference for  PP jobs than before.  Moreover, in this case 
women will even be more prominent than men in PP jobs if 1=φ . 
 
(B)  Predetermined wages and job attachment uncertainty 
A slightly different model where wages are no longer given but set by 
employers in order to avoid career interruption can be written using a slight 
adaptation of Lazear and Rosen ´s (1992) model of assignment of workers to 
slow and fast- jobs.  Let us assume that individuals in PP jobs work for two 
periods and are endowed with the same ability δ  which is known to the firm. 
In the initial period, they produce δ  and receive a wage W1.  As a result of 
longer tenure, their productivity in period 2 raises to µδ , where 1>µ  and gets 
paid W2. It is assumed that, workers receive a disutility shock, ω, in both periods 
which may force them to quit the job (say, for family duties). The ω shock is an 
i.i.d.  random variable, independent across periods, with c.d.f. F(ω) which is 
revealed to the worker after the wage in either period has been set by the firm.  
Thus, wages are predetermined and workers will stay in the firm both periods 
as long as Wti - ω ≥ 0, t=1, 2 and i=F, M . 
The key difference between men and women is that the c.d.f. for men, 
FM(ω), is stochastically dominated by the c.d.f. for women FF(ω), namely FM(ω) 
> FF(ω) for ω > 0. This assumption captures the fact that women are more likely 
to be affected by the shock than men. To simplify matters, and without loss of 
generality in terms of the qualitative results, we will assume that dF(.) are 
uniform distributions, such that the density functions verify:  fM(ω) = U[0, εM] 
and fF(ω) = U[0, εF ], with εF > εM. 
To solve for both wages, we proceed backwards in time. Under the 
assumption that the wage in period 2, W2i (i=f, m), is offered before ω is 
realized, employers will choose W2i in order to maximize expected profits in 
period 2, subject to the participation constraint in this period and conditional on 
the probability of staying in the firm during period 1 (equal to iiW ε/1  under a 
uniform distribution), namely:   
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=−=−∫ µδεωµδε              (A.2.6) 
Whereby the first-order condition (f.o.c.) w.r.t. W2i implies that the wage paid in 
equilibrium to male and female workers is identical:13  
W2* = 2/µδ                                                       (A.2.7) 
 and by replacing W2* into the bracketed term in (A.2.6) , the firm ´s profit in 
period 2 (Π*2i) is given by Π*2i =
222
1 4/)( iiW εµδ .  
                                                                                 
13 This is just the average of the worker´ s productivity´ and the outside wage which is assumed to be zero.  
The weight ½ in the average is due to the choice of the uniform distribution in the illustration. Alternative 
distributions will give rise to a weighted average with unequal weights.   
63 
 
 Going back to period 1, firms will choose W1i to maximize the sum of expected 
profits in both periods, subject to the participation constraint in that period, i.e. 
                     ( ) FMiWdW
i
iW
i
i
W
i
i
,},)(
4
1{max 22
2
1
0 1
1
1
=+−∫ µδεωδε
               (A.2.7) 
which implies that: 
                               
i
iW ε
µδδ
8
)(
2
2
*
1 +=                                                            (A.2.8) 
 Since MF εε > , it follows that
*
1
*
1 FM WW > . Given that, for the sameδ , 
*
2
*
2 FM WW = , it follows that the return to tenure ( )*1*2 ii WW − is higher for women 
than for men.   
Non-PP jobs can be interpreted in terms of this model as implying that 
,1=µ  that is, a flatter wage profile. From (A.2.7) and (A.2.8) with 1=µ , we get 
that wages in non-PP jobs are lower than in PP jobs.  
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APPENDIX 3: Additional gender differences and their effect on the PP gap 
(A) Gender differences in exerted effort (measured by overtime hours)  
Gender differences in PP compensation could be due to differences in 
"effort" exerted by men and women, respectively, in similar jobs. Since effort is 
hard to monitor, firms are bound to interpret it broadly, including workers´ 
willingness to work irregular hours and to avoid long parental leaves. Women 
may be pushed to exert less "effort" and to have "less job attachment" due to 
their larger involvement in housework and motherhood responsibilities, 
specially while childrearing.  Understanding "effort" in such a broad way may 
possibly lead employers to perceive mothers as less committed workers and, as 
a result, firms may be more reluctant in providing access to "fast track" jobs to 
these women.   
This type of firms´ behavior makes it unlikely that women with young 
children would return to the occupation and wage patterns they enjoyed before 
their children were born, leading to high persistence in the observed PP gender 
gap. Further, if women anticipate this type of employers´ behavior, they may 
segregate themselves into specific occupations/sectors where their 
family/personal chores become less penalized. 
The aim of this Appendix is precisely to shed some light on the role 
played by "differences in effort" in explaining the documented gender gap in 
PP. Measuring individuals' effort is a difficult task, and even harder is to 
identify whether there are differences by gender in workers´ effort within the 
firm. Indeed, the lack of information on civil status and number of children of 
workers in our database prevents us from testing properly for differences in 
effort between men and women with children, or between women with 
children and those without them. In view of these shortcomings, , the only issue 
we can address is whether there are gender differences in terms of "effort" 
broadly understood as discussed in the sequel.  
The length of the workday could be considered as an imperfect measure 
of the level of effort that a worker exerts in the labor market and therefore of job 
engagement.  However, since we have focused exclusively on full-time workers 
in this paper, this implies that even if the women are more involved in 
housework than men are, they have already decided not to reduce their labor 
market attachment by working part-time. Therefore, at least a priori, we should 
expect similar degree of commitment across genders except for their disposition 
to work from overtime. In other words, if women in our sample decide to put 
less "effort" in the job due to housework and/or motherhood burden, they will 
work less overtime. In our sample, the proportion of men working overtime 
(9.36%) nearly trebles the corresponding female proportion (3.35%). Table A.1 
shows the percentage of workers doing overtime by gender, occupation and 
payment scheme (PP and no PP workers). As can be observed, the proportion of 
men working overtime is higher than women's in some occupations- such as 
managers, professionals, agriculture and fisheries, and operators and 
assemblers. 
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Table A.1: Incidence of overtime by gender, occupation and Payment 
scheme 
  Non PP Jobs PP Jobs 
  Males Females Males Females 
Managers 1.20% 1.10% 1.00% 0.20% 
Professionals 1.80% 1.80% 1.00% 1.20% 
Technicians 4.70% 5.60% 1.70% 2.30% 
Clerks 6.10% 6.60% 2.30% 3.00% 
Personal Services 9.00% 7.10% 2.20% 2.40% 
Agriculture and Fisheries 5.20% 1.40% 2.80% 0.00% 
Craftsmen 10.10% 19.50% 8.10% 9.80% 
Operators and Assemblers 12.40% 19.00% 8.90% 10.50% 
Laborers, non-qualified operators 11.00% 13.60% 6.10% 5.80% 
 
To check if the observed gender differences in overtime are statistically 
significant, we proceed  to test two null hypothesis: i) the same proportion of 
workers doing overtime by gender;  and, ii) gender equality in average 
overtime hours worked within a specific job and within a payment scheme, for 
those working overtime. The alternative hypotheses considered are one-sided 
(i.e., women exert less "effort" than men) implying:  i) lower female 
participation in overtime and, ii) lower average overtime hours for those 
women who work overtime. The results (percentage of men and women doing 
overtime by occupation, t values and p-values for the above mentioned 
hypothesis tests) are provided in Tables A.2 to A.5 and can be summarized as 
follows. On the one hand, Hypothesis (i) is rejected against the alternative of 
higher participation by males in all the occupations (but agriculture and 
fisheries) at 5% level, both considering the whole sample and the restricted 
sample of PP workers. On the other hand, Hypothesis (ii)  is also rejected at 5% 
level against the corresponding one-sided alternative in all occupations (when 
all workers are pooled to perform the test) but agriculture and fisheries. 
However, when only PP workers are considered, we cannot reject the null of 
equal overtime hours in most cases.   
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Table A.2.Hypothesis Test: Mean Differences in Percentage of Workers doing 
Overtime by job and gender. All workers 
  % Working Overtime   Hypothesis Test   
  Male  Female 
  Ho: diff =0 Ha: diff > 0 
  
t Pr(T > t)  
All occupations 9.40% 3.40%   48.008 0.000 *** 
Managers 1.20% 0.60%   1.878 0.030 *** 
Professionals 1.80% 1.00%   4.649 0.000 *** 
Technicians 5.00% 1.90%   13.76 0.000 *** 
Clerks 6.20% 2.40%   15.028 0.000 *** 
Personal Services 8.60% 2.30%   19.236 0.000 *** 
Agriculture and Fisheries 4.60% 2.30%   0.725 0.234   
Craftsmen 11.70% 8.40%   5.916 0.000 *** 
Operators and Assemblers 13.60% 9.20%   8.883 0.000 *** 
Laborers, non-qualified operators 11.40% 6.00%   13.077 0.000 *** 
Note:  diff = mean (Male) - mean (Female) 
Rejection criteria: (***) Accept the alternative at 5% level;   (**) Accept the alternative at 
10% level;  
( *)  Accept the alternative at 15% level 
 
Table A.3.Hypothesis Test: Mean Differences in Percentage of Workers doing 
Overtime by job and gender. PP workers 
  % Working Overtime   Hypothesis Test   
  Male  Female 
  Ho: diff =0 Ha: diff > 0 
  
t Pr(T > t)  
All Occupations 10.70% 3.20%   27.24 0 *** 
Managers 1.10% 0.20%   2.22 0.013 *** 
Professionals 1.80% 1.20%   1.797 0.036 *** 
Technicians 5.60% 2.30%   7.689 0 *** 
Clerks 6.60% 3.00%   6.661 0 *** 
Personal Services 7.10% 2.40%   6.73 0 *** 
Agriculture and Fisheries 1.40% 0.00%   0.338 0.368   
Craftsmen 19.50% 9.80%   5.216 0 *** 
Operators and Assemblers 19.00% 10.50%   6.354 0 *** 
Laborers, non-qualified 
operators 13.60% 5.80% 
  6.351 0 *** 
Note:  diff = mean (Male) - mean (Female) 
Rejection criteria: (***) Accept the alternative at 5% level;   (**) Accept the alternative at 
10% level;  
( *)  Accept the alternative at 15% level 
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Table A.4.Hypothesis Test: Mean Differences in Overtime Hours Worked by 
job and gender. All workers 
  
Overtime Hours 
Worked 
  
Hypothesis Test   
  Male  Female 
  Ho: diff2=0 Ha: diff2> 0 
  
t Pr(T > t)  
All Occupations 15.54 14.03   1.293 0 *** 
Managers 14.35 32.43   -1.854 0.945   
Professionals 17.18 14.86   1.149 0.126 * 
Technicians 14.71 12.65   2.019 0.022 *** 
Clerks 15.38 11.56   4.037 0.000 *** 
Personal Services 23.87 12.68   8.634 0.000 *** 
Agriculture and Fisheries1 13.48 16   -  -    
Craftsmen 14.39 14.65   -0.28 0.610   
Operators and Assemblers 14.1 14.2   -0.154 0.561   
Laborers, non-qualified 
operators 19.28 16.13   
3.741 0.000 *** 
Note: 1There is only 1 female working overtime and the test is therefore not performed. 
2diff = mean(Male) - mean(Female) 
Rejection criteria: (***) Accept the alternative at 5% level;  (**) Accept the alternative at 
10% level;  
( *)  Accept the alternative at 15% level 
 
Table A.5.Hypothesis Test: Mean Differences in Overtime Hours Worked by 
job and gender. PP workers 
  
Overtime Hours 
Worked 
Hypothesis 
Test 
  
 
  Male  Female 
  Ho: diff =0 Ha: diff > 0   
  t Pr(T > t)  
All Occupations 14.27 12.815   1.994 0.023 *** 
Managers 13.96 16.000   - -   
Professionals 20.64 21.813   -0.240 0.595   
Technicians 13.45 11.422   1.133 0.129   
Clerks 12.02 9.770   1.440 0.076 *** 
Personal Services 17.49 9.940   3.246 0.001 *** 
Agriculture and Fisheries1 16 -   - -   
Craftsmen 14.09 15.085   49.171 0.664   
Operators and Assemblers 14.42 13.951   0.306 0.380   
Laborers, non-qualified operators 14.89 13.714   0.528 0.299   
 
Summing up, the above-mentioned results confirm that the proportion of 
men working overtime is higher than the corresponding female proportion 
across different occupations both in the whole sample and in the restricted 
sample of those receiving PP. By contrast, in general we do not find significant 
mean differences by gender in the number of overtime hours performed by 
workers receiving PP.  
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To identify if differences in effort play a role in explaining the observed 
gender PP gap, the exercise performed in the previous section is repeated here 
(see Table A.6) including as additional variables an indicator (1/0) for those 
working Overtime, interacted additionally with Female, plus the ratio between 
overtime hours worked and regular time in job. As can be observed, working 
overtime does not have significant effects on the gender PP gap. Hence, we 
interpret this preliminary evidence as further support for the "monopsonistic 
hypothesis". 
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Table A.6. Estimates of alternative specifications of log hourly wage equation 
for PP workers corrected for selectivity 
 
Dependent variable: Log PP Hourly Wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
OLS 
Heckman 
selection 
WF WO WFO 
            
Female -0.425*** -0.469*** -0.358*** -0.430***    -0.244*** 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Overtime -0.294*** -0.296*** -0.184*** -0.174*** -0.049 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) 
Overtime*Female 0.054 0.050 0.070 -0.033 -0.031 
(0.065) (0.063) (0.053) (0.062) (0.055) 
Overtime/Regular Time -5.909** -5.782** -2.350 -5.119** -3.810* 
(2.503) (2.464) (2.177) (2.416) (2.277) 
Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 0.252*** 0.328*** 0.218*** 0.283*** 0.164*** 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) 
Age 41-49 0.325*** 0.370*** 0.276*** 0.303*** 0.173*** 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age 50-59 0.315*** 0.339*** 0.250*** 0.283*** 0.140*** 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) 
Age >60 0.580*** 0.514*** 0.370*** 0.386*** 0.163*** 
(0.044) (0.051) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) 
College (ref: Primary) 0.767*** 1.294*** 0.649*** 0.889*** 0.389*** 
(0.020) (0.063) (0.128) (0.053) (0.132) 
Secondary 0.105*** 0.361*** 0.139** 0.287*** 0.096 
(0.018) (0.035) (0.064) (0.029) (0.067) 
Tenure 0.023*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.061*** 0.041*** 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) 
Tenure_sq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Indefinite contract 0.451*** 0.531*** 0.415*** 0.468*** 0.411*** 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021) (0.029) 
Exporting firm 0.119*** 0.258***   0.275***   
(0.016) (0.024)   (0.020)   
Firm Size:  50-199 -0.108*** 0.234***   0.307***   
Ref: <50) (0.018) (0.044)   (0.037)   
Firm Size: >199 -0.192*** 0.351***   0.483***   
(0.017) (0.067)   (0.056)   
Firm  Agreement -0.179***         
(0.016)         
Inv. Mills Ratio   1.541*** 0.156 1.882*** 0.354 
  (0.167) (0.379) (0.141) (0.398) 
Constant -1.065*** -4.123*** -1.471** -4.360*** -1.584** 
(0.028) (0.333) (0.601) (0.279) (0.629) 
            
Observations 44249 195163 44249 44249 44249 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 (B) Women segregation in no PP jobs as a result of gender differences in risk attitudes  
So far, the "monopsonistic" and "mommy track" hypotheses have been 
considered as competing plausible explanations for the gender PP gap. 
However the economic literature considers additional potential rationalizations 
of this gender wage gap related to the so-called "soft factors", comprising 
differences in attitudes, preferences and traits between men and women (for 
instance differences in competitiveness, negotiating skills, etc.).  Among these 
alternative (complementary) determinants of the gender gap in PP,  differences 
in attitudes towards risk between men and women appear as a particularly 
relevant factor. In effect, the economic experimental literature provides 
evidence in favor of gender differences in risk preferences (see, e.g., the surveys 
by Croson and Gneezy, 2009, and Eckel and Grossman, 2008) where women are 
portrayed as being more risk adverse than men. 
In our specific setup, risk-related factors underlying pay differences can 
be analyzed by considering the differences between base pay and PP, since the 
process determining the former component is very different from that 
determining PP compensation. The comparison of the gender gaps in these two 
pay components pay will allow us to analyze the extent to which the gender 
pay gap varies with the amount of risk in pay borne by the individual.  The 
rationale for gender differences in variable pay is as follows. On the one hand, if 
firms consider that women are more likely to quit the firm than men due to 
family or other non-job- related reasons, they may find it optimal to offer 
women labour contracts where they bear the risk of career interruptions.  In 
such a case, women will exhibit a higher proportion of PP in their overall pay. 
On the other hand, by contrast, if women are more risk averse than men, it is 
likely that they will select themselves into jobs and firms where pay is more 
stable. Hence, under this second hypothesis, women will exhibit a lower 
proportion of PP in their overall pay. 
Figures A.1 to A.4 show how women and men are distributed across 
industries, according with the information available in EES 2006. Most of firms 
hire both men and women in all industries (red line). However, there are "male 
industries" such as mining and construction, where most firms hire exclusively 
men (the average percentage of women hired over total workers in these two 
sectors is 7% and 9% respectively). Likewise, it is interesting to stress that 
"Female industries" (i.e., those with higher feminization rates- average % of 
women over total workers in a firm – like Health, Education, Hotels & 
Restaurants and Other Services) are the ones which have a lower percentage of 
firms offering PP. Nevertheless, segregation of women in industries with less 
incidence of PP is not obvious from this Figure, since the Financial 
Intermediation sector, where the percentage of firms paying PP is highest, 
employs a nearly equal number of men and women (its feminization rate is 
around 46%). 
Once we focus exclusively on firms paying PP that hire both male and 
female workers, we observe that women tend to concentrate more in those 
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industries with a lower proportion of firms paying PP. Additionally, the 
incidence of PP is higher among men than among women in all industries. 
When considering occupations, the same pattern emerges: the incidence of PP 
among women is higher in those occupations where the feminization index is 
lower (except in those "male" occupations, where both PP and feminization are 
low). Thus, these patterns are seemingly in line with the hypothesis related to 
gender differences in risk aversion, namely, being more risk averse than men, 
women tend to segregate into jobs where the incidence of PP is lower. 
However, once we restrict the analysis to men and women working in firms 
where PP is paid, we observe that the proportion of women receiving PP is 
higher than men´s, which would be consistent with our first hypothesis about 
firms offering women compensation schemes rewarding effort and penalizing 
quits. 
Figure A.1 PP firms and feminization rates by sector. All firms in ESS 
2006 
Note: Industry Feminization rate is defined as the average ratio within a sector of the number of 
women in a firm/ Total employees in a firm. PP firms are defined as those firms that pay at least one 
of its workers PP. 
 Figure A.2 Performance Pay incidence and Feminization. Only firms hiring 
both men & women in ESS 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A.3 Performance Pay incidence, by gender. Only firms hiring both 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4 Performance Pay incidence and feminization, by 
firms hiring both men & women in ESS 2006
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
men & women in ESS 2006 
occupation. Only 
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Figure A.5 Performance Pay incidence, by gender. Only firms hiring both 
men & women in ESS 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To shed some light on the above-mentioned arguments, we analyze how 
the gender pay gap varies across pay components for those individuals that 
receive PP within narrowly defined occupations. As described in section 2, we 
can distinguish among different types of payments: wage ordinary (base wage 
and other complements due to shifts, tenure, job risks, etc.) and non-ordinary 
(Fixed Annual Non-ordinary Payments and Variable Annual Non-ordinary 
Payments -performance pay-) components of annual gross earnings. 
Specifically, in this section, we complement the QR estimates of the 
coefficient on the Female dummy throughout the PP distribution reported in 
Table 8 by providing equivalent QR estimates for Total hourly wage and Total 
hourly ordinary wage. These are presented in Tables A.7 and A.8, respectively. 
Notice that the Fixed Annual Non-ordinary Payments component of non-
ordinary pay is omitted from this comparison since it is established at the 
collective bargaining level and therefore is bound to neither depend on 
workers´ or firms´ performance nor on differences in gender attitudes towards 
risk. 
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Table A.7 Adjusted Gender Wage Gaps – Quantile Regressions  
(with selection correction) 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Total Wage 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  P10th P25th P50th P75th P90th 
Female 
(WFO)   
-0.197*** -0.192*** -0.201*** -0.218*** -0.235*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
            
Note: s.e´s. in parentheses.  Estimations also control for the whole set of covariates (age, 
education, tenure, type of contract) as well as firm & occupational fixed effects (WFO).  
 
 
Table A.8 Adjusted Gender Wage Gaps – Quantile Regressions  
(with selection correction) 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly ordinary Wage 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  P10th P25th P50th P75th P90th 
Female 
(WFO)   
-0.086*** -0.126*** -0.148*** -0.175*** -0.199*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
            
Note: s.e´s. in parentheses.  Estimations also control for the whole set of covariates (age, 
education, tenure, type of contract) as well as firm & occupational fixed effects (WFO).  
 
When considering the QR for the hourly ordinary wage, a statistically 
significant gender gap emerges at all percentiles (ranging from 8.6% in the 10th 
percentile to almost 20% in the 90th percentile). However, the gender gap in the 
distribution of hourly ordinary wages is quite lower than the gap in the 
distribution of PP hourly wage at all percentiles. The same holds when QR 
estimates of the coefficients of female dummies of the total hourly wage are 
compared with equivalent coefficients for the PP hourly wage.  
Our results seemingly point out that, since women are less willing to bear 
risk than men, they tend to sort into occupations with more stable earnings. 
These occupations, due to compensating wage differentials in environments 
with risk-averse agents, tend to pay less on average, explaining in this fashion 
the lower gender gap observed in ordinary hourly wages. Moreover since 
women are more risk averse than men, they tend to negotiate wages with 
higher ordinary wages and lower PP, which would explain why the gender  
gap in total hourly wage is higher than the gender wage gap in ordinary wage 
which, in turn, is lower than the gender wage gap in PP hourly wages.  
Therefore, a preliminary conclusion from these results could be that differences 
in attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards negotiation cannot be discarded 
as additional explanatory factors behind the observed gender wage gaps. 
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(C) Misclassification of PP jobs. A sensitivity analysis 
Table A.9 reports the proportions of non receivers across gender 
occupations and industries.  Differences by gender are not noticeable when 
comparing these proportions by sector and occupation (by sector, the incidence 
of not receivers is higher among women in commerce transport and financial 
intermediation whereas, by occupation, the incidence is higher among men in 
clerks and agricultural workers) 
 
A clearer pattern emerges when the probability of receiving PP by gender 
and education is compared with:  i) the probability of working in a PP firm-job 
(that is within a firm and a job where at least one worker receives PP) and ii) the 
probability of being a non receiver.  Table A.10 reports predicted probabilities 
by gender and educational attainment. Gender differences increase as the 
educational attainment increases, both for the probability of receiving PP and of 
working in a PP firm. Gender differences in the probability of being a non 
receiver has a U-shaped form when it is depicted by educational level. This 
indicates that: i) women are less likely to work in firms and jobs in which PP is 
paid (women segregation in jobs/firms), and ii) once they are working in PP-
jobs firms, the probability of not receiving any PP is higher for them.  
 
To check if our main conclusions in section 4.2 are altered when 
considering information about "non receivers", we perform the following 
sensitivity analysis: We re-estimate , (i) pooled (P), (ii) within- occupations 
(WO), (iii) within-firm  (WF), and (iv) within-firm & occupation (WFO) 
regressions including in the sample of all workers (receiving or not PP) in firms 
and occupations where  at least some one worker has obtained PP in 2006.  
Results in Table A.11 support once more the “monopsonistic” hypothesis 
against the conventional “occupational segregation” hypothesis. 
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Male 
 
Managers Professionals Technicians Clerks 
Personal 
Services 
Agriculture Craftsmen Operators 
Non 
Qualified 
Mine 0.00% 5.90% 7.40% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 11.50% 0.00% 15.00% 
Manufactures 6.10% 9.20% 15.40% 3.70% 2.90% 0.00% 7.30% 6.40% 4.30% 
Energy 16.00% 14.90% 22.30% 7.70% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 13.50% 23.10% 
Construction 5.00% 13.80% 12.90% 1.60% 5.30% 0.00% 13.50% 0.00% 2.90% 
Commerce 9.40% 5.70% 16.80% 9.70% 12.40% 0.00% 3.40% 10.40% 6.60% 
Hotels & Restaurants 6.70% 9.80% 5.70% 8.40% 7.40% 0.00% 3.80% 0.00% 6.90% 
Transport 9.30% 14.50% 12.70% 11.00% 7.50% - 14.80% 8.60% 7.10% 
Financial Intermediation 14.30% 12.30% 22.00% 19.30% 0.00% - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Real State & Rental Services 8.80% 16.90% 17.70% 9.10% 9.90% 0.00% 20.40% 17.00% 7.90% 
Education 1.70% 8.40% 10.10% 8.40% 1.60% 0.00% 6.30% 0.00% 7.30% 
Health 0.00% 16.10% 6.90% 7.70% 5.70% 0.00% 0.00% 7.70% 3.00% 
Other Services 4.20% 8.90% 6.50% 8.80% 4.20% 0.00% 3.00% 1.40% 6.90% 
Female 
 
Managers Professionals Technicians Clerks 
Personal 
Services 
Agriculture Craftsmen Operators 
Non 
Qualified 
Mine 1.50% 6.50% 7.90% 5.30% 0.00% 0.00% 8.40% 4.40% 1.30% 
Manufactures 4.80% 9.80% 12.10% 6.10% 1.70% 4.00% 6.40% 7.00% 3.20% 
Energy 10.40% 16.70% 23.20% 9.10% 5.00% 0.00% 10.10% 12.40% 13.10% 
Construction 3.00% 11.70% 8.90% 5.10% 4.40% 0.00% 8.50% 4.50% 3.30% 
Commerce 7.20% 8.60% 15.10% 8.50% 11.60% 0.00% 6.30% 4.30% 5.70% 
Hotels & Restaurants 1.40% 11.50% 7.90% 7.20% 8.90% 0.00% 3.80% 0.00% 4.70% 
Transport 3.70% 7.10% 12.90% 7.50% 2.60% 0.00% 5.20% 4.80% 5.60% 
Financial Intermediation 13.40% 10.50% 21.00% 19.30% 0.00% - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Real State & Rental Services 9.00% 18.90% 17.90% 15.40% 11.80% 3.20% 9.70% 12.80% 9.30% 
Education 2.10% 10.00% 10.60% 7.80% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.00% 5.50% 
Health 0.00% 15.00% 6.00% 15.90% 5.80% 0.00% 1.80% 3.60% 5.10% 
Other Services 6.00% 6.00% 8.60% 10.80% 7.70% 8.20% 4.40% 4.80% 7.50% 
A.9. Percentage of individuals working in PP jobs but who did not receive PP, by occupation and sector of activity 
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Table A.10 Predicted probability of being a PP worker, Predicted probability 
of being working in a PP firm-job and Predicted probability of being a non 
receiver 
Predicted Probability  
of receiving PP 
Predicted Probability 
of working in PP 
firms 
Predicted Probability 
of being a non 
receiver 
  Men Women   Men Women   Men Women 
Primary 
0.147 0.142 
  
0.212 0.216   0.308 0.339 
(0.093) (0.088) (0.129) (0.130)   (0.102) (0.106) 
Secondary 
0.229 0.218 
  
0.311 0.307   0.262 0.289 
(0.135) (0.128) (0.174) (0.170)   (0.099) -0.106 
University 
0.345 0.29 
  
0.469 0.414   0.276 0.321 
(0.172) (0.168) (0.203) (0.208)   (0.119) (0.125) 
                  
  
78 
 
 
 
 
Table A.11. Dependent Variable: log PP wage component 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
OLS 
Heckman 
selection 
Within 
Firm 
Within 
Occupations 
Within 
Firm-
Occupation 
            
Female -0.407*** -0.425*** -0.320*** -0.387*** -0.207*** 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 0.257*** 0.370*** 0.092** 0.303*** 0.024 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.041) (0.025) (0.043) 
Age 41-49 0.334*** 0.429*** 0.174*** 0.346*** 0.061 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.037) (0.025) (0.039) 
Age 50-59 0.326*** 0.396*** 0.178*** 0.328*** 0.059* 
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.034) 
Age >60 0.601*** 0.623*** 0.363*** 0.500*** 0.159*** 
(0.044) (0.053) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039) 
College (ref: Primary) 0.793*** 0.888*** 0.505*** 0.350*** 0.174*** 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.039) (0.027) (0.043) 
Secondary 0.109*** 0.200*** 0.018 0.063*** -0.057 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.036) (0.022) (0.039) 
Tenure 0.023*** 0.054*** 0.003 0.048*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) 
Tenure square -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Permanent Contract 0.450*** 0.592*** 0.254*** 0.507*** 0.239*** 
(0.020) (0.034) (0.052) (0.028) (0.054) 
Firm Size:  50-199 -0.126*** -0.325***   -0.322***   
Ref: <50) (0.018) (0.037)   (0.031)   
Firm Size: >199 -0.209*** -0.495***   -0.480***   
(0.017) (0.046)   (0.038)   
Firm Agreement -0.188***         
(0.016)         
Exporting firm 0.114*** 0.153***   0.142***   
(0.016) (0.020)   (0.016)   
Inv. Mills Ratio   1.546*** -1.666*** 1.506*** -1.690*** 
  (0.263) (0.520) (0.223) (0.543) 
Constant -1.107*** -2.098*** -0.025 -1.612*** 0.208 
(0.028) (0.169) (0.385) (0.143) (0.402) 
No. Obs. 44249 61615 44249 44249 44249 
R-squared 0.165 0.166 0.109 0.086 0.065 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
79 
 
 
Figures and Tables (Main text) 
Figure 1.  Gender wage gaps (Total, Non-PP and PP components) 
- Whole Sample (in percent)-  
 
 
Figure 2.  Gender wage gaps and the contribution of PP component 
- Sample of PP workers (in percent)- 
 
Note: Graphs depicted in Figure 2 stand for the decomposition of the gender gap described in 
Appendix 1.  
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Table 1 – Sample characteristics (Full-time workers between 18-65 
years) 
 
Variables Women (65,233)  Men (129,930) Ho: µW= µM 
  
Mean Mean p-value test  
Individual Characteristics       
Education 
Primary or less 0.176 0.275 0.000 
Secondary 0.508 0.545 0.000 
University 0.316 0.180 0.000 
Age       
Less 30 years 0.257 0.200 0.000 
31-40 0.354 0.323 0.000 
41-50 0.245 0.265 0.000 
>50 0.143 0.212 0.000 
Tenure (years) 7.41 8.867 0.000 
Permanent Contract 0.727 0.768 0.000 
Wages       
Total Hourly Wage (logs) 2.185 2.391 0.000 
Performance Pay       
% PP job 0.227 0.227 0.000 
Total Hourly PP (only PP workers) 1.127 1.958 0.000 
Firm Characteristics       
Size       
<50 workers 0.339 0.403 0.000 
51-200 workers 0.265 0.288 0.000 
>200 workers 0.396 0.309 0.000 
Firm Bargaining Agreement. 0.163 0.194 0.000 
Exporting firms 0.163 0.194 0.000 
 Source: EES (2006)     
 
 
Note: The hypothesis of equal means (proportions) for men and women is tested. P-
values of the tests are reported in third column. The equal variance hypothesis is 
rejected for tenure, total hourly wages and total hourly PP.  Differences are statistically 
significant for all variables considered 
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Table 2a: Characteristics of workers and firms by type of job and gender 
 
  
Performance Pay Job Non-Performance Pay Jobs 
  Women  Men  Ho:  Women  Men  Ho:  
(14.789 obs) (29.460 obs)  µWPP= µMPP (50.444 obs) (100.470 obs)  µWPP= µMPP 
Variables Mean Mean 
p-value 
µWPP≠µMPP Mean Mean 
p-value 
µWPP≠µMPP 
Education             
Primary or less 0.107 0.178 0.000 0.196 0.304 0.000 
Secondary 0.494 0.545 0.000 0.512 0.545 0.000 
University 0.399 0.277 0.000 0.292 0.151 0.000 
Age             
Less 30 years 0.204 0.149 0.000 0.273 0.215 0.000 
31-40 0.381 0.313 0.000 0.346 0.325 0.000 
41-50 0.265 0.294 0.000 0.239 0.257 0.000 
>50 0.150 0.244 0.000 0.141 0.203 0.000 
Tenure (years) 9.281 12.037 0.000 6.861 7.938 0.000 
Permanent 
Contract 
0.814 0.862 
0.000 
0.741 0.741 
0.000 
Firm Characteristics           
Size             
<50 workers 0.201 0.235 0.000 0.380 0.452 0.000 
51-200 workers 0.239 0.297 0.000 0.272 0.285 0.000 
>200 workers 0.560 0.467 0.000 0.348 0.262 0.000 
Collective Bargaining: ref: 
Industry level 
          
Firm Collective 
Bargaining  0.193 0.288 0.000 0.154 0.167 0.000 
Firm Market (ref: International Market)       
Local or Nat. 
Market   
0.181 0.239 0.000 0.135 0.153 0.000 
 
 
 
Note: The hypothesis of equal means (proportions) for men and women is tested. P-
values of the tests are reported in third column. The equal variance hypothesis is 
rejected for tenure, total hourly wages and total hourly PP both in PP workers and no 
PP workers.  Differences are statistically significant for all variables considered 
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Table 2b: Incidence of PP by industry and occupation 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs.   
Industries   
Financial Intermediation 0.598 0.49 10475   
Energy 0.324 0.468 4627   
Transportation 0.324 0.468 12710   
Health 0.287 0.452 14178   
Retail trade 0.241 0.427 17131   
Manufactures 0.205 0.404 74332   
Real State and Res. Serv. 0.194 0.395 16342   
Mine & Extractive Ind. 0.188 0.391 2919   
Other Services 0.146 0.353 9040   
Construction 0.127 0.333 17096   
Hotels and Restaurants 0.123 0.328 8315   
Education 0.092 0.289 7998   
Occupations   
Managers 0.497 0.5 6190   
Technicians 0.326 0.469 30184   
Professionals 0.288 0.453 20295   
Clerks 0.257 0.437 24761   
Personal Services 0.196 0.397 17528   
Operators and Assemblers 0.18 0.384 34822   
Craftsmen 0.169 0.375 37918   
Agriculture and Fisheries 0.146 0.353 542   
Laborers, non-qualified operators 0.127 0.333 22923   
        
 
 
 
Table 2c:  Share of women throughout PP distribution 
 
  % Women in percentile 
 
[p1th-p10th]  40.6%  
[p11th-p25th]  40.3%  
[p26th-p50th]  39.5%  
[p51th-p75th]  32.0%  
[p76th-p90th]  24.8%  
[p91th-p95th]  18.6%  
[p95th-p100th]  15.9% 
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Table 3a:  Hourly Wages in PP and Non-PP Jobs 
 
 
  Pay Performance Jobs Non-Performance Pay 
Jobs 
  Women Men Women Men 
  Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
Ratio Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
Ratio Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
PP/Total  
Wage (%) 
PP/Total  
Wage(%) 
       
Average 14.503 7.164 19.144 9.012 9.678 11.665 
P10th 6.060 0.976 7.801 0.009 3.721 4.689 
P25th 8.577 2.087 10.804 0.025 5.884 7.308 
P50th 12.479 4.657 16.051 0.060 8.126 9.826 
P75th 18.800 9.491 23.546 0.127 12.048 14.192 
P90th  24.842   16.684    33.127     0.217    17.795    20.162 
 
 
 
Table 3b:  Hourly wage components for workers receiving PP (in €) 
 
    Women    Men 
    PP wage 
Other wage 
components 
  PP wage 
Other wage 
components  
            
Average 1.127 13.376 
 
1.958 17.186 
P10th 0.102 5.648 
 
0.132 7.031 
P25th 0.225 7.850 
 
0.324 9.675 
P50th 0.539 11.679 
 
0.89 14.758 
P75th 1.311 17.509 
 
2.198 21.694 
P90th 2.594 22.828 
 
4.493 29.597 
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Table 4: Log hourly wage regressions   
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Total Wage 
  (1) (2) (3) 
PP Workers Non-PP Workers Pooled 
PP Job 
    0.208*** 
    (0.009) 
Female 
-0.223*** -0.212*** -0.219*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 
0.139*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 41-49 
0.199*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 50-59 
0.227*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age >60 
0.262*** 0.155*** 0.158*** 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008) 
College  
(ref: Primary) 
0.277*** 0.223*** 0.215*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Secondary 0.077*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tenure 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure sq. -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Permanent Contract 0.282*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Size:  50-199 
(Ref: <50) 
0.067*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Size: >199 0.118*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm  Agreement 0.011 0.015* 0.013* 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Export market 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.045*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interactions with PP        
Female*PP     -0.007 
    (0.005) 
Age 30-39*PP (ref:<30)     -0.047*** 
    (0.007) 
Age 41-49*PP     -0.029*** 
    (0.008) 
Age 50-59*PP     0.072*** 
    (0.010) 
Age >60*PP     0.101*** 
    (0.016) 
College*PP  
(ref: Primary) 
    0.089*** 
    -0.007 
Secondary*PP     0.030*** 
    (0.006) 
Tenure*PP                                       0.011*** 
    (0.004) 
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Permanent Contract*PP     -0.025*** 
      (0.007) 
Firm Size:  (ref<50) 
50-199*PP     
-0.027*** 
(0.006) 
Firm Size: >199*PP     -0.042*** 
    (0.006) 
Firm  Agreement*PP     -0.006** 
    (0.003) 
Export. Firm *PP     -0.014*** 
      (0.006) 
No. Observations 44249 150914 195163 
R sq. 0.605 0.511 0.573 
 
Note: S.e´s. in parentheses.  Estimations also control for industry dummies (11) 
and occupational dummies (8). 
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Table 5: Probit estimation 
Dependent Variable: Receiving Performance Pay (1/0) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Female -0.047*** -0.103*** -0.066*** 
(0.008) (0.016) (0.022) 
Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 0.052*** 0.016** 0.032*** 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) 
Age 40-49 0.032*** 0.002 0.018 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age 50-59 0.015 -0.01 -0.010 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age >60 -0.076*** -0.099*** -0.137*** 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.025) 
University  
(ref: Primary) 
0.260*** 0.262*** 0.543*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Secondary 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.238*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Tenure 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure square -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Permanent Contract 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.152*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Firm Size:  50-199 0.295*** 0.301*** 0.287*** 
(Ref: <50) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Firm Size: >199 0.485*** 0.478*** 0.532*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Firm Collective Agreement 0.096** 0.120*** 0.095*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Exporting firm 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.097*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Interactions with female 
Age 30-39*Female    -0.047*** -0.048*** 
Ref:<30)   (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 40-49*Female   -0.031*** -0.032*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) 
Age 50-59*Female   0.072*** 0.074*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
Age >60*Female   0.062 0.064 
  (0.052) (0.051) 
University * Female (ref: 
Primary) 
    -0.084*** 
    (0.022) 
Secondary * Female       0.059*** 
    (0.020) 
No. Observations 195163 195163 195163 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.123 0.110 
Note: S.e´s. in parentheses  
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Table 6: Estimates of alternative specifications of log PP hourly wage equation corrected 
for selectivity (PP vs. all workers) 
Dependent Variable: log PP hourly wage component 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS 
Heckman 
selection 
Within 
Firm 
Within 
Occupations 
Within Firm-
Occupation 
Female 
-0.407*** -0.453*** -0.343*** -0.434*** -0.290*** 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) 
Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 
0.257*** 0.337*** 0.181*** 0.281*** 0.143*** 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) 
Age 41-49 
0.334*** 0.381*** 0.252*** 0.313*** 0.192*** 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) 
Age 50-59 
0.326*** 0.353*** 0.238*** 0.298*** 0.184*** 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021) 
Age >60 
0.601*** 0.532*** 0.416*** 0.395*** 0.311*** 
(0.044) (0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.036) 
College (ref: Primary) 
0.793*** 0.350*** 0.362*** 0.636*** 0.280*** 
(0.020) (0.064) (0.128) (0.053) (0.062) 
Secondary 
0.109*** 0.380*** 0.010** 0.213*** 0.043 
(0.018) (0.035) (0.064) (0.029) (0.035) 
Tenure 
0.023*** 0.061*** 0.019*** 0.060*** 0.0173*** 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Tenure square 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Permanent Contract 
0.450*** 0.534*** 0.389*** 0.443*** 0.362*** 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) 
Firm Size:  50-199 -0.126*** 0.236***  0.317***  
Ref: <50) (0.018) (0.045)  (0.048)  
Firm Size: >199 
-0.209*** 0.366***  0.505***  
(0.017) (0.068)  (0.0726)  
Firm  Agreement 
-0.019     
(0.016)     
Exporting firm 0.114*** 0.262***  0.263***  
 (0.016) (0.024)  (0.023)  
Inv. Mills Ratio  1.628*** 1.693*** 1.984*** 1.513 *** 
  (0.170) (0.198) (0.141) (0.474) 
No. Obs. 44249 195163 44249 44249 44249 
R sq. 0.186 0.175 0.115 0.089 0.125 
Note: S.e´s. in parentheses.  Coefficients in (1) are derived from an OLS regression over the 
overall sample of workers. Coefficients in (2) are derived from Heckman estimation, performed 
to correct for selection into PP jobs. Coefficients in (3) to (5) correspond to within firm, within 
occupations and within firm and occupations fixed effect estimation, respectively. Inverse Mills 
ratio derived from estimates in (2) are included in the three last columns as an additional 
covariate to correct for selectivitys. Estimations in (1) and (2) also control for industry dummies 
(11) and occupational dummies (8). 
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Table 7. Estimates of alternative specifications of log PP hourly wage equation corrected 
for selectivity (PP vs. PP entitled workers)  
Dependent Variable: log PP hourly wage component 
 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
OLS 
Heckman 
selection 
Within 
Firm 
Within 
Occupations 
Within 
Firm-
Occupation 
            
Female -0.425*** -0.320*** -0.387*** -0.207*** 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 0.257*** 0.370*** 0.092** 0.303*** 0.024 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.041) (0.025) (0.043) 
Age 41-49 0.334*** 0.429*** 0.174*** 0.346*** 0.061 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.037) (0.025) (0.039) 
Age 50-59 0.326*** 0.396*** 0.178*** 0.328*** 0.059* 
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027) (0.034) 
Age >60 0.601*** 0.623*** 0.363*** 0.500*** 0.159*** 
(0.044) (0.053) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039) 
College (ref: Primary) 0.793*** 0.888*** 0.505*** 0.350*** 0.174*** 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.039) (0.027) (0.043) 
Secondary 0.109*** 0.200*** 0.018 0.063*** -0.057 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.036) (0.022) (0.039) 
Tenure 0.023*** 0.054*** 0.003 0.048*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) 
Tenure square -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Permanent Contract  0.450*** 0.592***  0.254*** 0.507*** 0.239*** 
(0.020) (0.034) (0.052) (0.028) (0.054) 
Firm Size:  50-199 -0.126*** -0.325***   -0.322***   
Ref: <50) (0.018) (0.037)   (0.031)   
Firm Size: >199 -0.209*** -0.495***   -0.480***   
(0.017) (0.046)   (0.038)   
Firm Agreement -0.188***         
(0.016)         
Exporting firm 0.114*** 0.153***   0.142***   
(0.016) (0.020)   (0.016)   
Inv. Mills Ratio   1.546*** -1.666*** 1.506*** -1.690*** 
  (0.263) (0.520) (0.223) (0.543) 
Constant -1.107*** -2.098*** -0.025 -1.612*** 0.208 
(0.028) (0.169) (0.385) (0.143) (0.402) 
No. Obs. 44249 61615 44249 44249 44249 
R-squared 0.165 0.166 0.109 0.086 0.065 
Note: S.e´s. in parentheses.  Coefficients in (1) are derived from an OLS regression over the overall 
sample of workers. Coefficients in (2) are derived from Heckman estimation, performed to correct for 
selection into PP jobs from PP entitled jobs. Coefficients in (3) to (5) come from within firm, within 
occupations and within firm and occupations fixed effect estimation respectively. Inverse Mills ratio 
derived from probit estimates of the probability of receiving PP among the subsample of PP entitled 
workers are included in the three last columns as an additional covariate to correct for selectivity. 
Estimations in (1) and (2) also control for industry dummies (11) and occupational dummies (8). 
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Table 8:  Adjusted Gender Wage Gaps – Quantile Regressions  
(with selection correction)   
Dependent Variable: Log PP Hourly Wage   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
 P10th P25th P50th P75th P90th   
              
Female (WFO) 
 
-0.267** 
(0.022) 
-0.378*** 
(0.020) 
-0.498*** 
(0.014) 
-0.545*** 
(0.016) 
-0.548*** 
(0.019)   
        
Note: s.e´s. in parentheses.  Estimations also control for the whole set of covariates (age, education, tenure, type 
of contract) as well as firm & occupational fixed effects (WFO).  
 
 
 
                        
Table 9: Oaxaca Decomposition of (log) hourly Gap in PP 
Unadjusted Gender Wage Gap in PP: 46 log-points 
Variables 
Absolute [relative]  
Contribution of Diff.  
in Characteristics 
(Xm-Xf)*βm 
Absolute [relative] 
Contribution of Diff. 
in Returns 
(βm-βf)*Xf 
Sample Selection 0.62 
[1.34%] 
-1.56 
[-3.39%] 
Tenure 3.44 
[7.47%] 
-1.93 
[-4.19%] 
Education -2.82 
[-6.13%] 
3.83 
[8.33%] 
Age 1.35 
[2.93%] 
8.46 
[18.39%] 
Type of Contract 1.02 
[2.22%] 
2.42 
[5.26%] 
Occup. and Firm 
Effects  
1.81 
[3.93%] 
3.36 
[7.30%] 
Constant  26.0 
[56.52%] 
Total 5.42 
[11.8%] 
 
40.58 
[88.2%] 
       Note: Decomposition based on WFO estimation separately for each gender. Similar 
qualitative results are found with a joint WFO estimation for men and women allowing for 
different returns by gender.  
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1 Introduction 
The sustainability of pay-as-you-go systems is a matter of growing concern in 
ageing economies, such as Spain, since they were designed at a time when 
demographic structures exhibited a much lower life expectancy and higher 
fertility rates1. Therefore, both the number of people and the number of years 
that these people were alive to receive a public pension was much lower when 
the system was launched than nowadays2 , cf. Herce et al (2009).  
 
On top of such demographic developments, in recent years there has 
been a decline in the labour force participation of older workers. While in the 
seventies, the participation rates of males over 55 exceeded 50%, in 2008 it does 
not reach 30%. The combination of both factors has led to the prediction that the 
old age dependency ratio, which currently is 24.1% in Spain, will reach 59.1% in 
20603. Hence, a smaller proportion of people than what is currently the case will 
be providing the revenues to be transferred to older people in the form of 
pensions. In this sense, the behaviour of older workers is reinforcing the 
negative impact that demographic factors have on the sustainability of the 
pension system.   
The role of pension benefits rules in relation to labour market 
participation of the elderly is regarded as central in many countries, as not only 
they may be too generous in providing income support, but they may also 
create incentives to early retirement. In this sense, three issues are relevant here: 
the amount of the pension that the system provides, the pattern of benefits 
associated with each age of retirement, and the entitlement rights that define 
the conditions to be met to be able to claim a pension at each age. Parametric 
changes for the Social Security system are discussed in Spain under the so-
called Toledo Agreement, while some countries have already implemented 
large reforms4.  
Many changes have been directed to reducing incentives to early 
retirement embedded in the pension system and to increase incentives to leave 
the labour market at a later age. In particular, up to 2002, pension regulations 
implied total or substantial withdrawal from any form of employment 
requiring affiliation to the Social Security System to be able to receive an old-
age pension. In 2002, partial retirement was regulated, so that employment and 
old-age pensions could be simultaneously enjoyed, while the mandatory 
retirement age at 65 was effectively abolished and bonuses on pension benefits 
were introduced for those workers than extend their labour market 
participation beyond 65. In 2006, additional requirements were imposed on 
                                                                                 
1 The forecast that 32.3% of total Spanish population will be older than 65 in 2060 is mostly driven by the 
decline in fertility rates (European Commission (2008)). 
2 In fact, life expectancy at 65 for males was around 12 in the middle of the 20th century; it has grown up to 
17 in 2008, and it is forecasted to increase to 22 years in the middle of this century, according to Eurostat, 
EUROPOP 2008 projections. 
3 Ratio calculated as 65+/(15-64).  European Commission (2008)  
4 See Whitehouse et al.,2009 for a recent review of pension reforms in industrialized countries 
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partial retirement restricting it to workers older than 61 and with more than 6 
years of seniority in the firm. Different governments have also promoted active 
labour force policies that should stimulate the demand for elderly workers, thus 
contributing to raising labour market participation of the elderly. Therefore, the 
effects of pensions on retirement compound labour supply and demand forces, 
so that their magnitude is an empirical issue. 
 The goal of this paper is to quantify the role that Social Security 
provisions for old-age pensions play in the retirement decision of Spanish 
workers. In previous work, there is already an assessment about the impact of 
individual demographic characteristics on the likelihood of retirement at each 
age under the Spanish retirement legislation but without considering economic 
incentives, cf. Argimón, González and Vegas (2007a). Here, I propose to fill this 
gap by estimating a reduced-form model for retirement in order to capture the 
effects of pension incentives on the timing of the pension claim.  In particular, I 
analyse the probability of retiring at a given age, given that the person has not 
retired yet, as a function of individual demographic and economic incentive 
variables underlying the retirement legislation. Thus, I compare the retirement 
rates of workers with different levels of social security pension wealth at 
different ages, holding demographic variables constant, since decisions on 
retirement can be made within a certain age interval. 
I contribute to the large body of research that examines the economic 
incentives created by the pension system in Spain, by adopting a different 
methodological approach to that traditionally followed in the literature (see, 
e.g., Boldrin, Jimenez-Martín & Peracchi, 1999, 2004, Jiménez-Martín, 2006, and 
Moral-Arce et al., 2009). First, instead of using a point in time estimation, I 
analyse retirement patterns and the effects of economic incentives on the 
probability of retirement by means of a logistic specification of a duration 
model. This approach allows  to analyze the role played at each age by 
incentives stemming from social security rules for early retirement. In this 
fashion, the longitudinal information contained in Continuous Sample of 
Working Histories (CSWH, “Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”, MCVL in 
Spanish), wave 2006, a recently released database is fully exploited in this 
paper5. This database is particularly useful since it contains detailed 
information registered in Spanish Social Security records and in the Census, 
that allows to take time dependence into account, since workers’ decisions are 
tracked over time. The advantage of using CSWH relative to other databases 
used in some previous empirical work6, is that its sample design is publicly 
known and, therefore, it allows for a better and broader understanding of my 
main results.  I regard a duration model as an improvement over other 
straightforward binary dependent regression models since survival analysis is 
defined in terms of three attributes which are relevant in the context of 
                                                                                 
5  Moral-Arce et al (2009) also use the CSWH to evaluate the economic incentives generated by the Social 
Security System in Spain, but, unlike my work, they carry out such an analysis restricted to a given point 
in time, 2007. 
6 A previous sample of a similar database with information up to 1995 and whose description can be found 
in Martínez (1999), has been used in Boldrin et al (1999, 2004), Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2002),and 
Jimenez-Martín et al. (2000, 2006). The main drawbacks of such sample are that the detailed sample design 
has not been disclosed and that it is not publicly available. 
93 
 
retirement decisions: (1) individuals evolve along a finite number of states, (2) 
decision changes may occur at any time point, not just at a given point in time, 
and (3) factors that have an effect on the event analyzed could be either time 
varying or constant over time.  Point-in-time estimates do not allow considering 
differences in the length of time in which each person is at risk of experiencing 
the transition, namely, time dependence. These types of models ignore the 
structure of the dynamic optimization problem that underlies the workers 
decisions when they retire. Taking into account the inter-temporal correlations 
in the panel appears to be very important. Boldrin et al (1999, 2004) and 
Jiménez-Martín (2006) use a binary dependent model to estimate retirement 
probability. This procedure relies on the assumption that, conditional on 
covariates, the probability of the duration until a transition is adopted 
(retirement) does not change over time given that the units of observation have 
survived to time t (the period since the individual is eligible to retire). This 
technical limitation of point-in-time binary specifications can be overcome by 
considering that a transition occurred within some pre-specified interval of 
time. However, a large amount of information contained in the panel 
correlations is still lost. By including age dummies it would be possible to get 
some information about how retirement probability increases with age, but 
other individual panel correlations would not be taken into account. Additional 
problems would arise when time-varying covariates would be considered in the 
estimation.  Instead of assuming that the hazard rate (that is, the instantaneous 
rate at which workers retire) is flat (in other words, the duration dependence 
does not exist) survival analysis enables to use serial correlation - duration 
dependence- in the estimation, which leads to an unbiased estimation of 
coefficients when hazard rate depends on survival time. 
The second contribution of this paper is to quantify the effect on 
retirement decisions of the Retirement Amendment that took place in 2001 in 
Spain (Acuerdo para la Mejora y el Desarrollo del Sistema de Protección Social, April 
2001) and that was fully implemented in 2002 (Law 35/2002, July). The reform 
implied a shift towards a system closer to an individually capitalized one  in 
order to both  increase labour force participation of older workers and  foster 
retirement beyond 65.   
 
Specifically, in this paper I focus on the impact of the reform on 
retirement decisions that imply a full withdrawal from the labour market. To do 
so, I select a sample of men aged from 60 to 70 years old in 2006, contributing to 
the Social Security General Scheme and entitled to receive retirement benefits.  
The sample period spans 10 years, from 1996 to 2006.  
 
During this period, there was also another important pension reform in 
1997 which increased the number of years of contribution applied to compute 
the regulatory base (from 8 to 15), established the revaluation of retirement 
benefits according with CPI and created a reserve fund to pay pensions. 
Subsequently, the 2002 reform was primarily aimed to the establishment of a 
system of gradual and flexible retirement and to encourage an increase in older 
workers participation rates.  
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Next, for convenience, I provide a brief outline of the changes 
implemented by the 2002 pension reform. Further details are given in Appendix 
1. 
 
• After 2002 pension reform, access to retirement was possible even if the 
employee has not reached the statutory retirement age.  To take early 
retirement, the worker must have reached the age 61 (those who worked 
before 1967 are entitled to take early retirement at 60). Additionally, the 
worker must show a minimum of 30 years of contribution to Social 
Security (at least 2 within the last 15), and his last employment 
termination should be involuntary.  
 
• The 2002 Reform modified further the early retirement penalty 
increasing the linkages between the contributive effort exerted by 
workers and the pension received. After the 2002 Amendment, workers 
who retire before 65 and after 61 years old are charged with a penalty 
that decreases with age and total years of contributions. 
 
Each full year of employment beyond statutory retirement age (65), 
implies a 2% increase in regulatory base to compute retirement benefits, 
such that those workers older than 65 who continue working and who 
can show a minimum of 35 years of contributions can receive a pension 
that exceeds 100% of the regulatory base value. It becomes possible to 
receive a partial pension from the age of 60 whilst continuing to work 
part-time. The corresponding pension is calculated by applying the rate 
of the reduction of working hours to the amount of pension which the 
individual would normally received given his contributions history at 
the time of retirement. 
 
• No compulsory termination of unemployment benefits for workers older 
than 52 when they get the requirements needed to claim retirement 
benefits. Firms receive payment exemptions from Social Security 
contributions when workers are older than 65 years old and have 
contributed during 35 years to Social Security. At the same time, those 
firms hiring workers older than 60 using indefinite-term contracts receive 
a 50% bonus that increases by 10% each year, to reach 100% of the 
amount of common contingencies contributions when workers reach 5 
years seniority in the company. 
 
• Firms that dismiss older workers are punished: they must pay Special 
Agreements to finance contributions to the workers who have been 
massively dismissed (until the workers reach 61) provided the company 
is not bankrupt. From then onwards, the worker must necessarily pay his 
own contributions upon the Special Agreement until he decide to retire. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a 
literature survey of the main determinants of retirement for elderly workers, 
placing special emphasis on those related to the Spanish pension system. 
Section 3 describes the dataset used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains 
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a detailed discussion on the estimated empirical model whereas Section 5 
summarises the main results. Section 6 contains the conclusions. Additionally, 
three appendixes are included in the paper. Appendix 1 contains a brief 
description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Appendix 2 provides 
a short explanation about the main features of the Spanish Social Security 
pension system, and Appendix 3 includes some robustness checks and 
additional comments to further clarify the analysis. Specifically, issues such as 
the possible biases stemming  from the existence of people whose pensions are 
capped, some tax considerations, and the potential  endogeneity of some of the  
control variables are properly addressed in the third Appendix. 
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2 An overview of empirical evidence on the role of Social Security on 
retirement decisions.  
Population ageing is a matter of growing concern in modern developed 
countries, where the increase in population life expectancy, the decrease in 
fertility rates and the delay in the average age of entry of young people to the 
labour market, have jeopardized the sustainability of public pensions systems. 
These demographic phenomena have fostered the development of a vast 
economic literature both in the U.S. and Europe -and generally in most 
developed countries- concerning retirement during the last 30 years. The 
interest on this topic has lead to the publication of more than one thousand 
papers concerning retirement and pension related issues during the last 
decades (for a good survey, see  Smith, 2004).   
Empirical analyses of retirement behaviour are limited by the data 
available for estimation and also by the complexity of the retirement decision. 
As a result, most econometric studies report estimates obtained from reduced- 
form models.  Nonetheless, since this type of models are subject to the Lucas’ 
critique and also to potential biases arising from either omission of relevant 
variables or to individual working histories being correlated with  changes in 
public pension schemes (see, e.g., Lumsdaine, Stock,  Wise, 1992), there has been 
a shift to structural models in response to this shortcomings. However, 
structural models do come with their own limitations since, due to their 
complexity,  their estimation has usually been restricted to model the retirement 
decision as a binary (yes/no) option7. 
Conducting a comprehensive literature review on retirement issues is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The next paragraphs will be devoted to 
reviewing some of the more relevant empirical work, with a special emphasis 
on the Spanish evidence gathered so far. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
labour force participation rates among older workers and retirement patterns 
have been extensively analyzed in the literature; cf. Peracchi and Welch (1994); 
Costa (1998); Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998); Quinn (2000); Gustman & Steinmeier 
(2000), and Alba (1997); Boldrin et al (1999); Ahn and Mira (2000); Gutiérrez-
Domenech (2006) for Spain. This stream of research documents changes in 
retirement trends and pension retirement patterns during the last decades that 
reflect a tendency towards early retirement and lower participation rates among 
older workers.  
One of most prolific branches in the retirement economic literature is the 
one that analyzes demographic influences on retirement decisions of workers –
including papers which address the influence of gender, marital status, race or 
ethnicity, and/or other demographic characteristics on the individual (couples) 
                                                                                 
7 Several papers (Lumsdaine et al., 1992, Spataro, 2002 and Butler et al., 2002) have tried to assess the 
predictive behaviour of structural and reduced form models of retirement. Spataro (2002) seems to find a 
duration model preferable to the structural model. Butler et al.(2002) notices that the duration model 
imposes less assumptions than the structural model, but it is less robust when one wants to make policy 
simulations of major changes in the programme. 
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retirement: cf. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995; 1999; 2000); Pienta (1994; 1996; 
1997; 1998; 2003); Blau (1998), Maestas (2001).  
The interrelations between age, productivity and retirement have also 
been extensively analyzed in Lazear (1979) and Kim (2003). The study of the 
interrelations between health and retirement and on the influence of health care 
costs on retirement decisions has also been extensively analyzed (for an 
international overview, see, e.g., Krause et al.,1997, Gustman & Steinmeier, 
2004, Coile,2003). Additionally, labour supply has also been shown to be 
affected by disability schemes (see Börsh-Supan, 2007), an issue that has also 
been studied in Spain by Blanco (2000) and Jimenez-Martinez et al. (2006).  
Other papers analyze pros and cons of defined benefit pensions systems 
as compared to defined contribution type plans and make simulations and 
projections about the consequences of shifting from one system to the other. cf. 
Gokhale et al (2001), Hansen (2000), Gustman and Steinmeier (2003). An 
important line of research in Spain is the one devoted to analyze the 
sustainability of the retirement pension system and the reforms needed to 
guarantee its sustainability. This debate has become more intense recently 
because of the negative consequences of the ongoing economic crisis; cf. Barea 
(1996); Herce y Alonso Messeguer (1999); Jimeno and Licandro (1999); 
Jimeno(2000); García et al (2005); Messeguer (2006); Saez & Taguas (2006); 
Balmaseda et al (2006); Díaz-Giménez and Saavedra (2009); de la Fuente and 
Domenech (2009). The analysis is usually formulated in terms of overlapping 
generation models. Overall, the available evidence on the effects of delaying the 
normal retirement age a number of given years shows that it has a favourable  
impact on the sustainability of the Spanish pension system; cf. Montero Muñoz 
(2000); Sánchez-Martín (2003); Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín (2003); Díaz-
Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2008); Sánchez-Martín and Sánchez-Marcos 
(2008). 
Regarding the specific aim of this paper, there is quite a lot of research  
concerning the relationship between the incentives embedded in the social 
security rules and retirement decisions; e.g. Duval (2003); Gruber & Wise (1999, 
2004, 2007); Dorn & Sousa-Poza (2005, 2010); Martín and Moreno (1990); Lopez 
García (1990); Gómez & Hernández de Cos (2004). These studies focus on 
financial determinants to retire (the different rights acquired through age, 
gender, contributed earnings, years of contribution, pension replacement rates, 
etc) and the implicit incentives created by the system. The available micro-
econometric evidence for Spain shows that the  early retirement provisions play 
an important role in the modal age of retirement and its pattern in different 
ages (see, e.g.,  Boldrin et al. ,1999, 2004) and that, in general, labour force 
transitions of elderly men depend on Social Security regulations –see Alba 
(1997); García-Pérez & Sánchez- Martín (2008a; 2008b)8, and are correlated with 
health considerations- see  Blanco (2000); Prieto et al (2002); and Jiménez et al 
(1999). 
                                                                                 
8 See García Pérez & Sánchez Martín (2008a, 2008b) provide some results on the links between 
unemployment, retirement and their associated public insurance programmes calibrated with data from 
the MCVL. 
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One of the most revealing evidence of the dependency between 
withdrawal from labour force and pension regulations in Spain is the presence 
of spikes in the benefit claiming moment around the ages of 60, the earliest age 
a pension can be, in general, claimed and 65, the ordinary retirement age. Such 
pattern is also observed in most western countries (see, e.g., Gruber and Wise, 
1999, 2004) where eligibility ages prescribed in country-specific provisions also 
play a major role in defining the observed pattern of retirement by age. As 
mentioned earlier, there are few papers that attempt to evaluate the impact of 
pension Social Security incentives on labour force participation in Spain. In 
particular, Boldrin et al. (1999, 2004) and Jiménez-Martín (2006) follow a 
regression-based approach based on reduced-form behavioural equations to 
model the effect on the decision to retire of pension wealth, the incentives 
embedded in the pension system and individual demographic characteristics. 
After estimating retirement hazard rates by means of a probit model for a 
sample of individual work histories randomly drawn from the historical files of 
Social Security affiliates, they conclude that, while economic and financial 
measures of retirement incentives play some role in explaining retirement 
behavior, a substantial portion of the latter still remains unexplained and 
cannot be explained by Social Security factors. Further research by García Pérez 
and Sánchez Martín (2008b) find favourable evidence on the relevance of the 
social security incentives in explaining transitions from unemployment for 
older workers. Likewise, using a sample of individuals aged between 56 and 70 
from the European Union Household Panel (PHOGUE), wave 7 (2000), Utrilla 
de la Hoz and Ubago (2005) find that a replacement rate (pension over total 
income) below 80% reduces the probability of retiring. 
As for the impact of minimum pensions, this time based on the 
estimation of the behavioural parameters of a structural model, Jiménez-Martín 
& Sánchez (2000, 2006) show that the existence of minimum pension’s 
regulations has an impact on early retirement decisions. They find that the 
combination of age penalties and minimum pensions generate large incentives 
to early retirement for those workers with low wages and short labour histories. 
They conclude that there is a threefold increase in retirement at 60 with respect 
to the economy without minimum pensions and total early retirement (before 
or at 60) is almost 50% larger.  
A very intuitive procedure to analyze retirement incentives was provided 
by the option value model introduced by Stock & Wise (1990). In this model 
workers decide whether or not to retire by comparing the expected value of 
retiring at some period with the expected value of continuing working and 
retiring at any future date. In other words, workers compute the option value of 
postponing retirement. Gruber & Wise (1999, 2004, 2007) apply this approach 
across different individual countries while Scarpetta (1998) studies  the 
importance of early retirement in OCDE countries.  Coile & Gruber (2001) and 
Diamond & Gruber (1999) also follow this approach using USA data.  In the 
case of Spain, Cairó (2009) analyses partial retirement incentives and its impact 
on the average age of retirement using the option-value framework. 
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The effect of the successive pension reforms that have taken place in 
Spain has been empirically addressed in a series of papers. The results point 
out, in general, to its effectiveness in lowering retirement. Jiménez (2006) carries 
out a simulation exercise that computes the effect of the Spanish old age 
pension reforms that took place in 1997 and 2002 and concludes that they 
reduce the hazard rates. A similar qualitative result is found in Gutiérrez-
Domenech (2006), where, using a longitudinal survey of catalan population, it is 
shown that the 2002 reform contributed to the increase in the staying-on 
employed probabilities of the individuals older than 60. On the other hand, 
Sánchez- Martin (2005), using a calibrated overlapping- generations model 
finds that the overall effect of the 2002 reform is a clear drop in the average 
retirement age, as younger cohorts of low income workers benefit from the 
opportunity of leaving the labour force early. 
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3 The data 
3.1 The CSWH 
The database Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH 2006) 
includes all the electronically recorded information that the Social Security 
administration keeps regarding the employment and contributory pension 
history of more than one million individuals, whose anonymity is preserved. It 
is a 4% random sample from a reference population, which is composed of all 
the people who at any time during 2006 had a registered record with the Social 
Security system, either because they were contributing or because they were 
receiving a pension. Therefore, it does include those that were unemployed for 
the whole 2006, either if they received a contributory pension or if they received 
unemployment benefits, as in the latter case, the National Employment Service 
pays their social contributions to the Social Security Funds. The sample does not 
contain any information relating to the scheme called Régimen de Clases Pasivas 
that covers public sector employment, so that most civil servants cannot be 
included in the analysis. It must be pointed out that as a consequence of the 
definition of the reference population, a large proportion of non-working 
females is included in CSWH, mostly as they receive a survival (widowhood) 
pension9.  
Most of the labour, contributory and pension history of the over one 
million individuals has been recovered, so that their employment history can be 
reconstructed. The data contain, for each employment spell, information on 
covered earnings, which are the amount of the earnings that the Social Security 
takes into account for the computation of pension rights. Covered earnings can be 
regarded as a good proxy for actual earnings, although they are subject to a 
ceiling and a floor: on the one hand, a minimum contribution must be paid over 
earnings, independently of the actual amount received, so that there is a 
minimum covered earning associated to it; on the other hand, earnings above a 
given ceiling are not subject to contribution and therefore do not generate 
further rights. Covered earnings are used in the empirical analysis as a proxy to 
wages. 
Moreover, for each employment spell, CSWH 2006 also provides information 
on length and type of contract, worker's Social Security Scheme, the so-called 
contribution group (associated with the job and that determines the size of the 
workers Social Security contributions), as well as information about the firm, 
such as its activity sector and location (province). Available data also include 
some personal characteristics such as sex, age, place and year of birth. The 
CSWH has been matched with information coming from the Census. In the 
Census’ module “Co-inhabitants” there is information about the number of 
people living with the person in the CSWH dataset, their age and sex, but not 
their working status. As far as social transfers are concerned, the database 
contains information about periods and amounts enjoyed for old-age and 
                                                                                 
9 A detailed description of the sample can be found at Seguridad Social (2006) “La muestra continua de 
vidas laborales. 2004” and an overview in Argimón and González (2006) 
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disability pensions, and survivors’ pensions such as, orphanage, widowhood 
and family help. There is no data on other sources of individual wealth or other 
sources of income. The CSWH has also been matched with Personal Income Tax 
data, corresponding to the reference year. In that sense, this data module 
provides information on additional sources of income, but not in a longitudinal 
dimension.  
3.2 The subsample 
The analysis performed here is referred to a selected subsample of the 
people affiliated to Social Security and whose registers are recorded in CSWH-
2006.  
 The subsample considered here includes the available information on 
men who have contributed to Social Security at least once in their lifetime, have 
not collected an old age pension before 1997, and were born between 1936 and 
1946, so that in 2006 they were 60-70 years old. Moreover, I restricted the 
sample to those men whose longest contributory relationship with the Social 
Security took place in the Social Security General Scheme, and who have not 
claimed disability benefits. I also dropped some individuals who have collected 
an old pension after 1997, but whose eligibility to access a retirement pension, 
in terms of having at least fifteen contributory years, could not be proved with 
the available data, as their pensions could not be estimated with the available 
information  
Several reasons justify restricting the analysis to the specified subsample. 
First, the sample only refers to men because women often have quite different 
labour histories. Since women often experience a greater number of career 
interruptions than men during their  potential working life -due for instance to 
maternity leaves- including women in the sample could lead to biased results 
due to different gender-linked behaviour in labour participation. Furthermore, 
women may react differently to economic incentives. The literature that 
examines retirement's decisions within households shows that women respond 
significantly to the employment status of their husbands, bringing forward her 
retirement decisions to coincide with their partner’s retirement. Data about 
socio demographic characteristics, such as marital status are poorly recorded in 
the CSWH in the sense that information about civil status is not directly 
available. Although civil status could be somewhat approximated using 
information on age and gender of people living in the same household, the 
available data about people with whom the individual is living correspond only 
to the period when the administrative records was registered by first time and, 
in any case, there is no reference whatsoever to the spouse’s working status, 
labour history and registered Social Security contributions. Hence, due to these 
information shortcomings, it is not possible to consider the joint decision to 
retire using this data. 
Secondly, given that the aim here is to analyze retirement decisions taken 
by the elderly, I restrict the initial sample to people that are aged from 60 to 70 
in 2006 (i.e. those born between 1936 and 1946) and that have already become 
entitled to a pension benefit, defined in terms of being able to prove at least 15 
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contributory years. It means that those for which the Social Security system 
does not record any contributory life, those that have retired before their 60th 
birthday10 and those who started receiving an old age pension before 1997, 
when a large pension reform was introduced11, are excluded from the analysis. 
Further exclusions involve those that receive an old-age pension coming from 
disability, as the determinants to claim such kind of pension are most likely 
linked to health, which is not comparable with the rest of the determinants. 
Moreover, the transition to the old-age retirement scheme is deterministic, so 
that disability pensions are converted into retirement pensions once the 
beneficiaries become 65 years old. Additionally, to ensure homogeneity in 
pension rules, the sample is limited to those whose longest recorded labour 
relation has taken place in the Social Security General Scheme, because it is the 
one that gathers the largest proportion of workers. (See Appendix 2 on 
legislation). Finally, some individuals with incomplete recorded contributory 
information are also excluded from the analysis, so that the sub-sample I use for 
the analysis comprises 35,853 men, whose distribution by year of birth and 
retirement age is reflected in Table 1. The administrative nature of the data 
source explains that a limited number of individuals had to be deleted from the 
sample as the available information for them did not seem consistent. 
                                                                                 
10 Early retirement before the age of 60 is only possible for dangerous and unhealthy jobs such as air pilots, 
some miners, railways workers, bullfighters and artists.  
11 Very few records relating to pensions awarded before 1997 are available. 
Born Not retired Total
60 61 62 63 64 65
1936 205 199 152 295 892 189 1,932
1937 880 201 162 149 295 866 195 2,748
1938 817 136 159 153 285 819 170 2,539
1939 652 103 135 134 243 732 190 2,189
1940 948 168 225 232 401 1,225 314 3,513
1941 704 140 187 192 332 981 893 3,429
1942 607 186 170 188 350 1,956 3,457
1943 600 213 231 205 2,671 3,920
1944 554 200 220 2,963 3,937
1945 546 209 3,449 4,204
1946 388 3,597 3,985
Total 6,696 1,761 1,688 1,405 2,201 5,515 16,587 35,853
Table 1
Distribution by year of birth and retirement age. Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946 
having worked in the General Regimen and with a relation with the Social Security in 2006
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4 Empirical framework 
The earliest empirical work in this area considered reduced-form models 
of the retirement decision as a function of Social Security wealth and pension 
level. While there were differences in the estimation strategies, based mainly on 
the nature of available data, the results consistently suggested a role for Social 
Security. The main limitation of this type of studies was that they considered 
Social Security effects at a point in time and therefore cannot account for the 
impact on retirement decisions arising from the time pattern of social security 
wealth accruals.  
In order to address this shortcoming, different approaches have been 
followed in subsequent analysis. The accrual of Social Security or other more 
forward-looking incentive measures has been developed and their effect has 
been analysed with the estimation of reduced-form models12. Alternatively, a 
different approach has been to consider structural models where workers face a 
budget constraint discontinuous or kinked13. Another line of research, the 
“option value” model of retirement postulated that not only the level of pension 
wealth or its increases with one additional year of work are important 
determinants of the retirement decision, but also the evolution of future wealth 
and work are relevant. So retirement decisions are modelled as a function of the 
difference between the utility of retirement at the current date and at the date 
that maximizes one’s utility; cf. Stock and Wise (1990).  Given the difficulties in 
the implementation of this technique in structural form models, numerous 
authors -Samwick (1998); Gruber and Wise (1999); Hakola (2002); Blundell et al. 
(2002)- have used the option value in reduced form models. More recently, 
applied general equilibrium models are also being used to explore the pension 
issue -for instance, in Imrohoroglu et al. (1999)- so that they need to be 
calibrated to be able to produce numerical results14.   
This paper follows the hazard-model approach in Grubber and Wise 
(2004), and Blundell et al. (2002), among others, to capture the effects of changes 
in social security wealth and other variables on retirement. Specifically, I 
analyze here the incentives to early retirement stemming from the Social 
Security rules introduced in the 2002 Retirement Amendment, using a reduced- 
form approach by means of a duration model. This procedure is particularly 
useful since it allows assessing the impact of relevant variables on the 
retirement decision taking into account time dependence. 
Although the option value model is theoretically the most intuitive 
model and a structural model should provide more insight into the issue, I 
                                                                                 
12 Spataro, 2005 proposes a set of alternative measures that feature the forward-looking aspect and applies 
them to Italian data. 
13 The lifetime budget constraint is analogous to the standard labor-leisure budget constraint, with annual 
hours replaced by years of labour force participation, and annual earnings replaced by cumulative lifetime 
compensation. The kinks are produced by changes in the accrual rates (the rise in retirement income 
entitlement caused by continuing to work for one more year). See for instance (Burtless, 1986). 
14 See Jimeno et al (2006) for a survey of the features of different approaches used in the literature to study 
the effects of population aging on Social Security expenditures. 
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choose the simplicity of this reduced form technique because of the 
computational complexity of the alternative approaches. Moreover, the chosen 
reduced-form specification is partially forward looking, as it allows for 
continuous updating of information as individuals grow older. That is, for an 
individual who complies with the requirements to retire at age t, the probability 
of retiring at age t+1 is modelled in terms of the ratio of annual wage earnings 
over pension benefits, public pension accruals and labour situation at time t.  
Admittedly, analysis of retirement behaviour that use reduced form 
models are potentially subject to the Lucas Critique whereby estimated 
coefficients may represent a convolution of deep parameters and changes in 
policy rules, being therefore subject to structural breaks. The reason for not 
being particularly worried about the Lucas´ critique in the specific setup of this 
paper is that the period under analysis (2002-2006) is quite short and close to 
2002 when the reform took place. Therefore, it is unlikely that, in such a short 
period, the new rules regarding early retirement would have altered 
significantly the expectations formed by the individuals. These expectations are 
to a large extent driven by the parameters which define individuals´ utilities 
which, in turn, are captured in the estimation by the variables proxying  the 
economic incentives provided by Social Security included in the analysis. As a 
result, the changes in individuals´ behavior during such a short period since the 
reform are bound to be well captured by the interactions of the previous three 
variables with the 2002 reform dummy variable r2002. 
 
The retirement decision is analysed in this paper following a duration 
model approach that treats it as a dynamic discrete choice. The duration 
variable (T) is defined as the period from the age the person becomes entitled to 
receive a retirement pension until the age that she claims the benefit. It is 
treated as a discrete variable, defined in years, as a varying variable that 
changes as time goes by15.  Let iC  be the maximum number of years that we 
could observe the individual in the sample, which is constant since it only 
depends on his year of birth and the moment he became eligible. Thus, for 
example, if a person born in 1941, becomes eligible in 2001 (when he is 60), and 
only claims a pension benefit in 2003 (when he is 62), will have T=3 and C=5 in 
2004. In the estimation iC  is restricted to be at least 1 and no greater than 6 
under the assumption that the decision to retire only takes place between 60 
and 66, since only very few people retire after that age, or do not retire at all. 
The dataset contains some individuals that either can only be observed before 
they take the decision of interest (i.e. claim pension benefit) because I only 
observe the individuals up to the year 2006 or did not claim a retirement 
pension before the age of 66. In both cases, data is right censored. For these 
individuals we can only observe that T>C, so that they remain in the current 
situation for a larger number of years than the ones that the sample allows us to 
observe them. That is, we observe claiming at T only if T=<C. Otherwise, we 
observe that T>C. It is assumed that T is independent of C. It must be reminded 
that for some cohorts we can only have observations of people retiring after a 
given age (60 for those born in 1936) or before a given age (for instance, at most 
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at 60 for those born in 1946) given that this is the age when the sample was 
extracted, as shown in Table 1. 
The hazard function (i.e. the probability of an individual retiring 
precisely at time t, given that he has not retired before t), is defined as: 
( ) ( )
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where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, some of which are age 
dependent and others are constant and independent of the age, F is a logistic 
cumulative density function and ti is the duration observed for individual i. The 
hazard gives the probability of retirement defined over the surviving 
population at each time. In other words, it gives the probability of retiring at t 
for those eligible persons that have not retired. 
A discrete duration model can be regarded as a sequence of binary choice 
equations (with cross equation restrictions) defined on the survival population 
at each duration. We are, therefore, interested in the conditional distribution of t 
in relation to variables x: ( )ii xtF |  
Let' us define ci=1 if the individual has retired and ci=0 if she continues 
working. Therefore the likelihood can be expressed as:  
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where φ  is the estimated hazard function, C is the maximum number of years 
that we could observe the individual in the sample, nj is the number of people 
that retires when T=J and rj is the number of people that are eligible to retire at j. 
The likelihood can be alternatively rewritten as: 
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The dependent variable in the model is the probability of retiring 
(claiming a retirement pension) at a specific age, given that the person has 
become eligible to do so16 and has not retired the preceding years. The 
explanatory variables that have been included in the specification (Xi) can be 
grouped in three main categories: social security regulations, personal 
characteristics, and labour characteristics. A detailed description of these 
variables can be found in Appendix 1. For a complete derivation of the log-
likelihood function see Jenkins (2005). 
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median mean s.d. median mean s.d. median mean s.d.
SSWt(1) 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSAt(1) 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PVt(1) 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RRt(2) 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
lt-1(2) 57.49 62.67 54.74
ut-1
(2) 24.28 27.54 22.55
N 115,532 40,123 75,409
n 35,853 16,212 28,259
N: Number of observations; n: people
(1)
 In thousands of euros
(2)
 In percentage
Table 2
 Descriptive values of Social Security incentives and working status. Sample of men born between 1936 and 1946, having 
worked in the General Regimen and with a relation with the Social Security in 2006
 All period considered 1996-2006 Before 2002 After 2002
I build up traditional measures of incentive mechanisms that are 
standard in this literature. In particular, I use the Replacement Rate (RRt), which 
is the ratio of the expected pension benefits over wages, the Social Security 
Wealth (SSWt), that is, the present discounted value of the future stream of 
pension benefits, the Accrual Rate (SSAt) which measures the discounted 
change in SSW from postponing retirement one year and the Peak Value (PVt), 
that compares this year’s social security wealth to the maximum social security 
wealth that could be attained in the future. They are constructed under the 
assumptions that: (i) the age of death is certain, (ii) no changes in social security 
regulation are expected by individuals, and (iii) it excludes any tax 
considerations.  
 
 Table 2 provides information about the descriptive values of the 
incentive Social Security variables. It shows that, while the average stock of 
wealth was higher after the 2002 reform than before, the incentives linked to it 
were lower, and that RR increased after this reform. It also contains information 
related to working status, distinguishing between those observations 
corresponding to a working situation (l) previous to the decision moment and 
those corresponding to an unemployment situation (u). The rest of the 
observations correspond to either an already retired situation or where no work 
is involved.  Additional data concerning the rest of the variables can be found 
in Table A1 of the Appendix 1. Both the level of social security wealth and the 
different incentive variables enter the equation. The level captures wealth 
effects: the larger the value of wealth, the larger the demand of all goods, 
including leisure, if leisure is a normal good. The incentive variables capture a 
substitution effect: the higher the price for leisure, the lower its demand, so that 
if there is a larger financial incentive to additional years of work, then 
individuals will retire later.   
When tax considerations are addressed to compute economic incentive 
variables, the results previously described are slightly stronger, but the overall   
conclusions drawn in the main text remain similar. See Appendix 3 for further 
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details regarding the potential negative implications of excluding tax 
considerations. 
The specification chosen (a logistic duration model) also allows testing 
whether the individual leaves his current situation during the first year he is 
entitled to collect a pension benefit. Finally, the impact of the regulatory change 
introduced from 2002 is also analysed, as it could have affected the average 
probability of retiring and through its effects on the incentive mechanisms.  
As for the labour characteristics, the control variables are the individual’s 
labour situation the year preceding retirement, distinguishing between those 
being working and being unemployed, the industry where the individual 
works and some measures of labour mobility or precariousness.  In particular, 
there have been considered two variables as a proxy measure of the degree to 
which job insecurity and precariousness in employment (contingent work and 
temping, fixed-term contracts, involuntary part-time work, moonlighting) have 
an important effect in the individual's employment history. The number of 
different episodes of contribution, numrel (that includes both labour and 
unemployment periods), and their average length in years, meanlenght, are 
included as covariates.  
Finally, some standard demographic controls such as age, education and 
health status are included. I also control for the collection of other benefits as 
they may interact with the old age pension. Finally, regional dummy variables 
and GDP growth are also included to control for the macro environment. 
The duration dependence of the hazard rate is captured in two ways. On 
the one hand, following Bover et al. (2002), instead of imposing a specific 
functional form for duration, I introduce additive dummy variables for each of 
the possible discrete values of the duration variable. Durations of more than 6 
years (which would necessarily imply that the person is at least 66) are treated 
as censored at 6, due to the relatively small number of observations under such 
a circumstance. On the other hand, interaction of certain independent variables 
with the duration are included to test if the variable effects change with the 
number of years that a person takes to retire. Appendix 1 contains a summary 
and a brief description of the variables used in the analysis. 
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5 Results 
The qualitative impact of the variables on the hazard are discussed in 
terms of the sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, which 
are reported in detail in Table A 2 in Appendix 1. The Table A 2 shows 3 
different specifications each one contains two different sets of Social Security 
incentive variables. So, under model A I present the estimated coefficients 
obtained for the basic specification, distinguishing between the Accrual Rate 
(SSA) as incentive variable, and the Peak Value (PV). Model B tries to capture 
the impact of the 2002 reform through the inclusion of dummy variables that 
test for its relevance and the effect on the response to the social security 
variables, while model C, also includes dummy variables that capture the effect 
on the retirement hazard rate of being entitled to receive the minimum or the 
maximum pension benefit at each age.  
 
The size of the effect of the Social Security incentive variables on the 
probability of retiring is reported in Table 3a. In particular, for the variables that 
are continuous, the impact is measured as the effect of a change in the Social 
Security variable on the predicted hazard.  For the qualitative ones, its impact is 
computed from the change from 0 to 1 in the independent variables, so that 
coefficients can be interpreted as the direct effect of having such characteristics 
on the probability of retiring. The more detailed quantitative impact of a change 
in all the variables included in the specification distinguishing by age is 
reported in Table A 3 of Appendix 1.  
SSA PV SSA PV SSA PV
SSWt 0.0060 0.0060 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072
0.0029 0.0029 0.0034 0.0034 0.0033 0.0033
SSAt -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0006
-0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
PVt -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0003
-0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
RRt 0.0003 0.0002 0.0008 0.0009 0.0004 0.0006
0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003
Median values are in italics
(*)Quantitative effects are computed as the discrete differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 10% increase in 
the variables' values with respect to the logistic function evaluated at the observed variables' values. The effects are 
estimated for the period beginning in 2002. 
Results are obtained from the regressions presented in Table A2 where:
  Model A is the basic model
  Model B includes Model A variable and a dummy for the change in 2002 regulation as control variable
  Model C includes all variables in Model B adding income level as control variable.
Table 3a 
Quantitative effects of Social Security measures on the retirement probability (*)
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C
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Table 3b shows the corresponding percentage change in probability 
equivalent to those reported in Table 3a. The main finding is that, according 
with predictions of Model C, a 10% increase in the PV decreases the retirement 
probability by 0.0003 points, implying a -0.2% average hazard increase. 
 
Economic incentives and regulation 
The results in Table A 2 show that all the coefficients on social security variables 
(SSW, SSA and PV) are statistically significant with the expected sign. Increases 
in the total present value of the flow of pensions that a person will receive from 
the year she retires to the year she dies, i.e. a rise in SSW, increases the hazard. 
Increases in the difference of this amount derived from postponing the 
retirement (either one or more years) reduce the hazard, irrespectively of 
whether SSA or PV are used to capture the substitution effects. 
 
 
Model C 
Age Predicted Hazard
10% 
∆ SSW
10% 
∆ SSA
10% 
∆ RR
Predicted 
Hazard
10% 
∆ SSW
10% 
∆ PV
10% 
∆ RR
60 0.152 5.5% -0.6% 0.2% 0.153 5.4% -0.5% 0.4%
61 0.058 7.8% -0.7% 0.3% 0.057 7.7% -0.4% 0.6%
62 0.072 7.8% -0.5% 0.3% 0.071 7.8% -0.3% 0.6%
63 0.079 8.0% -0.4% 0.4% 0.078 7.9% -0.2% 0.6%
64 0.173 6.1% -0.3% 0.3% 0.172 6.1% -0.1% 0.6%
65 0.723 1.6% -0.2% 0.1% 0.723 1.5% -0.1% 0.2%
Average: 0.157 4.6% -0.4% 0.2% 0.157 4.5% -0.2% 0.4%
*Quantitative effects are reported as the % change in the predicted hazard. Probability values are reported in Table 3a 
Table 3 b 
% Quantitative effects of Social Security measures on the retirement probability (*)
Period: 2002-2006
PV
% ∆ in predicted hazard : % ∆ in predicted hazard :
SSA
AIC BIC AIC BIC
AIC BIC pr>χ(k)
2
= 
χ
2(k,Mc-Mi)
AIC BIC pr>χ(k)
2
= 
χ
2(k,Mc-
Exclusión restriction 
(M1): SSWt 66186.56 66717.71 -33038.28 (55) 0.000 66164.28 66695.43 -33027.14 (55) 0.000
(M2): SSAt/PVt 65694.62 66225.77 -32792.31 (55) 0.000 65694.62 66225.77 -32792.31 (55) 0.000
(M3): RRt 65659.82 66190.97 -32774.91 (55) 0.128 65656.79 66187.94 -32773.39 (55) 0.003
(M4): SSWt and SSAt/PVt 66212.33 66724.17 -33053.17 (53) 0.000 66212.33 66724.17 -33053.17 (53) 0.000
(M5): SSWt and RRt 66201.02 66712.86 -33047.51 (53) 0.000 66188.33 66700.17 -33041.17 (53) 0.000
(M6): SSAt/PVt and RRt 65703.37 66215.21 -32798.69 (53) 0.000 65703.37 66215.21 -32798.69 (53) 0.000
(M7): SSWt, SSAt/PVt and RRt 66226.46 66718.98 -33062.23 (51) 0.000 66226.46 66718.98 -33062.23 (51) 0.000
(M8): r2002 65787.63 66299.47 -32840.81 (53) 0.000 65792.13 66303.96 -32843.06 (53) 0.000
Relative incidence of Social Security measures on retirement decisions for all the period considered (*)
Table 4
(*)Results are obtained from regressions in columns 3 and 6 of Table A 2. Model parameters in parenthesis. k stands for the difference 
parameters betwen overall Model C and the alternative model considered
ln Likelihood ln Likelihood
(Mc): Overall Model C 65659.72 66210.18 -32772.86 (57) 65648.87 66199.34 -32767.44 (57)
ln Likelihood ln Likelihood
SSA PV
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In order to provide an assessment of the model specification and, in 
particular, of the goodness of fit resulting from the inclusion of the different 
economic incentive variables whose statistical significance has been tested, I 
propose using the Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian Information criteria (BIC)17.  
Each row in Table 4 shows AIC and BIC criteria for the 8 alternative 
specifications considered (M1-M8). These alternative models enforce an 
exclusion restriction in the overall model C, regarding the economic incentives 
variables that are specified in the first column of the Table. By providing a 
criterion to choose among nested models, I can compare the relative 
explanatory power of the different variables to affect the probability of retiring. 
The specification preferred should be the one including all the economic 
incentive variables, since it is the one with the lowest AIC and BIC. On pure 
likelihood grounds, overall Model C is also the preferred one. The only 
exception is encountered in the specification tested in M3 that does include the 
accrual value. The specification dominates the one with the more myopic 
incentive measure in the unrestricted model. 
 
The SSW variable and the other economic incentive variables are 
individually significant both in the SSA model as in the PV model, as shown  in 
their respective t-ratios in Table A 2. Moreover, joint significance of the 
incentive measures has been tested using a Wald test. Based on the p-value 
associated with a chi-square of 128.81 (145.72) with 3 degrees of freedom for the 
accrual (peak value) specification, I am able to reject the null hypothesis 
indicating that the coefficients for SSW, SSA/(PV) and replacement are not 
simultaneously equal to zero. Thus, inclusion of these variables improves the 
overall fit of the model. 
 
In spite of these effects being statistically significant, they are not very 
large. As the figures in Table 3 show, on average, a 10% rise in SSW increases 
the probability of retiring between 60 and 65 years of age by around 4.6 
percentage points. Moreover, these probabilities show a U-shaped form with 
age (Table A3), reaching the highest impact at 65, so that the closer a worker is 
to that age, the more responsive to changes in SSW becomes. 
As for the incentive variables, I find that increasing by 10% the difference 
between what a worker would receive if she retired now and what she would 
receive if she retired one year later (increasing SSA) decreases the average 
probability of retiring between 60 and 65 by an amount ranging between 0.3 
and 0.7 pp and by a similar amount if the 10% increase would be in PV. The 
effects on the retirement probability of the SSA and PV incentives are also U-
                                                                                 
17 AIC=-2*ln(likelihood)+2*k, and BIC = -2*ln(likelihood) + ln(N)*k . N is the number of observations 
and k the number of parameters  
.  
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shaped in relation to age (Table A3), so that they are larger at 60 and 65 and 
lower for the intermediate ages in that age range. 
On the other hand, the replacement rate shows the expected positive sign 
for the whole sample. Yet, it is not statistically significant, a finding which is 
confirmed by the results on the AIC and the BIC criteria shown in Table 4.  
The main conclusion from the estimates presented in Table 4 is that the 
wealth variable plays a larger role in the determination of the hazard rate than 
any of the remaining  incentive variables. This could imply that changing the 
amount of money that is transferred through pensions is more relevant for 
retirement decisions than changing the built-in incentives in the regulation. 
The predicted probability of retiring before 2002 between 60 and 65 is 
higher than after 2002 and this relationship holds for every age in the range 
from 60 to 65 (Figure 1). The role of the 2002 reform on this change is tested by 
including a dummy variable that takes value 1 from 2002 onwards and the 
interaction of this dummy variable with the Social Security incentives and 
pension wealth.  
 
The evidence from the signs and t-ratios of both the dummy and the 
interacted variables that are used to test for effect of the changes that were 
introduced in 200218, point out that the reform did not change the pattern of 
response to the wealth variable, but that, in general it changed the response to 
the incentive variables, reducing its impact on the timing of retirement (Table A 
2). This implies that we need a larger value of SSA (or PV) from 2002 to reach 
the same impact on the hazard, as shown in Table A 4, where a decomposition 
of the effects of the reform on the incidence of the different incentive variables 
is presented. This result could be explained as a consequence of the fact that one 
of the changes carried out under the reform improved the treatment for those 
that had more than 30 years of contribution, increasing for them the amount of 
the pension to be received at each age. The fact that most workers (64%) already 
had at least 30 contributory years (in particular, nearly one third had more than 
34 years of contributions), may explain the finding that the reform reduced the 
incidence of the incentive structure. Additionally, the replacement rate becomes 
                                                                                 
18 See Norton et al (2004) for a discussion of such test. 
Figure 1 Predicted hazard rates before and after 2002 by age
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statistically significant for this period, so that a more myopic approach seems to 
hold. Therefore, the observed reduction in the hazard rate does not seem to 
stem from the new regulation, which has reduced its incidence, but from a 
variety of other factors that are captured by the dummy variable.  
Since the Social Security legislation establishes a maximum and a 
minimum level of monthly contributions. I will refer in the sequel to the 
individuals who contribute at those levels as "low (upper) topped". Regarding 
this people, an interesting finding is that those who are low topped  have a 
higher retirement probability at 60 than those who are not (Table A 4). It could 
be argued that the minimum pension mechanism offsets the effect of early 
retirement penalties so that it creates a strong incentive for low income earners 
to retire, which is especially relevant at 60. From 61 onwards, being low topped 
in wealth reduces the probability of retirement. In fact, the older the worker is, 
the higher is the reduction in the probability to retire. This result could be 
consistent with the idea that people might choose to carry on working in order 
to build up more pension rights, given the built-in incentives. The latter arise 
from the higher dependency between the amount of the pension to be received 
and the latest wages that the worker receives compared to future wages which, 
if they were increasing in age, could lead to a larger pension in the future. 
The results also show that high earners (those who have their pensions 
capped) have a lower probability of retiring both at 64 and 6519 (Table A 4), in 
line with the findings in Villagarcía (1995), Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (1999), 
Blanco (2000) and Labeaga (2008). This finding could result from the fact that, 
for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal 
utility from working. A lower potential wage rate for a elderly workers is likely 
to be associated with a lower probability of labour force participation as, other 
things equal, a lower wage rate represents a lower opportunity cost of leisure 
and a higher replacement rate for government pensions.  
Appendix 3 explores possible biasing effects on the estimation of the 
Social Security economic incentive variable coefficients resulting from pooling 
both (upper and lower) capped workers and non-capped workers in the same 
regression. Results remain similar when analysis is restricted only to those who 
are not capped as can be seen in Table A 4. 
Duration variables and cycle 
Given that individuals enter the sample as soon as they satisfy the 
requirements to claim a pension, we can interpret the significance of the 
dummy coefficient for duration one period (g1) as a test for the relevance of 
becoming entitled to retirement benefits20. If the preferences for retiring were 
high enough, becoming eligible would be a main determinant of the decision to 
retire, and people will retire as soon as the regulation would entitle them to do 
so. However, the coefficient on g1 is statistically not significant (Table A 2). 
                                                                                 
19 People from all ages can be low topped, but only people that are 64 or older can receive the maximum 
pension 
20 See Appendix 2 for a description of these conditions. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that becoming eligible by itself is not a relevant 
ground for retirement. The results show also non-monotonic duration 
dependence. 
Early-retirement may result from business cycle fluctuations. In the 
economic literature, the effect of business cycles on retirement is ambiguous. 
The ambiguity arises as a result of the existence of two opposite forces in 
retirement decisions in response to changes in the business cycle. On the one 
hand, finding employment becomes more difficult during recessions. Thus, it is 
likely that in downturns those workers who become unemployed at ages where 
retirement is possible experience an increase in the probability of leaving the 
labour market and therefore retire. On the other hand, recessions often involve 
huge reductions in assets values owned by workers and this negative wealth 
effect may discourage them from early retirement. Our results show that, 
during the period analyzed, the propensity to retire is pro-cyclical, so that the 
hazard retirement rate is higher during expansions. Pro-cyclicality of early 
retirement encountered in Spain is in line with previous results by Montizaan, 
Cörvers and de Grip (2007) for the US. Asset price changes are highly correlated 
with the evolution of the business cycle. If individuals rely on their investments 
to fund their consumption during retirement, on top of what they can get from 
the retirement pension, they are particularly vulnerable to asset market 
downturns. That could be the reason why in periods of economic prosperity, 
prospective retirees are more optimistic about the evolution of their other 
sources of income and therefore decide to retire earlier. However, pooling EPA 
data, Muñoz (1995) provides evidence that individuals retire earlier in 
recessions than in expansions. The difference between Muñoz´s (1995) results 
and mine might be explained by the growing development of investment funds 
and retirement plans during the sample period I have considered in the 
analysis. While in 1993 there were only 91 pension plans in Spain, these 
amounted to more than 1500 in 2003 managing 55,764,768 thousand Euros 
(compared to 152,837 thousand Euros managed in 1993)21. Furthermore 
although pension plans based on fixed income securities are the most common 
in Spain,  equities pension plans have gained considerable importance (equities 
has grown from 3.7% of total investments in 1993 to more than 21 % in 2003).  
Age 
In the specification, I also include age dummies to account for differential 
effects related to this variable. These dummies should capture the effect of 
growing older “per se”, and not through the different coefficients in the 
calculation of pension rights that are age dependent.  The results show that, 
even when controlling for eligibility criteria and Social security variables, 65 is a 
prevailing retirement age. 
 
 
                                                                                 
21
 Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones (DGSFP) y Asociación de Instituciones de 
Inversión Colectiva y Fondos de Pensiones (INVERCO) 
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Working status, industry and other labour history related variables 
The labour market status prevailing during the year before the retirement 
decision is taken could be relevant for the retirement hazard. In particular, the 
sample allows us to distinguish among four labour status: working, receiving 
unemployment benefits and thus also contributing to Social Security, 
contributing without working nor perceiving unemployment benefits (special 
agreement), and not contributing. 
The results show that a person working in a particular year has a lower 
probability of retiring the following year than a person who was not working, 
even when I condition on social security incentives. They also show that being 
unemployed the preceding year increases the probability of retiring. Such 
findings may only reflect the predominance of special early retirement 
programs that exist for unemployed old people22. I also find that the size of 
these effects varies with age, as can be seen in Figure 2, showing a u-shaped 
form.  
 
The industry where the individual works (sector of activity) is also 
included as a covariate, allowing for the distinction between those working in 
the service sector and in the industry sector. The estimated coefficient is, 
however, not statistically significant, in contrast to other works where the sector 
of activity is found to be playing a significant role (Conde-Ruiz and García, 
2004, Blanco, 2000, Villagarcía,1995, and Muñoz,1995).  
The next couple of variables try to capture the quality of the labour 
relations, through the number of contracts that have been recorded for a given 
work history up to the eligibility moment and the average length of these 
contracts. The results show that job turnover (proxied by the total number of 
labour relations that a person has had) has a negative impact on the retirement 
hazard but that impact that fades away as duration increases. The sign of the 
coefficient suggests that the higher the labour turnover is the lower the 
probability of retiring between 60 and 65 becomes. This result is in line with the 
                                                                                 
22 See García Pérez and Sánchez Martín (2008b) for an analysis of the transitions from unemployment for 
older people. 
Figure 2 Predicted hazard rates according to previous working status 
and age
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findings that workers with a firm-specific training history retire earlier than 
workers with a general training background (see Montizaan, Cörvers and de 
Grip, 2007).  
Regarding the average length of the contract, it seems to play a 
significant role in the decision to retire only as time unfolds. Notice, however 
that, although in general, the longer the contract the more stable the 
individual’s working life has been, this it is not a sophisticated measure of a 
stable career as the same average may result from quite different job histories.  
Individual characteristics and other 
The results obtained for the negative role of higher education on the 
probability of retiring is in agreement with the available findings in Villagarcía 
(1995) and Gutiérrez-Domènech (2006)23. One explanation for such a finding 
may result stem from the theoretical argument stating that low-ability workers 
are induced to retire early because of the intra-generational redistribution built 
in early retirement provisions via the utility derived from leisure (Conde-Ruiz 
and Galasso, 2003). Further, the effect of education is reinforced by duration, so 
that the probability of retiring of a higher educated worker becomes larger the 
longer the time it has elapsed since becoming eligible. 
As for the health status, the results show a lower hazard for those 
receiving disability benefits the year before retirement. Such counterintuitive 
finding may just reflect the fact that those receiving disability benefits, besides 
having a poorer health, will probably be the ones receiving retirement disability 
pensions when they turn 65, the only age in which this type of pensions can be 
awarded and which I am not including in the analysis. 
Receiving public transfers other than unemployment or disability 
benefits reduces the retirement probability, which may be a consequence of 
liquidity constraints.  
Dummy variables for the region (Autonomous Community) where the 
worker initially registered are included in the specifications, as a way to capture 
other differences in the economic environment. Coefficients are not reported 
but are available under request. 
In sum, most of the covariates that I have included in the estimation 
provide evidence in line with previous empirical findings in the literature. The 
only noticeable differences lie in the pro-cyclicality of retirement and the 
absence of differential retirement patterns by sector of activity. The former can 
be due to the growing importance of complementary equity-based pension 
plans during the last decade, which is precisely the period analyzed in this 
paper. The latter discrepancy can be due to the restrictive characteristics of the 
sample selected here (only men working in the Social Security General Scheme) 
                                                                                 
23 Muñoz (1995), on the other hand, finds evidence that the education has a quadratic effect, so that those 
individuals with little or with a lot of studies retire later than those with an intermediate level of 
education.   
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which is narrower than those used in other available studies that analyze not 
only employees in public and private sector but also self-employed workers. 
 
Sensitivity analysis. Alternative regulatory schemes 
Finally, I have performed a few sensitivity exercises with the aim of 
shedding light on how the estimated retirement probabilities respond to small 
changes in the economic incentive mechanisms underlying the Spanish public 
pension system. The reason for considering only small changes of the baseline 
rules is to minimize the Lucas’ critique, and also to check whether these 
changes have enough sizeable effects or more drastic changes are needed in 
which case a structural approach to evaluate their impact would probably be 
required. Following a similar argument to that given earlier against the validity 
of the Lucas´ critique  in the specific setup of this paper, the sensitivity analysis 
in this section should also be interpreted as being only valid during a short 
period in which hat individuals have not time to change their expectations. As a 
result, the results in this section should only be considered as a counter- factual 
exercise that provides a quantification of what would have happened if 
alternative retirement reforms were proposed, given the observed behavior of 
individuals after the pension reform  in 2002. 
Specifically, I have computed the pension wealth that a person would 
receive under 3 alternative regulatory schemes implying very small changes 
over the retirement rules established in the 2002 pension regulatory framework. 
Recall that  this framework was characterized by requiring at least 15 years of 
contribution so that a pension reaches 50% of a proxy of gross average lifetime 
earnings (regulatory base), raising to 100% after 35 years of contribution. I have 
computed the SSW and the incentive measures that result from the assumed 
alternative settings for each individual in the sample to obtain counterfactual 
predicted retirement probabilities. These are compared with the ones predicted 
from my estimates, which act as a benchmark. The new probabilities are 
obtained using the specification in column 1 of Table A 2. In particular, I 
compute the changes in relation to the population that in the sample are subject 
to the rules prevailing in 2002. Each of the three alternative regulatory schemes 
tries to change only one item in the pension rules.  
The first sensitivity scenario (setting A) would consist of an overall 
reduction in the amount of the pension received at all ages. It caps the pension 
at 96% of the regulatory base, not allowing individuals to get the 100% of it at 
any retirement age. Under this scenario, with 15 contributory years, the pension 
amount is only 48% of the regulatory base. Moreover, up to 25 years of 
contribution, there would be an extra 3% increase in each year is added, and 
from 26, the increase would be 2% per year up to 96% of the regulatory base at 
35 or more years of contribution. Even if there were no changes in the number 
of people retiring, such scenario implies a reduction of the pension burden in 
relation to the benchmark. 
117 
 
The second scenario (setting B) affects mostly the incentive structure as it 
requires more years of contribution to claim a pension (18 years instead of 15), 
so that the increase ladder becomes steeper. Moreover, at the age of 66, if the 
person has more than 35 contributory years, an additional increase in the 
amount of the pension is added. Under this scenario, there is a 3% increase up 
to 25 contributory years. Beyond that age and with a longer contributory 
period, the increase is 3.22%. Only 2.6% of people at 60 have a labour history 
shorter than 18 years. Therefore, under this scenario, we cannot initially 
conclude whether the burden rises or not. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of the Regulatory Base linked to the number of years of contribution 
 
The third scenario (setting C) proposes changes in the short-term 
incentives to stay beyond 65, in the sense that it only introduces higher 
retirement benefits for each additional year beyond 65 that an individual 
remains not retired. It reproduces part of the changes introduced by the 
“Acuerdo sobre Medidas en Materia de Seguridad Social”, of 13 July 2006, 
which were implemented two years later. In particular, at 66 with at least 35 
years of contribution, a 2% increase in the pension is added, raising it to 3% for 
those individuals with at least 40 years of contribution. 
Table 5 shows the computed counterfactual predicted retirement 
probabilities for these three scenarios, the average predicted retirement age 
over the age interval 60-65 and the changes in the number of retirees in the 
same interval and its disaggregation by ages. All the changes analysed result in 
an extremely small increase on the average retirement age and a reduction in 
the number of people who retire between 60 and 65 which ranges from 0.08% 
under setting C to 1.6% under setting B.  
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Under the first two scenarios, retirement rates at all ages are affected by 
the proposed changes and the effects are increasing with age up to 63, when the 
largest impact is recorded. The smallest effect is at 65, probably reflecting that 
this age is regarded as normal retirement age.  
Under setting C, there is a very small impact on the probability of retiring 
between 60 and 64 compared to the benchmark case irrespectively of the use of 
a specification where only changes in SSA (Model C, column 1) or only changes 
in PV (Model C, column 2) are included. In either case, the decrease in the 
number of people that choose to retire at a later age is rather small (0.20 %), as 
only the incentive changes, but not the social security wealth at that age. In fact, 
those whose entire contributory life is below 35 years, experience a reduction in 
the amount they receive at 65 in relation to the benchmark. Notice, however, 
that when the specification with the PV is chosen in setting C, the retirement 
pattern predicted by ages turns out to be different. Since PV considers 
information about the entire time horizon, individuals take into account earlier 
in their lives changes that will affect them after 65, in contrast with what 
happened when predictions are derived from the specification with SSA. 
Despite these differences, predicted retirement age is similar under both 
specifications.  
Benchmark Setting A Setting B Setting C
Predicted retirement probability 77.08 76.03 76.82 76.95
Predicted retirement age 62.92 62.93 62.93 62.92
Change in number of retired people - -1.53 -1.58 -0.08
by age:
60 - -1.80 -1.63 0.00
61 - -2.45 -2.09 0.00
62 - -2.48 -2.10 0.00
63 - -2.59 -2.26 0.00
64 - -2.06 -1.90 0.00
65 - -0.60 -1.09 -0.20
Estimations are derived from Model C, Column 1
(1)
 In percentage
(2)
 The effects are estimated for the period begining in 2002
Setting A: Capping the pension to 96% of the Regulatory Base at 35 years of contribution and to 48% at 15 
years of contribution
Setting B: 18 years of contribution to claim a pension. Retiring after 65 implies 3% increase
Setting C: Retiring after 65 implies 2% increase and 3% if 40 years of contribution
Table 5
Effects of alternative settings on retirement between ages 60 and 65
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Benchmark Setting A Setting B Setting C
Predicted retirement probability (1) 77.08 77.23 76.99 77.76
Predicted retirement age 62.92 62.93 62.93 62.93
Change in number of retired people(2) - -1.49 -1.63 -1.63
by age:
60 - -1.02 -1.24 0.65
61 - -2.86 -2.88 -0.52
62 - -3.07 -3.00 -0.67
63 - -3.38 -3.10 -0.80
64 - -2.50 -2.28 -0.41
65 - -0.49 -0.84 0.00
Estimations are derived from Model C, Column 2
(1)
 In percentage
(2)
 The effects are estimated for the period begining in 2002
Setting A: Capping the pension to 96% of the Regulatory Base at 35 years of contribution and to 48% at 15 
years of contribution
Setting B: 18 years of contribution to claim a pension. Retiring after 65 implies 3% increase
Setting C: Retiring after 65 implies 2% increase and 3% if 40 years of contribution
Effects of alternative settings on retirement between ages 60 and 65
Table 6
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6 Conclusions 
There is some agreement that generous early retirement provisions 
account for a large proportion of the drop in the labour force participation of 
elderly workers that had been observed in Spain during the nineties. This paper 
aims at quantifying the impact of these provisions under the Spanish Social 
Security System. 
The evidence shows that, in general, the economic incentives stemming 
from Social Security regulations on old age pensions in Spain seem to have the 
expected effect on retirement. The present value of the future flow of pensions 
has a positive impact on the probability of retiring, with larger pensions 
shortening the span between becoming eligible for retirement and actually 
claiming the retirement pension. Therefore, all measures taken to reduce the 
present value of such flow at early ages may have the desired effect of reducing 
early retirement. Moreover, it seems that the built-in incentives in the system 
discouraging early retirement have a non negligible effect on old-age 
retirement, so that they are effective in retaining people in the labour market. 
The higher flow of pensions that workers receive for staying at work one 
additional year compensate for both the loss of leisure that they experience for 
the additional year that they keep contributing and the wage they receive at 
work. The quantitative size of such effect is statistically significant. Moreover, 
small variations in the incentives measures have a sizeable effect on early 
retirement. For the period beginning in 2002, a 10% increase in SSW (SSA, PV, 
replacement) results in a 4.6% (-0.4%, -0.2% and 0.4%) increase in the hazard 
according with estimates in Model C (see Table 3b). Therefore, from a policy 
perspective, there is a need to reinforce such effects. 
It has been also found that the new scheme implemented since 2002 has 
reduced the probability of retiring at each age, in spite of the fact that the 
substitution effects captured through the incentives measures seem to have also 
reduced their incidence on retirement decisions. Moreover, there is evidence 
pointing out to a more myopic behaviour of workers regarding social security 
incentives. The changes in the regulation that have taken place may explain 
such results. 
Any new change in the incentive structure of pensions should take into 
account the longer work histories that younger people have when becoming 
eligible. In fact, the counterfactual results show that a small change in the 
incentive structure has a small impact on the number of people retiring. It 
seems that to increase the number of people staying beyond 65 requires more 
than a tiny push. It is therefore necessary to combine economic incentives with 
other institutional constraints in order to effectively increase the retirement age. 
There is an urgent need to address the consequences of an ageing 
population on the Social Security accounts. Minor changes in the rules that 
define the amount received at each age in relation to the years effectively 
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contributed may have a positive impact on the pension accounts, through its 
impact on the probability to retire at each age. Yet, as the evidence is this paper 
shows, this is not enough. Prospective amendments in retirement rules should 
be oriented to link the possibility of retiring and the benefit rights not only to 
contribution efforts but also to life expectancy.  
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APPENDIX 1: DATA 
 
This appendix contains the definition of the variables included in the 
different specifications. As already been mentioned in the text, the data source 
is the Continous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH) 2006, "Muestra Continua 
de Vidas Laborales" in Spanish), a sample of administrative data gathered by the 
Social Security.  
 The main descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table 
A1. Notice that not all individuals in the sample are either working or have 
claimed an old-pension during 2006 since some  are unemployed and receive 
benefits, some do not receive benefits but are also contributing, and some do 
not contribute at all. Moreover, some go through different labour situations 
before claiming the pension; cf.Argimón, González and Vegas (2007a). 
(A) Economic Incentive Variables: 
To calculate the Social Security benefits to which individuals in the sample are 
entitled, I make use of the Social Security covered earnings histories of 
individual in the CSWH 2006. 
SSW it: Value of Social Security Wealth of individual i at time t, at 2006 prices:  
]])1/()|()[,([)( tsi
Ls
ts
iiit tsprsBrSSW
−
=
=
+=∑ ρ , 
indicates Social Security Wealth at time t (at age t) if retiring at age r, L is the 
maximum life length, ),( rsBi is the pension benefit in period s (at age s) if 
retiring at r, p(s| r) is the conditional probability of an individual at time t to be 
alive at time s where s>r, iρ  is the individual discount rate.  
)()1/()(),( rSSWjrSSWjrrSSW j −++=+ ρ  
To calculate the pension I make use of data on covered earnings and from it I 
have built the Regulatory Base which has been computed, following the 
regulation , as  a moving average of the contribution bases in the 15 years 
immediately before retirement. The minimum base that has been used to 
complete job careers has been the one corresponding to contributory group 5, 
senior administrative (“oficial administrativo“), the group with the largest 
volume of population. On the other hand, the maximum base has been taken to 
be the one corresponding to group 1, Engineers and Graduates (“Ingenieros y 
Licenciados“), the group with the highest base for all the years. The maximum 
life length (T) is assumed to be 98 years; iρ , the individual discount rate is 
assumed to be fixed at 3%, p(s| r), the conditional probability of an individual 
aged r to be alive at age s, has been taken from the National Statistics Institute 
(INE) demographic projections (scenario 2), based upon 2001 Census data. 
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Pensions are assumed to increase 2% yearly from 2006. Upper and lower limits 
on the pension benefits are applied to compute retirment pension (the 
minimum one corresponds to a worker with a dependent spouse). Not 
considering heterogeneity on survival probability among individuals with 
different income levels, as well as on discount rates, could be understood as a 
limitation on the assumptions behind the incentive variables used in the 
estimation. However, heterogeneity on official estimates of life expectancy by 
socioeconomic level are not available in Spain, and though it were possible to 
estimate them, it is presumable they would not differ too much, since the 
country is not characterized by such remarkable levels of wealth inequality. 
Maybe additional research would be needed to analyze the impact of 
considering different discount rates, also linked to income level.  Assumed 
discount rates, and minimum and maximum pension, are homogeneous to 
ensure simplicity in the analysis. 
In order to calculate the different incentive measures, I need to project SSW for 
the future. Two different situations arise, depending on the age of the 
individual and whether or not he has retired. For those that are not 66 before 
2006, I need to project their pension and their SSW beyond this year. To do so, I 
assume that their salary and, therefore, their contributory base will be 
increasing at a 2% rate every year.  For those that have retired before 2006, I 
project their salaries for the years before 2006 assuming that they keep the 
purchasing power of their last observed salary (or the following one), so that 
the contributory base increases by the same amount as the December over 
December CPI 
SSA it: The accrual rate,  
ititiit rSSWrSSWrSSA )()1()1/(1)( −++= ρ  
and we let 
)1(
1)1()1(
t
itrSSW
itrSSW Π+
+
+
=+  
A limitation of this index is that it does not take into account the comparison 
that the individual can make between pension benefits and the level of his/her 
income. It could be argued that the leisure preference is such that wages can 
fully compensate for the forgone leisure enjoyment from postponing retirement. 
 
PV it: Peak Value computed between the ages of 60 and 65 is defined as,  
 
otherwiseSSA
rSSWrrSSWrrrSSWrrSSWrPV
i
iiiii
,
))66,(...,)3,(,)2,(,)1,(max()(
=
+++=
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I follow Coile and Gruber (2000) and restrict the peak value to be equal to the 
accrual rate, if the individual works beyond the highest value for his social 
security wealth. They also normalize the peak value by the expected stream of 
wages over the period between the maximum year and the current year. Hence 
their actual index measures the benefits of continued work relative to the social 
security wealth earnings in the same period. They call this measure the 
tax/subsidy rate. This normalization can also be made for both the accrual and 
the option value.  
RR it : Replacement rate, )(rRRi  is the ratio of the expected pension benefits
)(rBi  at time t over wages )(rwi  received at time t-1 for individual i at age r, if 
the person retires at age r.  
))(/)(()( rwrBErRR iiri =  where E is the expectation operator. 
 
(B) Other variables 
failurejubi it: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the person retires at time t 
and 0 otherwise. It is the dependent variable. 
disab it-1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was 
receiving any disability benefit while he was a year younger (at time t-1) and 
zero, otherwise.  
univ i: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the contributory group (“grupo de 
cotización“) of the longest contributory relationship with the Social Security 
system is the one with the highest academic qualifications (group 1: “Engineers 
and Graduates“), and zero, otherwise. 
numrel i: Number of contributory labour relations that have been recorded by 
the Social Security before becoming entitled to an old age pension and that 
include those involving the perception of unemployment benefits.  
Regional Government (Comunidad Autónoma) where the worker initially 
registered: Group of 19 dummy variables, each one corresponding to a CA, 
plus one for Ceuta and one for Melilla, that records the initial worker’s 
registration.  (IIccaa-) 
serv i. Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the longest job a person has held 
has taken place in the following CNAE sector classifications: Trade (50 to 52), 
Restoration (Hostelería) (55),  Transport (60 to 64), other services, including 
education y health (65 to 67, 70 to 74,  80, 85 and 90)  
u it-1. Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was receiving 
unemployment benefits, either as a subsidy or a contributory transfer, while he 
was a year younger (at time t-1), and zero, otherwise. That is, people whose 
relationship with Social Security is coded as a TRL 751-756 in the administrative 
files. 
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l it-1. Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was working and 
contributing to Social Security while he was a year younger (at time t-1), and 
value zero, otherwise.  
g_kit: Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is at time t in the k–th 
period decision and cero otherwise, where k=[1,6]. That is, g_k takes value 1 if 
the value of the length of the spell from the year the person becomes entitled to 
a retirement pension is k. 
age_kit: Dummy variables that take value 1 if the person is k years old at time t 
and cero otherwise, where k=[60,65]. 
cycle t   : Spanish GDP real growth rate (for years 1997 to 2006)  
r2002: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the year of the observation is 
greater than 2001. 
otherben it-1: Dummy variable that takes value 1 at time t if the person was 
receiving any Social Security benefit other than disability, old age or 
unemployment while he was a year younger (at time t-1) and zero, otherwise.  
meanlength i: Average number of years for the spells that the individual i has 
had before becoming entitled to a pension. 
t:a linear time  trend 
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median mean s.d. median mean s.d. median mean s.d.
SSWt(1) 199.30 222.50 96.83 195.83 211.84 87.02 201.35 228.17 101.21
SSAt(1) 6.89 6.73 12.95 10.12 9.79 12.20 4.97 5.09 13.04
PVt(1) 12.65 18.84 26.73 21.68 26.77 28.03 8.32 14.63 25.01
RRt(2) 57.61 67.36 35.50 50.77 57.61 26.56 61.93 72.55 38.45
lt-1(2) 57.49 62.67 54.74
ut-1
(2) 24.28 27.54 22.55
numrel 10.770 25.866 9.547 19.763 11.420 28.565
meanlenght(3) 7.237 7.243 7.763 7.436 6.957 7.122
time since eligible(3) 2.677 1.565 2.275 1.390 2.892 1.609
univ 0.106 0.307 0.101 0.302 0.108 0.310
serv 0.364 0.481 0.356 0.479 0.367 0.482
disab 0.126 0.332 0.024 0.152 0.181 0.385
otherben 0.134 0.341 0.030 0.172 0.190 0.392
low60 0.086 0.281 0.101 0.302 0.078 0.268
low61 0.047 0.211 0.034 0.181 0.053 0.224
low62 0.029 0.168 0.015 0.123 0.036 0.187
low63 0.018 0.134 0.008 0.091 0.024 0.152
low64 0.011 0.104 0.005 0.067 0.014 0.120
low65 0.008 0.086 0.003 0.053 0.010 0.100
top64 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.042
top65 0.003 0.058 0.001 0.034 0.005 0.067
age61 0.219 0.413 0.236 0.425 0.209 0.407
age62 0.175 0.380 0.158 0.365 0.184 0.387
age63 0.135 0.342 0.110 0.313 0.148 0.355
age64 0.100 0.300 0.068 0.252 0.118 0.322
age65 0.065 0.246 0.027 0.162 0.085 0.278
cycle(4) 3.667 0.679 4.262 0.688 3.350 0.406
r2002 0.653 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
   (1)
 In thousands of euros
   (3)In years
   (4) In percentage variation of GDP
After 2002
   (2)
 In percentage
Table A 1
Descriptive values. Sample of
men born between 1936 and 1946, having worked in the General Regimen, with a relation with the Social Security in 2006
All period considered 
1996-2006 Before 2002 
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ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
LR chi2(45)=38014.62 LR chi2(49)=38187.03 LR chi2(56)=38597.09 LR chi2(45)=38030.83 LR chi2(49)=38213.54 LR chi2(56)=38607.93
Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371 Pseudo R2=0.365 Pseudo R2=0.367 Pseudo R2=0.371
Log likelihood =  -33064.09 Log likelihood = -32977.89 Log likelihood =  -32772.86 Log likelihood = -33055.97 Log likelihood = -32964.63 Log likelihood = -32767.44
SSWt 2.979 2.969 2.462 2.401 2.322 2.289
(23.08)*** (23.31)*** (11.69)*** (11.81)*** (10.78)*** (10.83)***
SSAt -7.993 -12.941 -10.510
(-7.07)*** (-7.78)*** (-5.69)***
PVt -4.284 -6.730 -5.363
(-8.11)*** (-9.26)*** (-6.92)***
RRt 0.046 0.043 -0.083 -0.144 -0.085 -0.139
(1.2) (1.14) (-1.25) (-2.14)* (-1.28) (-2.06)*
SSWt * r2002 1.109 1.166 1.272 1.252
(4.76)*** (5.16)*** (5.48)*** (5.53)***
SSAt * r2002 8.821 4.018
(4.50)*** (2.04)*
PVt * r2002 4.451 3.265
(4.94)*** (3.61)***
RRt * r2002 0.232 0.300 0.151 0.252
(3.04)** (3.89)*** (1.97)* (3.26)**
 r2002 -0.763 -0.843 -0.689 -0.787
(-10.37)*** (-11.04)*** (-9.31)*** (-10.24)***
low60 0.205 0.224
(4.45)*** (5.01)***
low61 -0.035 -0.001
(-0.46) (-0.01)
low62 -0.587 -0.554
(-5.68)*** (-5.38)***
low63 -0.922 -0.878
(-6.42)*** (-6.14)***
low64 -1.885 -1.899
(-9.73)*** (-9.80)***
top64 -0.546 -0.383
(-2.26)* (-1.61)
top65 -1.509 -1.415
(-11.52)*** (-11.07)***
l t-1 -1.577 -1.577 -1.551 -1.556 -1.575 -1.577
(-39.51)*** (-39.52)*** (-38.65)*** (-38.77)*** (-39.05)*** (-39.10)***
u t-1 0.942 0.934 0.965 0.952 0.954 0.947
(25.21)*** (24.98)*** (25.72)*** (25.33)*** (25.31)*** (25.09)***
numrel -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 -0.023
(-11.82)*** (-11.74)*** (-11.11)*** (-11.06)*** (-11.74)*** (-11.66)***
t x numrel 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(9.03)*** (8.97)*** (8.68)*** (8.65)*** (9.10)*** (9.04)***
meanlenght 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.75) (0.73) (0.96) (1.01) (1.57) (1.58)
t x meanlenght 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(3.85)*** (3.92)*** (3.43)*** (3.40)*** (2.56)* (2.61)**
serv -0.003 -0.001 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.024
(-0.07) (-0.02) (0.50) (0.54) (0.58) (0.60)
t x serv -0.020 -0.022 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028
(-1.67) (-1.81)* (-2.01)* (-2.13)* (-2.22)* (-2.30)*
(cont…)
 MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C
Table A 2
Logit estimates of the effects of pension incentives on retirement behaviour between 60 and 65 years of age. Males born between 1936 and 1946, 
having worked in the General Regime with a relation with the Social Security in 2006(*)
115.532 number of observations
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND REGULATION
WORKING STATUS, SECTOR OF ACTIVITY AND OTHER LABOUR HISTORY RELATED VARIABLES
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(cont…)
univ -0.729 -0.751 -0.706 -0.716 -0.779 -0.794
(-10.46)*** (-10.82)*** (-10.10)*** (-10.28)*** (-10.95)*** (-11.18)***
t x univ -0.078 -0.068 -0.086 -0.079 -0.038 -0.029
(-4.02)*** (-3.57)*** (-4.39)*** (-4.15)*** (-1.89) (-1.49)
disab -1.578 -1.586 -1.468 -1.485 -1.484 -1.498
(-8.28)*** (-8.34)*** (-7.64)*** (-7.74)*** (-7.70)*** (-7.78)***
otherben -2.981 -2.970 -2.978 -2.972 -3.016 -3.015
(-17.55)*** (-17.54)*** (-17.39)*** (-17.41)*** (-17.54)*** (-17.55)***
age61 -0.015 -0.037 -0.069 -0.095 0.098 0.069
(-0.06) (-0.15) (-0.29) (-0.40) (0.40) (0.28)
age62 -1.047 -1.076 -1.055 -1.087 -0.767 -0.791
(-3.70)*** (-3.80)*** (-3.70)*** (3.81)*** (-2.48)* (-2.56)*
age63 -0.710 -0.739 -0.725 -0.759 -0.098 -0.134
(-2.50)* (-2.59)** (-2.54)* (-2.65)** (-0.32) (-0.44)
age64 -0.712 -0.759 -0.686 -0.739 0.247 0.213
(-2.46)* (-2.63)** (-2.36)* (-2.55)* (0.78) (0.67)
age65 2.813 2.788 2.865 2.834 3.271 3.272
(10.94)*** (10.84)*** (11.09)*** (10.96)*** (12.34)*** (12.33)***
cycle 0.241 0.246 0.111 0.119 0.125 0.131
(16.89)*** (17.18)*** (5.94)*** (6.42)*** (6.69)*** (7.03)***
g1 -0.514 -0.540 -0.591 -0.615 -0.331 -0.370
(-1.96 (-2.06)* (-2.24)* (-2.33)* (-1.23) (-1.37)
g2 -1.703 -1.733 -1.697 -1.723 -1.539 -1.572
(-6.76)*** (-6.88)*** (-6.74*** (-64.85)*** (-6.02)*** (-6.15)***
g3 -0.522 -0.557 -0.538 -0.567 -0.442 -0.483
(-2.06)* (-2.20)* (-2.11)* (-2.22)* (-1.64) (-1.79)
g4 -0.858 -0.904 -0.856 -0.891 -1.094 -1.128
(-3.52)*** (-3.72)*** (-3.50)*** (-3.65)*** (-4.32)*** (-4.45)***
g5 0.054 0.027 0.028 0.016 -0.494 -0.519
(0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (-1.95) (-2.05)*
cons -2.328 -2.264 -1.422 -1.306 -1.731 -1.635
(-3.82)*** (-3.71)*** (-2.30)* (-2.12)* (-2.76)** (-24602)**
  Statistical significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Coefficients of Autonomous Communities not resported. Prob > chi2=0.
 DURATION VARIABLES
(*) Notes:
  Model A represents the basic model. Model B includes Model A and changes in 2002 regulation as control variables. Model C includes Model B and income levels as control variables.
   Dependent variable is 1 if person retires and 0 otherwise, conditioned on not having retired before. Monetary values are in 1,000,000 euros, prices 2006. Z-values are in parenthesis.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS & OTHERS
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mean median mean median mean median mean median
Economic Incentives and 
Regulation
SSWt 0.00718 0.0034 0.00717 0.0034 0.00725 0.0033 0.00715 0.0033
SSAt -0.00038 -0.0002 -0.00060 -0.0002
PVt -0.0003802 -0.0001 -0.00035 -0.0001
RRt 0.00082 0.0003 0.00086 0.0004 0.00036 0.0001 0.00061 0.0003
r2002 overall change -0.02257 -0.0097 -0.02225 -0.0100 -0.01929 -0.0086 -0.01953 -0.0087
r2002 change
low60 0.01627 0.0088 0.01781 0.0097
low61 -0.00268 -0.0014 -0.00005 0.0000
low62 -0.04063 -0.0189 -0.03861 -0.0181
low64 -0.10067 -0.0382 -0.10122 -0.0385
top64 -0.03790 -0.0178 -0.02744 -0.0132
top65 -0.08607 -0.0345 -0.08238 -0.0337
Individual Characteristics
numrel -0.00067 -0.0001 -0.00066 -0.0001 -0.00071 -0.0002 -0.00071 -0.0001
lt-1 -0.12357 -0.1088 -0.12392 -0.1088 -0.12525 -0.1094 -0.12556 -0.1097
ut-1 0.07886 0.0588 0.07767 0.0577 0.07751 0.0566 0.07698 0.0561
uni -0.05481 -0.0264 -0.05498 -0.0265 -0.05596 -0.0268 -0.05638 -0.0271
serv -0.00035 -0.0002 -0.00032 -0.0002 -0.00030 -0.0002 -0.00032 -0.0002
disab -0.08750 -0.0345 -0.08822 -0.0347 -0.08763 -0.0345 -0.08829 -0.0348
otherben -0.13931 -0.0509 -0.13919 -0.0512 -0.13911 -0.0507 -0.13920 -0.0509
NOTES:
Results are obtained under Models B and C in Table A2. The effects are estimated for the period beginning in 2002.
Quantitative effects of the continuous variables are computed as the discrete differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 10% increase 
in the variables' values with respect to the logistic function evaluated at the observed variables' values.
Table A 4
Quantitative effects of pension incentives and other variables on the average hazard rate for ages between 
60 and 65
MODEL B MODEL C
ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
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APPENDIX 2: LEGISLATION 
 
The institutional framework 
 
The labour-market based social security is mandatory for workers in 
Spain. Old-age public pensions are mainly provided through three different 
schemes: Social Security General Scheme (Régimen General de la Seguridad Social 
(RGSS)), Social Security Special Schemes (Regímenes Especiales de la Seguridad 
Social (RESS)) and Civil Service Scheme for government employees (Régimen de 
Clases Pasivas (RCP)). The RGSS and RESS are administered and managed by 
the Social Security as a joint pay-as-you-go system. The RCP is administered 
and managed by the Central Government. Around 72% of social security 
contributions are obtained from the RGSS. The pension regulations for RESS, 
within which the self-employed are assigned, and RCP do not, in general, allow 
for early retirement, so that the focus of the analysis will be on the RGSS. 
The main changes that have taken place in Social Security regulation in 
recent years that affect the period covered by the sample correspond to the 
reforms introduced in 1997 and 2002 in relation to the framework set in 1985. 
The normal retirement age in Spain, that is the age when a person 
becomes eligible for the full pension benefit, is 65. In fact, in some sectors 
retirement at 65 has been compulsory for some years. However, since 2002, 
incentives have been built in the regulation so as to promote retirement beyond 
the age of 65. The regulation increased the amount of the pension to be received 
if the worker remained employed and payment of social contributions by 
employers and employees with indefinite-term contacts were waived. Early 
retirement is possible from the age of 60, under some specific conditions and it 
imply a reduction in the amount of the pension to be received. The early 
retirement penalty is defined by a reduction coefficient that is detailed below. 
Entitlement criteria for RGSS: 
 
A payroll tax defined for both employers and employees and levied on 
earnings, with a minimum contribution and a maximum pensionable earning, 
finances the Social Security System. 
Up to 1997 only 8 contributory years were required to be entitled to a 
retirement pension. The change introduced in 1997 set a timetable to extend this 
period to fifteen years, one every year, so that in 2002, 15 years were required to 
be able to receive a pension at the age of 65, the ordinary retirement age. An 
additional requirement introduced in 1997 was that two of these contributed 
years had to have taken place during the last eight years.  
As for early retirement before the age of 65, there are three different 
cases: 
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On the one hand, those who, before January 1, 1967, contributed to the 
labour mutual funds system that preceded the current Social Security system 
are entitled to retire from the age of 60 if the total contributory years are at least 
15.  
For those whose first year of contribution to Social Security was after 
1967 and only since the 2002 amendment, the earliest retirement age is 61. For 
them, the minimum number of contributory years amounts to 30. Moreover, in 
order to be able to claim the pension, they have to have spent at least six 
months involuntarily unemployed and registered as job seekers in the Public 
Employment Service Offices, during the period immediately preceding the 
pension claim. Years spent unemployed and receiving unemployment benefits 
add as contributory years towards an old-age pension. In fact, unemployed 
workers aged 52, and older, can receive unemployment benefits that turn into 
subsidies until they are eligible for early or ordinary retirement. 
Retiring at the age of 64 is also possible and is subject to different rules: 
from 2002 no previous period of unemployment is required, but just the 
minimum 15 contributory years. However, in this case, the firm needs to hire 
another worker for a minimum period of a year (substitution contract) to 
replace the retiree, if full benefits (as at the age of 65) are to be guaranteed. 
Regulation also allows for early retirement for professions, especially 
those involving dangerous or unhealthy activities or some instances of those 
affected by industrial restructuring regulated by special legislation. Moreover, a 
new regulation came into force in 2002 allowing for partial retirement that can 
be simultaneously enjoyed with a part-time job. Workers can partially retire 
starting at the age of 60 if the firm replaces the retiree with another worker 
(relief contract) to compensate for the retiree’s reduction in work-time 
The database does not provide information about contributions dating 
from before the seventies. On the other hand, all men born between 1936 and 
1946 could potentially have been working by 1967, as the youngest would have 
started working at the age of 21. Therefore, the assumption in the empirical part 
is that all people in the sample contributed to the labour mutual funds system, 
so that they only need 15 years of contribution to be entitled to retire1. In fact, in 
the sample 34% of those I observe retiring, do so at 60 and 40% do so with less 
than 30 registered years of contribution.  
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The pension amount: 
 
The amount of the old age pension is defined by the interaction of 
different elements. On the one hand, the Regulatory Base (Base reguladora, BR) 
that defines the amount upon which to calculate the pension rights is directly 
related to wages received, but subject to lower and upper caps. Different caps 
have been in place for different types of workers depending on their group of 
contribution (grupo de cotización) associated with type of job and education level 
The minimum and maximum contributory periods to be considered in its 
calculation and the inflation correction mechanism to obtain its present value 
are regulatory defined. Reduction coefficients for early retirement and for less 
than 35 years of contribution are also defined. There is a special treatment for 
those that contributed to the system before 1967 (mutual funds contributors or 
“mutualistas”) Minimum and maximum pensions are yearly defined and its 
amount depends on marital status and number of economically dependent 
people who depend on the person receiving the benefit. Pensions are up-rated 
by the Consumer Price Index. Up to 2002, any additional year contributed 
beyond 35 did not add to the amount of pension received. 
A person retiring between 1985 and 1996 with at least 15 contributory 
years at year t had a regulatory base defined as: 


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where  wt-j are covered earnings for the jth month before retiring at t and I t-
j is the price index for the jth month before retirement, so that only eight years 
were taken into account to define BR. Notice that the weighted average was 
divided by 112 as pensions are paid in fourteen annual instalments.  
Since 2002, the regulatory base is defined as:  
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so that 15 years are taken into account. A transitory period was set from 
1997 to 2002 such that each year, one additional year was included in the up-
rated part of the weighted average and, therefore the fifteen years were finally 
accounted for the definition of the regulatory base in 2002 2. As social 
contributions are paid 14 months a year, the effective number of years taken 
into account to compute the regulatory base was 6.8 up to 1997 and 12.9 since 
then. The 2006 agreement proposes to rise the effective contributory years to 15, 
without taking into account the 14 monthly payments.The relation between the 
first monthly pension received at time t (Bt) and the regulatory base (BRt) 
calculated at t can be expressed as  t
T
ntt BRB ⋅= α where 
a
nt
y
nt
T
nt ααα = , so that 
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y
ntα  depends only on contributory years (n), and 
a
ntα  depends on the age of 
retirement.  
If retirement age is equal or larger than 65 then, and up to 1997, 1=antα  
and T
ntα  is expressed as: 
( )

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The reform introduced in 1997 modified the number of years to define 
the contributory base and the substitution rate (αTn) if age of retirement was 
equal or larger than 65, so that: 
( )
( )







≤
<≤−+⋅
<≤−+⋅
<
=
nif
nifn
nifn
nif
T
nt
351
3525,2502.080
2515,1503.050
15,0
α  
That new scheme thus implied a more progressive approach to full 
benefits. For early retirement, regulation also sets a penalization system linked 
to age. Mutualistas that retire early were subject to a reduction coefficient 
equivalent to 8% for each year in advance of 65 that he/she retires, so that  
( ) 606508.01 =>−−= rwhereratα . The 1997 reform reduced the reduction 
coefficient to 7% for those with more than 40 contributory years, when claiming 
the pension. This coefficient should be jointly applied with the one 
corresponding to contributory years. 
The 2002 reform changed the penalization mechanism, so as to make the 
age coefficient ( atα  ) more linked to the number of contributed years, so that: 
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where r is retirement age. 
Moreover, it introduced a premium for late retirement, so that the pension was 
increased by 2% per additional year if the worker credited more than 35 years 
of contribution The 2006 Agreement proposed raising the premium to 3% for 
those with more than 40 contributory years. The partial retirement regulation 
introduced with the 2002 reform, established that no correction coefficient for 
age would be used for those claiming this type of pension. The reform agreed in 
2006 aims at rationalizing this type of retirement, requiring six years of seniority 
in the firm before retiring, 30 contributory years (instead of the current 15), and 
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changing the maximum and minimum labour day reduction to 75% and 25%, 
respectively from the current 85% to 15%. Full implementation was in 2010.  
 
( ) 35  65   6502.01 ≥>−+= nandrifrTnα  
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APPENDIX 3. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
(A) Censoring in contributions and earnings 
To check whether there is any bias resulting from the fact that the 
estimation includes individuals whose contributions are capped (and therefore 
not equal to their productivity -wages-), I perform here an additional estimation 
exercise where only those observations that are not upper or lower capped are 
considered. As can be observed in Table A.3.1, the effect of economic incentives 
goes in the same direction as when considering all observations. Coefficients 
and marginal effect from the estimations are provided in the Tables below. As 
can be observed, increases in the total present value of the flow of pensions that 
a person will receive from the year she retires to the year she dies (increases in 
SSW) increases the hazard while an increase in the difference of this amount 
from postponing retirement, SSA, decreases the hazard. Thus, the results 
remain similar. 
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Table A3.1 Logit estimates of the effect of pension incentives on retirement behavior 
between 60 and 65 years of age. Males born between 1936 and 1946, having worked 
in the Social Security General Scheme with a relation with the Social Security in 
2006 (*) and whose contributed earnings are not capped 
ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
LR chi2(45)=31064.40 LR chi2(45)=31028.47 LR chi2(49)=31112.89 LR chi2(45)=31075.08
Pseudo R2=0.3643 Pseudo R2=0.3639 Pseudo R2= 0.3649 Pseudo R2= 0.3645
Log likelihood =  -27099.731 Log likelihood = -27117.7 Log likelihood =  -27075.487 Log likelihood = -27094.391
SSWt 2.891*** 2.782*** 3.057*** 2.944***
(0.144) (0.143) (0.235) (0.233)
SSAt -9.359*** -7.256***
(1.392) (2.011)
PVt -1.908*** -2.073**
(0.617) (0.820)
RRt -0.124 -0.042 -0.278 -0.251***
(0.141) (0.040) (0.373) (0.072)
SSWt * r2002 -0.002 0.009
(0.270) (0.268)
SSAt * r2002 -4.099*
(2.273)
PVt * r2002 -0.623
(0.975)
RRt * r2002 0.208** 0.282***
(0.084) (0.082)
 r2002 -0.253*** -0.330***
(0.095) (0.095)
l t-1 -1.586*** -1.584*** -1.593*** -1.591***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
u t-1 0.921*** 0.933*** 0.920*** 0.929***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
numrel -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
t x numrel 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
meanlenght 0.006* 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
t x meanlenght 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
serv 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.142*** 0.142***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
t x serv -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
WORKING STATUS, SECTOR OF ACTIVITY AND OTHER LABOUR HISTORY RELATED VARIABLES
 MODEL A MODEL B
92.033 number of observations
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND REGULATION
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univ -0.749*** -0.789*** -0.748*** -0.785***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
t x univ -0.049** -0.032 -0.054** -0.036*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
disab -1.080*** -1.086*** -1.066*** -1.071***
(0.233) (0.233) (0.234) (0.234)
otherben -3.455*** -3.463*** -3.480*** -3.487***
(0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210)
age61 -14.912*** -14.923*** -14.919*** -14.943***
(0.850) (0.851) (0.854) (0.855)
age62 -16.004*** -15.993*** -15.998*** -15.993***
(0.793) (0.794) (0.799) (0.801)
age63 -15.162*** -15.148*** -15.178*** -15.179***
(0.775) (0.775) (0.780) (0.781)
age64 -15.077*** -15.050*** -15.074*** -15.062***
(0.748) (0.748) (0.752) (0.754)
age65 -11.806*** -11.717*** -11.816*** -11.751***
(0.650) (0.651) (0.655) (0.657)
cycle 0.174*** 0.180*** 0.104*** 0.106***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
g1 -15.440*** -15.485*** -15.462*** -15.523***
(0.649) (0.651) (0.653) (0.656)
g2 -1.623*** -1.657*** -1.623*** -1.667***
(0.549) (0.548) (0.550) (0.548)
g3 -0.301 -0.346 -0.298 -0.364
(0.456) (0.455) (0.457) (0.457)
g4 -1.116*** -1.159*** -1.089** -1.146***
(0.423) (0.422) (0.424) (0.423)
g5 -0.255 -0.292 -0.249 -0.301
(0.370) (0.370) (0.371) (0.370)
cons 13.345 13.269 13.747 13.763
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dependent variable is 1 if person retires and 0 otherwise, conditioned on not having retired before. Monetary values are in 1,000,000 euros, prices 
2006. std errors are in parenthesis.
Statistical significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Coefficients of Autonomous Communities not resported. Prob > chi2=0.
Model A represents the basic model. Model B includes Model A and changes in 2002 regulation as control variables. Model C includes Model B and 
income levels as control variables.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS & OTHERS
 DURATION VARIABLES
(*) Notes:
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All ages Age 60 Age 61 Age 62 Age 63 Age 64 Age 65 All ages Age 60 Age 61 Age 62 Age 63 Age 64 Age 65
Economic Incentives and 
Regulation
SSWt 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.009
0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.009
SSAt -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
PVt -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RRt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Individual Characteristics
numrel -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lt-1 -0.131 -0.168 -0.076 -0.099 -0.110 -0.211 -0.143 -0.143 -0.188 -0.086 -0.110 -0.120 -0.226 -0.143
-0.118 -0.173 -0.071 -0.095 -0.106 -0.233 -0.134 -0.130 -0.184 -0.077 -0.102 -0.113 -0.241 -0.137
ut-1 0.077 0.098 0.045 0.058 0.064 0.118 0.095 0.084 0.109 0.051 0.065 0.070 0.127 0.095
0.057 0.079 0.030 0.041 0.046 0.112 0.098 0.064 0.086 0.033 0.045 0.050 0.118 0.097
uni -0.056 -0.069 -0.032 -0.040 -0.044 -0.081 -0.102 -0.062 -0.076 -0.036 -0.045 -0.048 -0.087 -0.109
-0.027 -0.035 -0.012 -0.017 -0.020 -0.054 -0.102 -0.031 -0.040 -0.014 -0.020 -0.022 -0.059 -0.123
serv 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.009
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.010
disab -0.070 -0.083 -0.037 -0.046 -0.051 -0.097 -0.159 -0.074 -0.089 -0.040 -0.050 -0.054 -0.103 -0.162
-0.030 -0.039 -0.014 -0.019 -0.021 -0.059 -0.187 -0.033 -0.042 -0.015 -0.020 -0.023 -0.062 -0.193
otherben -0.156 -0.157 -0.065 -0.084 -0.092 -0.198 -0.593 -0.163 -0.163 -0.068 -0.088 -0.095 -0.204 -0.595
-0.060 -0.073 -0.026 -0.036 -0.041 -0.109 -0.660 -0.061 -0.072 -0.026 -0.036 -0.041 -0.112 -0.662
NOTES:
ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE
      
    Model B: Quantitative effects of continuous variables are computed as the discrete differences of the logistic function evaluated at a 10% increase in the variables' values with 
respect to the logistic function evaluated atthe observed variables' values. Results are obtained under Model A in Table A 2. Median values are in italics. The effects are 
estimated for the period beginning in 2002 and for those workers whose contributions are not upper or lower capped.
Table A3.2. Quantitative effects of pension incentives and other variables on the average hazard rate by age 
148 
 
 
 
(B) The potential negative implications of excluding tax considerations 
Tax- induced changes in labor supply behavior has been receiving an 
enormous amount of effort in economic literature. Such studies have 
focused on the impact of taxes on hours of work and labor force 
participation rates. However, due to lack of appropriate microdata 
gathering all the relevant elements in  labor supply decisions, this type of 
analysis is rather scarce in Spain and the available literature has only 
focused on partial dimensions of the decision problem, like the  extensive 
margin of  labor market participation or the determination of wages.   
 
The effect of personal income taxes has not yet been integrated in the 
analysis of retirement decisions to obtain conclusions about the effect of 
taxes in older labor force participation in Spain.  
 
CSWH provides information about personal income taxes and earnings, 
but only regarding the reference year of the sample, that is 2006. That was 
the reason why in the main text, I stated that "... it excludes any tax 
considerations".  
However in light of the apparent sensitivity of retirement decisions to 
taxes, this issue definitely requires further inquiry. In the future, when 
further CSWH waves will become available, it will be possible to analyze 
properly the effect of income taxes on retirement decisions, taking into 
account individual longitudinal information. Here, with the aim of getting 
some insight about the size of the effect of income taxes on retirement 
decisions, I use the fiscal information referred to the year 2006 and 
compute and economic incentive variables under the assumption that, 
during 2002-06 period, individuals will remain classified in the same 
income tax group where they were classified in 2006.  
To define income taxation groups I classify individuals according their 
real yearly contributions into five different groups according to income 
taxation rules in 2006, namely,  no income taxation for those whose yearly 
income is lower than 9000 €/year, 24% income tax for those whose income 
is between 9000-17360 €/year, 28% income tax for those whose income is 
17361-32360 €/year, 37% income tax for those whose yearly income is over 
32361-52360 €/year, and 43% income tax for those whose income is higher 
than 52360 €/year.   
Given limitations in the available information, this procedure provides a 
rough identification mechanism on the degree of heterogeneity in the 
individuals´ responses to economic incentives taking into account tax 
149 
 
considerations.  As can be observed in Table A.3.3 , the effect of net 
economic incentives is slightly stronger than when no tax information is 
considered, but the overall conclusions drawn in the main text  remain 
similar. 
 
 
 
Table A.3.3. Logit estimates of the effects of pension incentives on 
retirement behavior between 60 and 65 years of age. Economic 
incentives measured net of income taxes. 
    
MODEL A   MODEL B   MODEL C   
    ACCRUAL PEAK VALUE   ACCRUAL 
PEAK 
VALUE   ACCRUAL 
PEAK 
VALUE   
                      
  
Net SSWt 4.376*** 4.307***   4.405*** 4.215***   4.130*** 4.000***   
  
  (0.183) (0.181)   (0.285) (0.277)   (0.286) (0.280) 
  
  
Net SSAt -11.578***     -19.322***     -16.748***     
  
  (1.497)     (2.154)     (2.480)   
  
  
Net RRt 0.104** 0.108**   0.070 0.024   0.070 0.036   
  
  (0.043) (0.042)   (0.073) (0.075)   (0.073) (0.075) 
  
  
Net PVt   -5.751***     -9.115***     -7.298***   
  
    (0.708)     (0.973)     (1.054) 
  
  
r2002       -0.581*** -0.656***   -0.502*** -0.595*** 
  
  
        (0.077) (0.080)   (0.078) (0.081) 
  
  
Net SSWt* 
r2002       0.438* 0.549**   0.598*** 0.638*** 
  
  
        (0.231) (0.226)   (0.232) (0.226) 
  
  
Net SSAt* 
r2002       10.272***     5.463***   
  
  
        (2.015)     (2.045)   
  
  
Net RRt* 
r2002       0.106 0.162*   0.023 0.112 
  
  
        (0.084) (0.086)   (0.085) (0.086) 
  
  
Net PVt* 
r2002         4.636***     3.406*** 
  
  
          (0.942)     (0.946) 
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(C) The inclusion of other benefits as controls  
The variable other benefits is included to take into account 
personal/ family circumstances that are not captured in the other 
covariates included in the estimations.  It takes value 1 at time t if the 
person is receiving any Social Security benefit different from disability, old 
age or unemployment while he was a year younger (that is, widowhood 
benefits, orphanhood benefits and other type of benefits whose 
entitlement come from relatives' contributions). Unlike what would 
happen to a sample of women, the incidence of a possible endogeneity 
problem from including this variable is expected to be of scarce magnitude 
(1.2% of people in sample receive widowhood benefits, only 0.02% receive 
orphanhood benefits and only 0.01% receive benefits from family 
contributions),, since the sample is restricted to men.  
 
 
